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Abstract 
Stocks added to (deleted from) the Russell 2000 and the S&P 600 indexes 
experience positive (negative) abnormal returns following the announcement. However, 
researchers disagree on whether these abnormal returns are permanent or temporary and 
offer competing explanations. I address this controversy by examining market reactions 
for firms that are added to or deleted from the FTSE Small Cap index (the main testing 
sample) and the S&P/TSX SmallCap index (the comparison sample). For the main testing 
sample, all stocks except pure additions, experience a permanent price change that is 
accompanied by a permanent change in liquidity. However, for the comparison sample, 
abnormal returns over the announcement period fully reverted within 30 days. In further 
examination of stock liquidity for the main testing sample, sample stocks experience 
permanent change in liquidity. Taken together, the observed results support the price 
pressure and liquidity hypotheses. 
Acknowledgements 
First and foremost, I would like to express the deepest appreciation to my 
committee supervisor Dr. Ernest N. Biktimirov, who has the attitude and the substance of 
a genius: he continually and convincingly conveyed a spirit of adventure in regard to 
research and scholarship, and an excitement in regard to teaching. Without his guidance 
and persistent help, this dissertation/thesis would not have been possible. 
I would like to thank my committee members, Dr. Donald A. Cyr and Professor 
Robert Welch, and the external thesis examiner, Dr. Selim Topaloglu, for their valuable 
comments, which helped me greatly improving my dissertation/thesis. 
I would like to convey my sincerest gratitude to other professors from the Faculty 
of Business, Brock University, family members, and friends who have given me 
continuous support. 
Table of Contents 
Chapter 1 ~In~t~ro~d~u~c~ti~·o~n~ ______________________________________ ~1 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 6 
2.1 Hypotheses 6 
2.1.1 Price Pressure Hypothesis 7 
2.1.2 Downward Sloping Demand Curve (Imperfect Substitutes) Hypothesis 7 
2.1.3 Liquidity Hypothesis 8 
2.1.4 Information Content Hypothesis 8 
2.1.5 Investor Awareness Hypothesis 9 
2.2 Market Reactions to Changes in the UK and Canadian Stock Indices 10 
2.2.1 Changes to the UK FTSE SmallCap Index 11 
2.2.2 Changes to the Canadian TSE 300 Index 13 
Chapter 3 Samples 
3.1 Overview of the FTSE SmallCap Index 
3.2 The UK sample 
3.3 Overview of the S&P SmallCap Index 
3.4 The Canadian Sample 
3.5 Data Sources 
15 
15 
16 
22 
23 
26 
Chapter 4 Methodology and Empirical Results 
4.1 Abnormal Return Analysis 
4.1.1 The UK sample 
4.1.2 The Canadian Sample 
4.2 Trading Volume Analysis 
4.2.1 The UK Sample 
4.2.2 The Canadian Sample 
4.3 Differentiating between Temporary and Permanent Price Effects 
4.4 Institutional Ownership Analysis 
4.S Liquidity Tests 
4.6 Regression Analysis of Stock Price Effects of Index Changes 
4.7 Discussion 
ChapterS Summary and Conclusions 
Bibliography 
Appendix: Significance Testing 
27 
27 
28 
38 
46 
47 
60 
6S 
66 
73 
83 
8S 
92 
94 
99 
List of Tables 
Table 1: Overview of Studies that Examine Index Effect in the US Small-Cap 
Indices, Canadian Indices, and UK Indices: .................................................... 2 
Table 2: FTSE SmallCap Index Sample Additions and Deletions ....................... 18 
Table 3: Summary Statistics for the UK Final Sample ......................................... 20 
Table 4: S&P/TSX SmallCap Index Sample Additions and Deletions ................ 24 
Table 5: Summary Statistics for the Canadian Final Sample ................................ 25 
Table 6: Price Effects for Stocks Added to the FTSE SmallCap Index ................ 31 
Table 7: Price Effects for Stocks Deleted from the FTSE SmallCap Index ......... 32 
Table 8: Price Effects for Stocks Added to the FTSE SmallCap Index ................ 33 
Table 9: Price Effects for Stocks Deleted from the FTSE Small Cap Index ......... 34 
Table 10: Price Effects for Stocks Added to the S&PITSX SmallCap Index ....... 40 
Table 11: Price Effects for Stocks Deleted from the S&P/TSX SmallCap Index 42 
Table 12: Abnormal Trading Volume of Additions in the FTSE SmallCap Index 
Using Pre-event Estimation Window ............................................................ 50 
Table 13: Abnormal Trading Volume of Deletions in the FTSE SmallCap Index 
Using Pre-event Estimation Window ............................................................ 52 
Table 14: Abnormal Trading Volume of Additions in the FTSE SmallCap Using 
Post-event Estimation Window ..................................................................... 54 
Table 15: Abnormal Trading Volume of Deletions in the FTSE SmallCap Index 
Using Post-event Estimation Window ........................................................... 56 
Table 16: Abnormal Trading Volume of Additions in the S&P/TSX SmallCap 
Index .............................................................................................................. 61 
Table 17: Abnormal Trading Volume of Deletions in the S&P/TSX SmallCap 
Index .............................................................................................................. 63 
Table 18: Cumulative Abnormal Return for Additions in the FTSE SmallCap 
Index Starting From ED-30 ........................................................................... 67 
Table 19: Cumulative Abnormal Return for Deletions in the FTSE Small Cap 
Index Starting From ED-30 ........................................................................... 69 
Table 20: Descriptive Statistics for Percentages ofInstitutional Shareholdings and 
Percentage of Total Shares Available to Ordinary Investors before and after 
the Changes to FTSE Small Cap Index from Jul 2002 to Dec 2008 .............. 72 
Table 21: Mean Difference of Percentages Institutional Shareholdings and 
Percentage of Total Shares Available to Ordinary Investors for Changes 
Following the FTSE SmallCap index additions and deletions from May 2002 
to Dec 2008 .................................................................................................... 74 
Table 22: Changes in Stocks Liquidity (180-Day Window) ................................ 77 
Table 23: Changes in Stocks Liquidity (90-Day Window) ................................... 79 
Table 24: Changes in Stocks Liquidity (45-Day Window) ................................... 81 
Table 25: OLS Analysis of Stock Price Effects ofIndex Changes ....................... 84 
Table 26: Summary of Results for UK sample ..................................................... 86 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Cumulative abnormal returns for pure additions and deletions in the 
FTSE SmallCap Index over the period of [ED-30, ED+60] .......................... 35 
Figure 2: Cumulative abnormal returns for downward additions and upward 
deletions in the FTSE SmallCap Index over the period of [ED-30, ED+60]. 36 
Figure 3: Cumulative abnormal returns for upward additions and downward 
deletions in the FTSE SmallCap Index over the period of [ED-30, ED+60].37 
Figure 4: Cumulative abnormal returns for pure additions and deletions in the 
S&P/TSX SmallCap index over the period of [AD-30, ED+60] ................... 44 
Figure 5: Cumulative abnormal returns for downward additions and upward 
deletions in the S&P/TSX SmallCap index over the period of [AD-30, 
ED+60] .......................................................................................................... 45 
Figure 6: Daily abnormal trading volume for additions to the FTSE SmallCap 
Index using pre-event estimation window ..................................................... 58 
Figure 7: Daily abnormal trading volume for deletions from the FTSE SmallCap 
Index using pre-event estimation window ..................................................... 59 
Figure 8: Cumulative abnormal returns for pure additions and upward additions in 
the FTSE SmallCap Index over the period of [ED-30, ED+60] .................... 88 
1 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
A large body of literature examines stock price and trading volume reactions to index 
changes in the Standard and Poor's (S&P) 500 index in the United States. Those studies 
consistently find a significant increase in stock price and trading volume on the 
announcement day for additions. But the evidence is mixed regarding the post-
announcement trends. Since the first time that the event study methodology was 
introduced by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969), several hypotheses are developed to 
explain the post-announcement trends. Harris and Gurel (1986) document a temporary 
market reaction to index changes. They suggest that any effect, which is caused by index 
changes, is reverted completely once the excess demand is met. In· contrast, Shleifer 
(1986) finds a permanent 3% abnormal return on the announcement day for the S&P 500 
index additions from 1976 to 1983. Based on this result, Shleifer (1986) suggests that the 
long-term demand curve may be downward sloping, rather than being horizontal. Beneish 
and Whaley (1996), who examine all S&P 500 index additions and deletions from 1986 
to 1994, extend Shleifer's (1986) study and find evidence consistent with the downward 
sloping demand curve hypothesis. Recently, Chen, Noronha, and Singal (2004), who 
observe an asymmetric market reaction for S&P 500 index additions and deletions from 
1962 to 2000, propose the investor awareness hypothesis. In addition, other hypotheses 
are suggested in the literature, such as the information content (Jain, 1987) and liquidity 
(Amihud and Mendelson, 1986) hypotheses. 
The non-US stock indices do not get much attention from researchers in early years. 
Table 1 provides an overview of studies that analyze changes in on non-US and US small 
capitalization stock indices. Chung and Kryzanowski (1998) find evidence that is 
consistent with the price pressure hypothesis by examining changes in the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSE) 300 index!, and Vespro (2006) and Mazouz and Saadouni (2007) also 
provide evidence consistent with the price pressure effect by examining changes in the 
Financial Times-Stock Exchange (FTSE) 100 index. But Kaul, Mehrotra, and Morck 
(2000), who examine the index weight adjustment in the TSE 300 index that occurred in 
1996, find evidence consistent with the downward sloping demand curve hypothesis. 
I The TSE 300 index was replaced by the S&P/TSX Composite index in May 2002. 
Table 1: Overview of Studies that Examine Index Effect in the US Small-Cap Indices, Canadian Indices, and UK Indices2: 
Author(s) Object(s) of the study Index(es) Sample Size Period Support 
HJJ!.otheses 
Chung and Price effects of additions and TSE 300 82 annual + 30 non- 1990 - Price pressure 
Kryzanowski (1998) deletions annual additions; 1994 hypothesis; 
49 annual + 23 non- Liquidity 
annual deletions hypothesis 
~asse,lIanrahan, Price effects of additions and TSE 300 134 additions; 1984 - Price pressure 
Kushner, and deletions 109 deletions 1994 hypothesis 
~artinello (2000) 
Kaul, Price effects of an index TSE 300 31 stocks experienced 1996 Downward sloping 
~ehrotra, and ~orck weights adjustment weight adjustment demand curve 
(2000) hypothesis 
~adhavan (2003) Price and volume effects of Russell 2000; 404 additions; 1996 - Price pressure 
indices reconstitution Russell 3000 242 deletions 2002 hypothesis; 
Liquidity 
h~l2othesis 
Biktimirov, Cowan, Price, volume, and Russell 2000 4321 pure additions + 1991 - Price pressure 
and institutional ownership effects 875 downward shifts; 2000 hypothesis 
Jordan of additions and deletions 3092 pure deletions + 
(2004) 861 ul2ward shifts 
Chen Price, volume, and bid-ask Russell 2000; 13 samples grouped as 1993 - Downward sloping 
(2006) spreads effects of indices Russell 1000 retention, switching, 2000 demand curve 
reconstitution additions, deletions hypothesis 
Shankar and Price, volume, and S&P 504 pure additions + 52 1995 - Price pressure 
~iller institutional ownership effects Small Cap 600 downward shifts; 2002 hypothesis 
(2006) of additions and deletions 112 pure deletions + 107 
upward shifts 
2 Liu (2000) finds evidence that is consistent with Beneish and Whaley (1996) by examining index changes to Nikkei 500 (Japan) index. N 
Table 1 (continued) 
Docking and Dowen Price effects of additions and S&P 181 pure additions + 30 1999 - Investor awareness 
(2006) deletions SmallCap 600 downward shifts; 2002 hypothesis 
173 pure deletions3 + 50 
u£ward shifts 
Mase Long-term price effects of FTSE 100 85 additions; 1992 - Investor awareness 
(2006) additions and deletions 72 deletions 1999 hy£othesis 
Gregoriou and Price and volume effects of FTSE 100 258 additions; 1984- Information 
Ioannidis (2006) additions to and deletions 258 deletions 2001 cost/liquidity 
from the index hypothesis 
Vespro (2006) Price and volume effects of FTSE 100; FTSE 100: 23 additions 1997 - Price pressure 
additions to and deletions CAC 40; and 28 deletions; 2001 hypothesis 
from the index SF 120 CAC 40 and SF 120: 24 
additions and 14 
deletions 
Mase Price and volume effects of FTSE 100 132 additions and 1992 - Price pressure 
(2007) indices reconstitution deletions 2005 hypothesis 
Mazouzand Price and volume effects of FTSE 100 190 additions; 1984 - Price pressure 
Saadouni indices reconstitution 187 deletions 2003 hypothesis 
(2007) 
3 The sample size for pure deletions reduces to 95 at effective day. w 
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Also, as shown in Table 1, three studies, such as Chung and Kryzanowski (1998), 
Madhavan (2003), and Gregoriou and Ioannidis (2006), support the liquidity hypothesis. 
Only a few studies examine index effect in US small capitalization stock indices. 
Madhavan (2003) finds significant and temporary abnormal returns around the annual 
rebalancing of the Russell 2000 and Russell 3000 indices from 1996 to 2002. Similar to 
Madhavan (2003), Biktimirov, Cowan, and Jordan (2004), who examine the Russell 2000 
index additions and deletions from 1991 to 2000, find no evidence to support a permanent 
price reaction that is associated with pure additions and deletions. Chen (2006), however, 
finds that the market reaction around the annual rebalancing of the Russell indices 
supports the downward sloping demand curve hypothesis. Several recent studies examine 
the S&P Small Cap 600 index. Docking and Dowen (2006), who examine all index 
changes in the S&P Small Cap 600 index from 1999 to 2002, find that additions 
experience a significant and permanent abnormal return, while deletions experience a 
temporary abnormal return. In contrast, Shankar and Miller (2006) find evidence 
consistent with the price pressure hypothesis by examining additions and deletions in the 
S&P 600 SmallCap index from 1995 to 2002. 
It appears none of the studies has examined changes to the United Kingdom or 
Canadian small capitalization stock markets. The main purpose of this thesis is to 
investigate quarterly constituent changes in the FTSE Small Cap (UK) index to determine 
any abnormal movement in stock price, trading volume, institutional ownership, and 
liquidity. As a comparison, I also examine price and volume effects associated with 
constituent changes in the S&P/TSX SmallCap4 (Canada) index. 
The rule for the FTSE SmallCap index is primarily related to stock market 
capitalization. The FTSE SmallCap index contains stocks in the FTSE All-Share index 
that are not large enough to be included in the FTSE 350 index5• In most cases, firms 
enter the FTSE Small Cap index by being transferred from either the FTSE 250 index or 
the FTSE Fledgling index and vice versa. Major changes to the FTSE Small Cap index 
happens through quarterly and annually reviews6• In contrast, The S&P/TSX SmallCap 
4 The Standard and Poor's and Toronto Stock Exchange (S&P/TSX) SmallCap index. 
5 The FTSE All-Share index is the combination ofthe FTSE 350 index and the FTSE SmallCap index. 
6 The dates on which the changes are announced and effective are known in advance. 
5 
index is a float adjusted and market capitalization weighted index. Firms enter the 
S&P/TSX SmallCap index either by transferring :from the S&P/TSX 60 and S&P/TSX 
MidCap indices or are chosen from the firms that are not in the S&P/TSX Composite 
family of indices 7• Furthermore firms deleted :from the S&P/TSX Small Cap index are 
either transferred to another S&P/TSX Composite family index or deleted :from the 
S&P/TSX Composite family of indices. The S&P/TSX index Committee evaluates the 
candidates based on the criteria including eligibility, listing, domicile, market 
capitalization, and liquidity. A detailed description of these two indices can be found in 
Chapter 3. 
I follow an approach similar to the one used by Biktimirov, Cowan, and Jordan 
(2004). I divide my original sample into sub-groups and examine them separately. In 
examining six sub-groups of index changes in the FTSE SmallCap index, I find a 
permanent price change and permanent change in stock liquidity for all sub-groups 
except pure additions. Pure additions experience a temporary increase in stock price and 
non-consistent in liquidity proxies. Overall, these findings support the price pressure and 
liquidity hypotheses. For four sub-groups of index changes in the S&P/TSX SmallCap 
index, I conduct only abnormal return and trading volume analyses and find support for 
the price pressure hypothesis. 
This thesis offers several contributions to the literature. First, this thesis provides the 
first examination of market reactions to index changes in non-US small capitalization 
indices. Numerous studies have focused on US indices and large capitalization stock 
indices, but researchers find support for different competing hypotheses. This thesis also 
offers a more comprehensive study of market reactions to index changes that includes not 
only abnormal return and abnormal trading volume analyses, but also the examination of 
changes in instructional ownership and stocks' liquidity. Besides representing the 
performance of stocks :from a non-US stock market, the FTSE SmallCap index has other 
differences :from the Russell 2000 and S&P 600 indices. Specifically, the Russell 2000 
and S&P 600 indices have only two groups of additions: pure additions and downward 
7 The S&P/TSX Composite index contains the S&PITSX 60 index, the S&PITSX MidCap index, and the 
S&PITSX SmallCap index. However, after March 2007, the S&P/TSX SmallCap index is no longer a part 
ofthe S&PITSX Composite index. 
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additions from the Russell 1000 and S&P 400/500 indices, respectively. In contrast, the 
FTSE Small Cap index has three groups of additions: pure additions, downward additions 
from the FTSE 250, and upward additions from the FTSE Fledgling index. In addition, 
changes to the FTSE index are based on a known criterion (market value) on a known 
date, which means announcements about the FTSE Small Cap index changes should have 
no information effect. Moreover, small cap stocks are expected to be more sensitive to 
changes in liquidity and investor awareness than mid/large cap stocks. 
Lastly, this thesis provides a comparison of abnormal return and trading volume 
reactions to index changes between the FTSE Small Cap and S&P/TSX SmallCap indices. 
This comparison is interesting given that the FTSE and S&P/TSX index committees use 
different announcement policies and maintenance rules. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. The following chapter describes the 
competing hypotheses and relevant studies. Chapter 3 describes the samples and the data. 
Chapter 4 describes the methodology and presents empirical results of abnormal return, 
trading volume, institutional ownership, and liquidity analyses. Finally, Chapter 5 offers 
conclusions. 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
In this chapter, I discuss five hypotheses in the event study literature (index effect) 
and several previous studies that examine the market reaction to index changes in non-US 
large capitalization indices. 
2.1 Hypotheses 
The hypotheses proposed by previous studies of market reaction to index changes in 
the literature can be grouped into five basic categories: price pressure hypothesis, 
downward sloping demand curve hypothesis (or imperfect substitutes hypothesis), 
liquidity hypothesis, information content hypothesis, and investor awareness hypothesis. 
A large number of researchers are trying to provide possible explanations for the stock 
market reactions to index changes through United States stock market, primarily the S&P 
500 index. But only a few researchers focus on the international stock markets indices. 
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2.1.1 Price Pressure Hypothesis 
The price pressure hypothesis is the only hypothesis that predicts the temporary 
reaction to index changes. This hypothesis assumes a perfect elastic long-term demand, 
but the price may move beyond or below the equilibrium level in the short-term. The 
temporary reaction around the index changes is caused by index fund managers who 
rebalance their portfolios according to the index changes (Harris and Gurel, 1986). 
Harris and Gurel (1986), who examine a sample of index additions to the S&P 500 
index from 1978 to 1983, report an immediate price increase of more than 3% after an 
addition is announced, but this price effect is fully reversed after 2 weeks. Biktimirov, 
Cowan, and Jordan (2004) find significant changes in prices, trading volume, and 
institutional ownership associated with a large sample of additions and deletions in the 
small capitalization Russell 2000 index, but both changes in prices and trading volume 
reversed quickly. 
Similar to the two studies mentioned above, Scholes (1972), Lynch and Mendenhall 
(1997), Madhavan (2003), Shankar and Miller (2006), Vespro (2006), Mase (2007), and 
Mazouz and Saadouni (2007) also provide evidence consistent with the price pressure 
hypothesis. 
2.1.2 Downward Sloping Demand Curve (Imperfect Substitutes) Hypothesis 
This hypothesis assumes that the long-term demand curve is downward sloping or 
there are no perfect substitutes for a firm that is added to an index. Because index funds 
will hold a substantial portion of the added firm's shares and there are no perfect 
substitutes for this specific firm, the supply of the stock for other investors is reduced. 
Consequently, this hypothesis suggests that the share price for the added (deleted) stocks 
is expected to increase (decrease) permanently. Shleifer (1986), Beneish and Whaley 
(1996), and Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) present evidence consistent with the 
downward sloping demand curve hypothesis. 
Liu (2000) and Kaul, Mehrotra, and Morck (2000) provide evidence consistent with 
the downward sloping demand curve hypothesis by examining index changes in non-US 
indices. Liu (2000) finds a permanent abnormal return of 1.5% (-2.5%) for stocks added 
to (deleted from) the Nikkei 500 index from 1991 to 1999. Kaul, Mehrotra, and Morck 
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(2000), who study the index weight adjustment for 31 stocks in the TSE 300 index in 
November 1996, find a significant and permanent mean excess return of 2.3% during the 
event week. 
2.1.3 Liquidity Hypothesis 
The liquidity hypothesis suggests that a stock's liquidity is affected by its addition to 
or deletion from an index. Shleifer (1986) and Goetzmann and Garry (1996) argue that an 
addition of a stock to the index increase the public information and number of trades of 
the stock. This stock, therefore, is traded more actively, becomes more liquid, and has a 
smaller bid-ask spread. The reversal is true for deleted stocks. Based on this hypothesis, 
investors should expect a price increase immediately after the inclusion due to the 
lowered required rate of return on the stock (Shleifer, 1986) or due to the capitalization of 
improvement in liquidity (Chen, Noronha, and Singal, 2004). 
Erwin and Miller (1998) examine the bid-ask spread changes around the S&P 500 
index revisions from 1984 to 1988. Erwin and Miller (1998) divide the sample into two 
subsamples: optioned vs. non-optioned stocks. The result indicates that the price and 
volume effects of non-optioned stock sample reflect enhanced stock liquidity. But Erwin 
and Miller (1998) find nothing for the optioned stock sample. Erwin and Miller (1998), 
therefore, argue that the inability of finding support for the liquidity hypothesis from 
optioned stocks is mainly because of the lack of informational efficiency of index futures 
and options. 
Hegde and McDermott (2003) examine all index changes to the S&P 500 index from 
1993 to 1998. For stocks added to the S&P 500 index, Hegde and McDermott (2003) find 
a significant and long-term improvement in market liquidity following the addition. For 
stocks removed from the S&P 500 index, Hegde and McDermott (2003) find an increase 
in the cost of trading, which indicates a decrease in liquidity. 
2.1.4 Information Content Hypothesis 
The information content hypothesis suggests that the announcement of an addition or 
deletion contains valuable information regarding the stock's past and future performance. 
Based on this hypothesis, Woolridge and Ghosh (1986) suggest that stock prices should 
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adjust immediately and permanently to a new equilibrium level, and trading volume may 
increase temporarily. This is also gives support to the theory of market efficiency. 
Jain (1987) provides strong evidence that the S&P decisions have information content. 
Jain (1987) documents the excess returns, which cannot be explained by the price 
pressure hypothesis, for the firms included in the supplementary indices that are not 
tracked by index funds. Jain (1987) then suggests the following two possible explanations: 
a) S&P prefers stable firms for its indices, inclusion of a firm is perceived as a reduction 
in the riskiness of its securities; b) inclusion signals an increase or perceived increase in 
quality of management. Dhillon and Johnson (1991), who examine the prices of stocks, 
bonds and options, find evidence consistent with the information hypothesis. 
Denis, McConnell, Ovtchinnikov, and Yu (2003), who examine the earnings forecasts 
and realized earnings for new additions to the S&P 500 index, argue that an 
announcement of a stock's impending inclusion in the S&P 500 index is not information 
free because the S&P may embed some analysis of the future prospects of the candidate 
companies or because the S&P has access to information not available to other market 
participants. 
2.1.5 Investor Awareness Hypothesis 
Chen, Noronha, and Singal (2004) propose the investor awareness hypothesis, which 
is against the generally accepted explanations8, to explain the asymmetric market reaction 
around index changes. 
Chen, Noronha, and Singal (2004) examine a sample of 760 additions and 235 
deletions of the S&P 500 index in three different regimes from 1962 to 2000. Chen, 
Noronha, and Singal (2004) find a positive permanent price reaction9 for stocks added to 
the index, but there is a price reversal for the stocks deleted from the index. In the case of 
volume turnover, Chen, Noronha, and Singal (2004) find a permanent change in trading 
8The generally accepted explanations predict symmetric market reactions around index changes. 
9For additions during period from 1976 to 1989, abnormal return is over 3.2% on announcement day, and 
the cumulative excess return from the announcement day to 60 day after is 3.6%. For additions during 
period from 1989 to 2000, abnormal return is 5.4% on announcement day, and the cumulative excess 
return from the announcement day to 60 day after is 6.2%. 
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volume for stocks added to the S&P 500 index during period 1989 to 200010. But, again, 
there is only a temporary change in the turnover ratios for stocks deleted from the S&P 
500 index. Chen, Noronha, and Singal (2004), therefore, suggest the following: 
1. Both investor awareness and monitoring do increase significantly for added 
companies, but they are unlikely to diminish suddenly when companies are 
removed from the index. 
2. Added companies become more efficient and have improved access to capital, 
but the deleted companies do not necessarily experience a significant change 
in efficiency or that access. 
3. When a company added to an index, more information are produced by the 
analysts or media, and well-diversified investors are willing to invest in the 
company with lowed required returns. The "shadow cost" is lowered, which 
therefore causes the price increase. 
4. Abnormal returns are significantly related to changes in the Merton's "shadow 
cost," Merton (1987). To be more specific, deletion from an index does not 
imply a significant change of neither awareness nor company's "shadow cost." 
The price reaction should only be temporary because the index fund managers 
adjust their portfolios according to the index changes. 
The investor awareness hypothesis predicts a permanent effect for the additions to an 
index and a temporary effect for the deletions from an index. Other studies having results 
consistent with those of Chen, Noronha, and Singal (2004) include Lynch and 
Mendenhall (1997), Beneish and Whaley (2002), Docking and Dowen (2006), and Mase 
(2006). 
2.2 Market Reactions to Changes in the UK and Canadian Stock Indices 
In this section, I summarize the papers that examine the stock market effect of 
changes in the constituents of the Canadian and UK indices. The largest Canadian stock 
index, the TSE 300 index, is similar to the S&P 500 index with some minor differences. 
10 No evidence is found for permanent change in trading volume for additions to the S&P 500 index during 
period from 1976 to 1989. 
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However, the FTSE 100 index is very different from the Standard and Poor's indices 
because its constituent changes primarily by following a ranking related to the market 
capitalization. 
2.2.1 Changes to the UK FTSE SmallCap Index 
Gregoriou and Ioannidis (2006) look at the additions to (deletions from) the FTSE 
100 list for the period of 1984 to 2001. They find a cumulative average prediction error 
from day -2 to +2 of 11 % which is distinguishable from zero for firms added to the FTSE 
100 list and a cumulative average prediction error from day -2 to +2 of -7.42% is 
distinguishable from zero for firms deleted from the FTSE 100 list. Moreover, they find 
that the behavior of stock prices from one to three months subsequent to the 
announcement suggests that the price increase (decrease) for additions (deletions) in the 
FTSE 100 index is permanent. In their trading volume analysis, they find significant and 
permanent increase (decrease) in trading volume associated with additions (deletions) to 
the FTSE 100 index. Their findings related to information availability changes and 
liquidity changes are important to distinguish between the liquidity hypothesis and the 
imperfect substitutes hypothesis. The average number of analysts following the stock 
increases (decreases) significantly for additions (deletions), and the bid-ask spreads 
decrease (increase) significantly for additions (deletions). As a robustness check, they 
employ a cross-sectional test using the model that is similar in spirit to that of Beneish 
and Gardner (1995). The authors then claim that they provide evidence that is consistent 
with the information cost/liquidity hypothesis. 
Mase (2006) takes a long-term approach to extend the results documented by Chen, 
Noronha, and Singal (2004) in the United Kingdom stock market. The author examines 
one-year and three-year abnormal buy-and-hold returns using a sample of changes in the 
FTSE 100 index from 1992 to 1999 (85 additions and 72 deletions). For additions to the 
FTSE 100 index, Mase (2006) finds significant mean abnormal returns, estimated on the 
announcement day, over an one-year holding period and over a three-year holding period 
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are 10.8% and 17.6%11, respectively. In the case of deletions from the FTSE 100 index, 
Mase (2006) find only one significant buy and hold abnormal return. Given that the 
changes in composition of the FTSE 100 index follow a ranking based on the market 
capitalization, the author argues that stock's addition or deletion must reflect its relative 
performance prior to the announcement. Results in Mase (2006) demonstrate that this 
relative performance continues for up to three years after changes taking place, and the 
return continuation is unlikely to be explained by a momentum effect. Mase (2006) 
concludes that his results are inconsistent with the long-term downward sloping demand 
curve hypothesis, which predicts symmetric post-event price effects. Therefore, Mase 
(2006) provide support for the investor awareness hypothesis. 
Vespro (2006) provides evidence of price and volume effects associated with index 
changes by analyzing the additions to (deletions from) the French CAC40, SBFI20, and 
FTSE 100 indices. His FTSE 100 sample includes 89 additions and 89 deletions between 
January 1997 and March 2001. He finds that the event period mean CAR is significant, 
but reverted quickly. Based on his findings, the author suggests that the price pressure 
hypothesis is the most robust theory. 
Mase (2007) examines the impact of changes in the FTSE 100 index. The sample in 
the paper contains 132 inclusion and deletions resulting from the quarterly reviews that 
took place from 1992 through 2005. By applying the market model and conducting 
robustness checks, the author finds an asymmetric pre-event return reversal and no 
significant abnormal returns over the complete event window for both additions and 
deletions. The author argues that the evidence is consistent with the short-term downward 
sloping demand curve. Mase (2007) then defines two sub-samples based on whether the 
stock is new to the index or previous constituents, and suggests that the investor 
awareness and the increased monitoring are unlikely to be the factors that explain the 
price effect associated with inclusion in the FTSE 100 index. 
Mazouz and Saadouni (2007) examine both short-term and long-term effects 
associated with the changes in the FTSE 100 index using a sample that contains 190 
additions and 187 deletions during the period from 1984 to 2003. They find significant 
II Mase (2006) finds significant mean abnormal returns, estimated from 21 days after the event date, over a 
one-year holding period and over a three-year holding period are 12.1 % and 20.9%, respectively. 
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abnormal returns around the effective day and the price reversal is total rather than partial. 
Mazouz and Saadouni (2007) then argue that this is strong evidence to support the price 
pressure hypothesis. Furthermore the authors find a permanent volume increase 
associated with the added stock. 
Vespro (2006), Mase (2007) and Mazouz and Saadouni (2007) provide support for 
the price pressure hypothesis, yet their results are inconsistent with those reported in 
Mase (2006) or Gregoriou and Ioannidis (2006). 
It appears that the studies examining market reaction to index changes in Canadian 
and UK large capitalization stock indices find inconsistent results. This means further 
investigations are necessary. 
2.2.2 Changes to the Canadian TSE 300 Index 
Chung and Kryzanowski (1998) examine the impact of changes in the constituents of 
the TSE 300 index. They use daily data over a five-year period from 1990 to 1994 with a 
sample of 112 index additions and 72 index deletions after removing all units, the impact 
of confounding events, and the impact of low priced shares on price impact. They then 
divide the sample into two sub-samples based on whether the change was part of an 
annual revision or not. They find that large traders buy prior to the simultaneous inclusion 
of numerous stocks to the TSE 300 index to better balance the tradeoff between price 
pressure and tracking error. Large traders, therefore, appear to avoid making portfolio 
adjustments on the effective date for simultaneous index deletions. The authors then 
measure the abnormal returns using the modified market models taking into account the 
selection criteria effect, market sensitivity shift, liquidity change, and large trade activity. 
The results from the modified models provide the support for the price pressure 
hypothesis and the liquidity hypothesis12• 
Masse, Hanrahan, Kushner, and Martinello (2000), who examine the market reaction 
to additions or deletions in the TSE 300 index, make use of the fact that the Toronto 
Stock Exchange announces changes to the TSE 300 index after they actually have taken 
effect prior to 1988. For the period from 1984 to 1994, two sub-samples are defined: one 
12 Trade and quote data are extracted from the TSE Equity History File (Chung and Kryzanowski, 1998). 
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contains changes that occurred during 1984 to 1988 that the announcement occurring 
after the changes and another contains changes that occurred during 1989 to 1994 that the 
announcement occurring before the changes. The sample consists of 134 additions and 
109 deletions. The authors use the dummy variable approach to estimating abnormal 
returns considered by Thompson (1985) and adjust the estimated standard error for 
arbitrary heteroskedasticity and clustering of events. In addition, data are adjusted for 
missing values based on the trade-to-trade method 13. The authors find a positive reaction 
for the inclusion; CARs reached 4.75% and 2.56% by the event for the respective periods. 
Regardless of when the announcement takes place the reaction for inclusion is positive 
and statistically significant even when the information should already be known. In 
addition, no evidence of return reversal is found up to 30 days after effective day (or 
announcement day). Masse, Hanrahan, Kushner, and Martinello (2000) claim the result is 
consistent with Shleifer's (1998) hypothesis that the actual indexing causes index fund 
managers to enter the market. In the case of deletions, there is a negative reaction, but 
none of the results is significant. There is no further discussion regarding the asymmetry 
effects, but the asymmetry effects are consistent with the investor awareness assumption 
(proposed by Chen, Noronha, and Singal, 2004), in a short-term framework, that an 
addition can lead to a significant increase in awareness, but it is unlikely to fall 
significantly fallowing a deletion. 
Unlike most of event study papers, which focus on index additions and deletions, 
Kaul, Mehrotra, and Morck (2000) examine the market reaction to changes in the weights 
of 31 stocks in the TSE 300 index in 1996. In the week the weight change became 
effective, the authors find a statistically significant excess returns of 2.34%. In addition, 
all 31 stocks experience unusually high trading volume, but there is no evidence for bid-
ask spread changes. Both uni-variate and multi-variate results show that the reported 
effects are permanent. The authors then argue that the event is information free since the 
announcement was made three months earlier, and all the stocks were already in the 
index so that the reduction in liquidly costs is insignificant. All the evidence, therefore, 
supports the downward sloping demand curve hypothesis. 
13 See Maynes and Rumsey (1993). 
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The market reactions associated with index changes in the large-cap TSE 300 are 
consistent with those reported for the changes in the large-cap S&P 500 index, but the 
results are inconsistent whereas Chung and Kryzanowski (1998) suggest the price 
pressure hypothesis, Kaul, Mehrotra, and Morck (2000) suggest the downward sloping 
demand curve hypothesis while Masse, Hanrahan, Kushner, and Martinello (2000) 
provide support for the investor awareness hypothesis. 
Chapter 3 Samples 
In this chapter, I provide an overview of the S&PITSX SmallCap and the FTSE 
SmallCap indices and a discussion about my samples. 
3.1 Overview of the FTSE SmallCap Index 
FTSE International Limited introduced the FTSE SmallCap index on January 4, 1993. 
The FTSE SmallCap index consists of the FTSE All-Share index constituents that are too 
small to be the constituents oftheFTSE 350 indexl4• Consequently, after the constituents 
of the FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 indices are determined, companies left in the FTSE All-
Share make up the FTSE SmallCapl5. Starting on March 25, 1996, the FTSE SmallCap 
index has been calculated in real time, rather than "at the end of day". 
The index committee reviews the constituents of the FTSE SmallCap index on a 
quarterly basis. Eligible stocks are determined based on liquidity rules and restrictions, 
such as free float restrictions and the type of the stock. The constituents of the FTSE 
SmallCap index are determined based on a ranking of market capitalization among 
eligible stocks. The review meetings are held on the Wednesday after the first Friday in 
March, June, September and December, and index changes take place on the first trading 
14 The FTSE 350 index consists of350 largest UK companies, and it contains the FTSE 100 and the FTSE 
250 indices. 
15 According to the FTSE UK Series Ground Rules, the FTSE Fledgling index consists of those fully 
quoted companies too small to be constituents of the FTSE All-Share. Companies which are large enough 
to be constituents of the FTSE All-Share but do not meet all the relevant liquidity criteria will not be 
included in any FTSE UK family indices. See Ground Rules for the Managements of The UK Series of 
the FTSE Actuaries Share Indices, 
http://www.ftse.comlIndicesfUK_IndiceslDownloadsIFTSE_UK_Index _Series_Index _ Rules.pdf# 
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day after the third Friday of the same month. Under this schedule, there is a fixed number 
of trading days between the announcement (release of the reviews) and the effective dates. 
An addition to the FTSE Small Cap usually occurs in quarterly reviews. Yet the 
addition can also happen in association with a stock re-assessment or demerger. For a 
deletion, stocks that do not meet the relevant liquidity or market capitalization 
requirements are generally deleted through the quarterly reviews. A deletion caused by 
replacing the stock in the FTSE 250 index can happen anytime since the FTSE 250 index 
is maintained with a fixed number of250 constituents. 
As of September 2008, there were 311 firms in the FTSE Small Cap Index with a total 
market capitalization of about 36.5 billion British pounds, which represents 
approximately 2% of the UK market capitalization. Firms from financial sector and 
Industrial sector make up about 70% of the index in terms of market capitalization. 
3.2 The UK sample 
An initial sample of 936 additions and 736 deletions in the FTSE Small Cap index 
over the period January 1998 through December 2008 are identified from the FTSE UK 
Quarterly Review (in March, June, and September) and the FTSE Annual Review (in 
December). The sample starts on 1998 is because there were a few important changes to 
the FTSE UK series indices. First, the FTSE Fledgling index was introduced in 1995. 
Second, the FTSE SmallCap index has been calculated in real time, rather than "at the 
end of day" since March 1996. Finally, in 1998, the index committee decided to bring 
forward the implementation of the usual annual index constituent changes, which was 
effective in the following year, to the same date as the December's annual reviews. The 
effective day, denoted as ED, is one trading day before the actual change takes place. 
Consequently, the effective day is defined as the last day available for investors to 
trade on the information relating to index changes. I define the announcement day, 
denoted as AD or ED-6, as the first trading day after the day on which the FTSE releases 
the quarterly reviews to the public since the FTSE announces changes after the close of 
trading on the day. In addition, the event window runs from 30 trading days before to 60 
trading days after the effective day, [ED-30, ED+60]. The initial sample is reduced to a 
final clean sample of 672 additions and 532 deletions after applying the following screens. 
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The first screen applies to additions only: seven additions that are caused by the IPO 
of the stock within 30 trading days before the effective day are removed. The second 
screen removed stocks for which the event window overlapped with another index 
change (removed 26 additions and 4 deletions). The third screen kept only unique stocks 
in the sample. For example, if one stock appears more than once in the one of the sub-
samples, I only keep the earliest event for this stock (removed 99 additions and 61 
deletions). The last screen removed stocks having more than 20 non-trading days in the 
91-trading-day event window (removed 132 additions and 139 deletions). 
Panel A in Table 2 shows the detailed construction of the final clean sample for 
additions. Following similar sample construction methodology used by Biktimirov, 
Cowan, and Jordan (2004), I divide all additions in the FTSE SmallCap index into the 
following three sub-groups: 
1. Pure additions consist of 187 stocks added to the FTSE SmallCap Index that were 
not previously in any other FTSE index. 
2. Downward additions consist of 289 stocks that were demoted from the FTSE 250 
Index to the FTSE SmallCap Index. 
3. Upward additions consist of 196 stocks that were promoted from the FTSE 
Fledgling Index to the FTSE Small Cap Index. 
Panel B in Table 2 shows the detailed construction of the final sample for deletions. I 
divide the deletions into the following three sub-groups: 
1. Pure deletions consist of 30 stocks deleted from the FTSE SmallCap Index that 
were not shifted to any FTSE family index. 
2. Upward deletions consist of 203 stocks that were promoted from the FTSE 
SmallCap Index to the FTSE 250 Index. 
3. Downward deletions consist of 299 stocks that were demoted from the FTSE 
Small Cap Index to the FTSE Fledgling Index. 
Table 3 presents summary statistics of the levels of daily closing price, trading 
volume in shares, market value, and relative spread before and after index additions and 
deletions. The pre-event window covers 50 trading days from ED-80 to ED-31, and the 
post-event window covers 50 trading days from ED+61 to ED+ll0. Since all six sub-
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groups of index changes are considered to be independent from each other, I use a 
parametric test, two independent samples t-Test, and a non-parametric test, Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney Test, to test whether the levels of daily closing price, daily trading 
volume in shares, market value, and relative spread before and after index additions and 
deletions are significantly different between sub-groups. 
Table 2: FTSE SmallCap Index Sample Additions and Deletions 
This table provides detailed construction of the final clean samples for the FTSE 
SmallCap Index quarterly/annually additions and deletions for period Jan 1998 through 
Dec 2008. Pure additions are stocks added to the FTSE SmallCap Index that were not 
previously in FTSE family index. Downward additions are stocks that were demoted 
from the FTSE 250 Index to the FTSE Small Cap Index. Upward additions are stocks that 
were promoted from the FTSE Fledgling Index to the FTSE Small Cap Index. Pure 
deletions are stocks deleted from the FTSE SmallCap Index that were not shifted to any 
FTSE family index. Upward deletions are stocks that were promoted from the FTSE 
SmallCap Index to the FTSE 250 Index. Downward deletions are stocks that were 
demoted from the FTSE SmallCap Index to the FTSE Fledgling Index. 
Panel A: Additions 
Initial Quarterly Additions Sample 
Less: 
Step 1: IPO within 30 trading days before the ED 
Step 2: Event window overlapped with other changes 
Step 3: Appeared more than once in the sub-sample 
Step 4: More than 20 non-trading days during event window 
Clean sample: 
Pure additions 
Downward additions 
Upward additions 
Total clean sample 
Panel B: Deletions 
Initial Quarterly Deletions Sample 
Less: 
Step 1: Event window overlapped with other changes 
Step 2: Appeared more than once in the sub-sample 
Step 3: More than 20 non-trading days during event window 
Clean sample: 
Pure deletions 
Downward deletions 
Upward deletions 
Total clean sample 
936 
-7 
-26 
-99 
-132 
187 
289 
196 
672 
736 
-4 
-61 
-139 
30 
299 
203 
532 
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Summary statistics for additions in the FTSE Small Cap index are shown in Panel A 
of Table 3. Pure additions have a mean (median) pre-event level of market capitalization 
of £172 (£152) million and experience very small impact on the market capitalization 
after the addition. But it is surprising that the mean (median) daily trading volume drops 
in an economic significant sense from the pre-event level of 842 (224) thousand shares to 
the post-event level of 307 (183) thousand shares. Downward additions experience a 
decrease in both market capitalization and daily trading volume, mean (median) market 
capitalization decreases from £350 (£334) million to £235 (£226) million and daily 
trading volume decreases from 1784 (451) thousand shares to 1283 (451) thousand shares. 
Note that, on average, firms in the downward additions sub-group are significantly larger 
and traded more frequently than the other two sub-groups. This is not surprising since 
firms in the downward additions sub-group were in the mid-cap FTSE 250 index. In 
contrast, on average, firms in the upward additions sub-group are the smallest and least 
frequently traded among three sub-groups of additions in an economic and statistical 
significant sense. This is not surprising since firms in the upward additions sub-group 
were in the non-real-time calculated FTSE Fledgling index. 
Panel B of Table 3 presents the summary statistics for deletions in FTSE SmallCap 
index. Pure deletions have a mean (median) pre-event level of market capitalization of 
£124 (£112) million and experience slightly decline on the market capitalization. Similar 
to pure additions, the change in daily trading volume is opposite to the expected. The 
mean (median) daily trading volume increases in an economic significant sense from the 
pre-event level of 80 (38) thousands of shares to the post-event level of 218 (131) 
thousands of shares. Note that, on average, firms shifted up to the mid-cap FTSE 250 
index have the largest market capitalization and daily trading volume while firms shifted 
down to the FTSE Fledgling index have the smallest market capitalization and daily 
trading volume. This is not surprising given that FTSE family of indices determine 
members based primarily on the market capitalization. Similar to additions, the pre-event 
levels of all three sub-groups of index deletions are significantly different from each other. 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for the UK Final Sample 
This table presents summary statistics on the levels of daily closing price, daily trading 
volume (in thousand shares), market value (in millions f), and relative spread before and 
after addition to and deletion from the FTSE· SmallCap index. The pre-event levels are 
averaged over a 50-day window that runs from ED-80 to ED-31, and post-event levels are 
averaged over a 50-day window that runs from ED+61 to ED+ 110. 
Panel A Closing Price Volume Market Value % Spread (thousand shares) (millions £) 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
(i) Pure additions (N=187) 
Mean 2.33 2.45 843 307 172 179 0.0254 0.0299 
Max 28.56 25.04 35,518 2,057 563 826 0.1207 0.2230 
Q3 2.50 2.62 597 398 213 234 0.0320 0.0340 
Median 1.55 1.55 224 185 152 146 0.0228 0.0239 
Ql 1.10 1.04 87 80 103 105 0.0150 0.0160 
Min 0.26 0.19 0 4 45 34 0.0030 0.0024 
( ii ) Downward additions (N=289) 
Mean 3.07 2.09 1,784 1,283 350 235 0.0245 0.0309 
Max 27.64 13.66 71,578 30,235 1,057 817 0.1357 0.1331 
Q3 3.94 2.74 1,225 964 401 310 0.0327 0.0408 
Median 2.35 1.38 540 451 334 226 0.0204 0.0239 
Ql 1.25 0.77 235 176 272 150 0.0123 0.0140 
Min 0.12 0.01 8 8 16 7 0.0009 0.0000 
( iii) Upward additions (N= 196) 
Mean 2.17 2.87 398 411 84 118 0.0305 0.0300 
Max 67.08 108.34 8,811 7,212 368 564 0.1353 0.1683 
Q3 2.56 3.31 304 327 96 137 0.0382 0.0367 
Median 1.37 1.76 152 132 76 103 0.0253 0.0244 
Ql 0.71 0.94 63 67 60 75 0.0175 0.0173 
Min 0.04 0.06 0 2 26 22 0.0063 0.0066 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test: Pr > Izi 
Two independent sample t-Test: Pr > It I 
(i) vs. 0.0004 0.0250 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0597 0.8936 
(ii) 0.0061 0.1144 0.0370 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.5595 0.6496 
(i) vs. 0.0078 0.6334 0.0049 0.1115 <.0001 <.0001 0.0057 0.3413 
( iii) 0.6903 0.4892 0.0471 0.1226 <.0001 <.0001 0.0050 0.9661 
( ii) vs. <.0001 0.0302 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.3209 
( iii) 0.0125 0.1078 0.0008 0.0002 <.0001 <.0001 0.0006 0.6514 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Panel B Closing Price Volume Market Value % Spread (thousand shares) (millions £) 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
( iv ) Pure deletions (N=30) 
Mean 1.93 1.74 80 218 124 107 0.0414 0.0386 
Max 7.79 7.09 409 1,944 354 312 0.1450 0.1543 
Q3 2.31 1.93 82 229 133 128 0.0510 0.0397 
Median 1.48 1.14 38 131 112 109 0.0304 0.0312 
Ql 0.96 0.63 15 78 72 58 0.0244 0.0196 
Min 0.05 0.03 2 14 6 4 0.0140 0.0138 
( v ) Upward deletions (N=203) 
Mean 3.11 3.75 901 886 304 400 0.0195 0.0186 
Max 11.58 16.66 26,193 17,184 492 1,170 0.0768 0.0841 
Q3 4.27 4.79 890 920 349 480 0.0251 0.0232 
Median 2.64 3.06 329 351 308 369 0.0171 0.0169 
Ql 1.34 1.46 142 132 248 278 0.0114 0.0098 
Min 0.10 0.26 0 0 8 34 0.0025 0.0019 
( vi ) Downward deletions (N=299) 
Mean 0.78 0.62 577 545 47 36 0.0715 0.0914 
Max 8.27 6.60 26,013 10,807 156 110 0.4401 2.0000 
Q3 1.07 0.89 362 452 60 49 0.0935 0.0861 
Median 0.56 0.38 159 177 43 33 0.0558 0.0552 
Ql 0.27 0.16 71 83 30 19 0.0331 0.0375 
Min 0.01 0.00 0 1 4 0 0.0000 0.0000 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test: Pr> Izl 
Two independent sample t-Test: Pr > It I 
(iv) vs. 0.0028 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
(v) 0.0081 0.0005 0.0634 0.0681 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
(iv) vs. <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0680 <.0001 <.0001 0.0004 <.0001 
(vi) <.0001 <.0001 0.1768 0.1540 <.0001 <.0001 0.0040 0.1387 
(v) vs. <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
(vi) <.0001 <.0001 0.0993 0.0189 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
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3.3 Overview of the S&P SmallCap Index 
The precursor ofthe S&P/TSX SmallCap index, S&P/TSE Canadian Small Cap index 
is a float adjusted and market capitalization weighted index. It was introduced on 29 
April, 1999 by Standard and Poor's and the Toronto Stock Exchange. The S&P/TSE 
Canadian Small Cap index consists of 180 smallest representatives from each sector of the 
TSE 300 Composite index. Because a fixed number of constituents are maintained, an 
addition to the index usually occurs corresponding to the deletions from the index. In the 
following few years, there were a series of name changes and redefinition of the 
S&P/TSX family indices. As a result, the number of constituents is no longer fixed since 
May 2002 and income trusts make up a significant portion of the index since 2005. 
Before March 2007, the S&P/TSX Index Committee maintained the S&P/TSX SmallCap 
index and met on a quarterly basis. Changes made through the quarterly review were 
effective after the close of trading on the third Friday of March, June, September and 
December. Since March 2007, the S&P/TSX SmallCap is no longer a member of the 
S&P/TSX Composite index. Consequently, the S&P/TSX SmallCap index is maintained 
separately from the S&P/TSX Composite family of indices and is reviewed annually in 
September. 
The index candidates must meet all criteria for index additions including eligibility, 
listing, domicile, market capitalization, and liquidity. All securities added to the index 
must be listed on the on the TSX for at least 12 full calendar months with no more than 
25 non-trading days over the past 12 calendar months. In addition, added securities must 
have at least C$100 million and at most C$ 1.5 billion in both quoted market value and 
total market value 16. Deletions usually occur when firms are involved in mergers, 
acquisitions, important restructuring, or no longer meet the relevant requirements. 
Announcements are made after the daily close of trading and press releases are posted on 
the Standard and Poor's web site and major news services. 
As of2008, there were 208 firms in the S&P/TSX SmallCap index with a total market 
capitalization of about 70 billion Canadian dollars. Firms from the energy sector, 
materials sector, financial sector and industrial sector make up about 75 percent of the 
16 See S&P/TSX SmallCap Methodology for more information, 
http://www2.standardandpoors.comlspt7pdt7index/SP_TSX_SmallCap _Methodology _ Web.pdf 
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index in terms of market capitalization. Since the launch of the S&P/TSX SmallCap 
index, the performance of the index was remarkable until the recent financial crisis. 
3.4 The Canadian Sample 
My Canadian sample consists of 367 additions and 429 deletions in the S&P/TSX 
SmallCap index over the period May 1999 through August 2008. Index changes are 
identified from the monthly TSX Review and the LexisNexis database. Similar to my UK 
sample, the effective day, denoted as ED, is the last trading day before the actual change 
takes place and the announcement day, denoted as AD, is the first trading day after the 
day on which Standard and Poor's announces the changes. Given that the number of 
trading days between the effective and announcement dates varies for different stocks, the 
event window for my Canadian sample covers the period of [AD-30, ED+60]. 
For deletions in the S&P/TSX SmallCap index, 85 deletions are caused by merger 
and acquisition, four deletions are caused by spin-off, and one deletion is caused by 
bankruptcy. The initial sample is reduced to a final clean sample of335 additions and 251 
deletions after applied the following screens. The first screen removed stocks for which 
the event window overlapped with another index change (removed two additions and two 
deletions). The second screen kept only unique stocks in the sample. For example, if one 
stock appears more than once in the one of the sub-samples, I only keep the earliest event 
for this stock (removed 13 additions and 16 deletions). The last screen removed stocks 
having more than 20 non-trading days in the event window (removed 17 additions and 70 
deletions) 
Table 4 shows the detailed construction of the final clean sample. Furthermore my 
Canadian sample is divided into four sub-groups, which are pure additions, downward 
additions, pure deletions, upward deletions. Pure additions consist of 310 stocks added to 
the S&P/TSX SmallCap index that were not previously in the S&P/TSX index universe. 
Downward additions consist of 25 stocks that were demoted from the S&P/TSX MidCap 
or S&P/TSX 60 indices. Pure deletions consist of 179 stocks deleted from the S&P/TSX 
SmallCap index and S&P/TSX index universe. Upward deletions consist of72 stocks that 
were promoted to the S&P/TSX MidCap or S&P/TSX 60 indices. 
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Table 4: S&PITSX SmallCap Index Sample Additions and Deletions 
This table provides detailed construction of the final clean samples for the S&P/TSX 
Small Cap Index additions and deletions for period May 2002 through Aug 2008. Pure 
additions are stocks added to the S&PITSX SmallCap index that were not previously in 
the S&P/TSX index universe. Downward additions are stocks that were demoted from the 
S&P/TSX MidCap or S&PITSX 60 indices. Pure deletions are stocks deleted from the 
S&P/TSX SmallCap index and S&P/TSX index universe. Upward deletions are stocks 
that were promoted to the S&P/TSX MidCap or S&P/TSX 60 indices. 
Panel A: Additions 
Initial Additions Sample 367 
Less: 
Step 1: Event window overlapped with other changes -2 
Step 2: Appeared more than once in the sub-sample -13 
Step 3: More than 20 non-trading days during event window -17 
Clean sample: 
Pure additions 310 
Downward additions 25 
Total clean sample 335 
Panel B: Deletions 
Initial Deletions Sample 429 
Mergers and Acquisitions -85 
Spin-offs -4 
Bankruptcy -1 
Useable Events: 339 
Less: 
Step 1: Event window overlapped with other changes 
Step 2: Appeared more than once in the sub-sample 
Step 3: More than 20 non-trading days during event window 
Clean sample: 
Pure deletions 
Upward deletions 
Total clean sample 
-2 
-16 
-58 
179 
72 
251 
Table 5 presents summary statistics of the levels of daily closing price, trading 
volume in shares, market value, and relative spread before and after addition to and 
deletion from the S&P/TSX SmallCap index. The pre-event and post-event levels are 
estimated over the period of [AD-80, AD-31] and [ED+61, ED+ 110], respectively. 
Similar to the UK sample, I use a parametric test, two independent samples t-Test, and a 
non-parametric test, Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, to test whether the levels are 
25 
Table 5: Summary Statistics for the Canadian Final Sample 
This table presents summary statistics on the levels of daily closing price, daily trading 
volume (in thousand shares), market value (in millions C$), and relative spread before 
and after addition to and deletion from the S&P/TSX Small Cap index. The pre-event 
levels are averaged over a 50-day window that runs from AD-80 to AD-31, and post-
event levels are averaged over a 50-day window that runs from ED+61 to ED+ 110. 
Closing Price Volume Market Value %S2read 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
( i ) Pure additions (N=31 0) 
Mean 14.21 15.95 2,924 3,400 751 905 0.0127 0.0110 
Max 60.25 78.17 46,755 73,134 8,856 7,808 0.0775 0.0905 
Q3 19.60 21.59 2,766 3,026 813 1,128 0.0168 0.0146 
Median 11.46 13.11 1,248 1,319 443 611 0.0087 0.0077 
Ql 6.12 7.12 554 637 243 298 0.0058 0.0048 
Min 0.55 0.06 6 27 79 23 0.0017 0.0016 
( ii ) Downward additions (N=25) 
Mean 9.23 6.64 4,703 8,582 680 432 0.0130 0.0191 
Max 26.97 26.62 32,745 99,374 2,539 1,184 0.0288 0.1039 
Q3 12.76 8.70 3,901 5,885 767 651 0.0152 0.0190 
Median 9.29 3.97 1,847 1,912 547 325 0.0116 0.0129 
Ql 3.55 1.89 1,075 1,395 367 169 0.0090 0.0118 
Min 1.29 0.05 197 341 170 6 0.0061 0.0047 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test: Pr > Izl 
Two independent sample t-Test: Pr > It I 
(i) vs. 0.0256 <.0001 0.0597 0.0091 0.3366 0.0019 0.0782 0.0004 
(ii) 0.0259 0.0004 0.1228 0.0081 0.7325 0.0308 0.884 0.0002 
( iii) Pure deletions (N= 179) 
Mean 11.61 10.45 2,090 2,796 399 365 0.0198 0.0357 
Max 227.22 204.09 71,335 154,123 8,077 7,661 0.0776 1.4245 
Q3 11.91 8.93 1,629 1,819 396 342 0.0249 0.0334 
Median 5.72 4.26 646 645 206 158 0.0175 0.0190 
Ql 2.41 1.61 279 228 111 70 0.0101 0.0116 
Min 0.26 0.02 18 8 33 2 0.0027 0.0023 
( iv ) U2ward deletions (N=72) 
Mean 27.45 26.83 4,755 3,997 2,215 2,412 0.0069 0.0067 
Max 71.83 97.04 57,740 49,737 9,903 11,175 0.0208 0.0221 
Q3 38.69 35.58 4,624 3,945 2,404 2,859 0.0094 0.0089 
Median 24.42 23.41 1,791 2,037 1,427 1,689 0.0060 0.0051 
Ql 15.06 14.89 983 1,235 1,043 1,146 0.0039 0.0037 
Min 2.91 4.22 344 299 386 372 0.0019 0.0013 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test: Pr > Izl 
Two indef!..endent sampJe t-Test: Pr > It I 
(iii) vs. <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
(iv) <.0001 <.0001 0.007 0.4283 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0251 
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significantly different between sub-groups. 
As shown in Table 5, pure additions have a mean (median) pre-event level of market 
capitalization of C$750 (C$443) million. Firms in this sub-group experience an increase 
in market capitalization in an economic significant sense. In contrast, the mean (median) 
market capitalization of downward additions decreases in an economic significant sense 
from C$680 (C$547) million to C$432 (C$325). This is not a surprise that demotion from 
a larger index to the S&P/TSX SmallCap has negative impact on the firm's value. Pure 
deletions have a mean (median) pre-event level of market capitalization of C$399 (C$365) 
million. The post-event level of market capitalization of this sub-group is slightly smaller 
than the pre-event level. In contrast, the mean (median) level of market capitalization of 
upward deletions increases from C$2,215 (C$I,427) million to C$2,412 (C$I,689). 
When compared to the stocks in my UK sample, stocks in my Canadian sample are 
much larger than those in my UK sample in terms of market capitalization. In addition, 
stocks in my Canadian sample have much higher daily trading volume than those in my 
UK sample. 
3.5 Data Sources 
I obtain all data for the analyses for my UK sample from Thomson Datastream 
database. Thomson Datastream is the leading database in terms of number of markets 
covered and number of securities covered in each market. In my analyses in the next 
chapter, I will specify the definition of the data I download form Thomson DataStream 
and its corresponding Thomson Datastream variable. 
The Toronto Stock Exchange - Canadian Financial Market Research Center (TSX-
CFMRC) provides daily data from January 2, 1975 to December 31, 2008 (2009th 
Edition). For my Canadian sample, I use daily data such as rate ofretum17, volume, and 
closing bid and ask prices which are obtained from the CFMRC database. 
17 Daily return are calculated as ifthe security was purchased at the close yesterday and sold at the close 
today. See CFMRC Database Documentation, http://dcl.chass.utoronto.ca/cfinrc/docs/datadoc.html. 
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Chapter 4 Methodology and Empirical Results 
In this chapter, I describe the methods for capturing the abnormal changes and 
empirical results in abnormal return, trading volume, institutional ownership, and 
liquidity analyses. 
4.1 Abnormal Return Analysis 
There are several approaches to measure the abnormal returns. The market-adjusted 
model and the market model are the most basic and frequently used models. The market-
adjusted model suggests that the abnormal return of any stock} on day t, ARj ,t, is the 
difference between the daily individual stock return and the daily market return: 
(1) 
where Rj ,t is the daily return of stock} on day t and Rm,t is the market return on day t. 
I choose the market-adjusted model18 over the standard market model or three-factor 
model based on findings in Edmister, Garham, and Pirie (1994) that the selection of 
estimation window of parameters surrounding index additions can significantly influence 
estimated abnormal returns. In addition, the use of the estimation window significantly 
reduces the sample size because of insufficient trading days of a stock or overlaps19. 
The sample mean abnormal return on day t is given by: 
N 
_ 1, 
ARt = N L A~,t, 
j=l 
(2) 
where N is the sample size. The cumulative mean abnormal return over a certain time 
window [TV T2] is calculated as: 
T2 
CAR(rv'[2) = I ARt· (3) 
t=Tl 
18 Becker-Blease and Paul (Forthcoming) and Gregoriou and Ioannidis (2006) use only the market-adjusted 
model to calculate abnormal returns. 
19 For one stock, its estimation window may overlap with another index change. To avoid any possible 
influence to the estimated abnormal returns, those stocks are excluded from the analysis. 
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An appropriate method to deal with missing returns is necessary because small 
capitalization stocks may be infrequently traded. There are several ways to deal with 
missing stock returns: the uniform return, the lumped return, and trade-to-trade return20 
adjustments. In this thesis, I follow the lumped return procedure because of three reasons. 
First, given that both S&PITSX SmallCap and FTSE Small Cap indices have relevant 
liquidity requirements, most stocks in my sample are, at least, moderately traded stocks. 
Second, Maynes and Rumsey (1993) suggest that the lumped returns, by increasing the 
number of return observations, can improve the efficiency of estimators and test statistics 
used in event studies. Finally, significantly more computational efforts are required for 
the trade-to-trade procedures while the lumped returns are easy to implement. The 
lumped return procedure is used in Datastream database. When there is not enough 
information to calculate stock return, Datastream assigns a zero stock return and multi-
period return is assign to the next trading day. 
4.1.1 The UK sample 
In this section, I perform abnormal return analysis to examine whether the abnormal 
return is associated with addition to and deletion from the FTSE SmallCap Index. If any 
abnormal return is present, I examine whether the observed abnormal return is transitory 
or permanent. 
I calculate abnormal returns from the market-adjusted model, using the FTSE 
SmallCap value-weighted index as the market portfolio, for firms added to or deleted 
from the FTSE Small Cap index. I use return of the FTSE SmallCap index as the market 
return proxy in order to control for the size factor. Few studies, such as Shankar and 
Miller (2006), Chen (2006), and Becker-Blease and Paul (Forthcoming), also use return 
of smallcap index as their market return proxy. Note that Thomson Datastream returns 
are calculated from changes in the Thomson Datastream return index, RI21. The effective 
day (ED) is the last trading day before the actual change takes place and the 
announcement day (AD or ED-6) is the first trading day after the day on which FTSE 
20 See Marsh (1979). 
21 Datastream defines the variable RI as "this shows a theoretical growth in value of a share holding over a 
specified period, assuming that dividends are re-invested to purchase additions units of an equity or unit 
trust at the closing price applicable on the ex-dividend date." 
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release the annually or quarterly reviews to public. The 91-day long event window runs 
from 30 trading days before to 60 trading days after the effective day, [ED-30, ED+60]. 
As some stocks share the same announcement and effective days, I use the "crude 
dependence" adjustment described by Brown and Warner (1980), to correct for a possible 
event-clustering problem. In addition to a parametric I-test, I also use two nonparametric 
statistics, the rank test described by Corrado (1989) as well as a sign test suggested by 
Corrado and Zivney (1992) and Cowan (1992). Nonparametric tests do not require a 
symmetrical distribution of security abnormal returns for correct specification. 
For robustness checks, I use different models and market index proxies. Results are 
qualitatively the same using the market model with a 180 trading days post estimation 
window that starts from ED+61. Results are also qualitatively the same when I use the 
FTSE Small Cap value-weighted (results are shown in Table 6 and Table 7 and plots in 
Figure 1, 2 and 3), FTSE All-Share value-weighted (results are shown in Table 8 and 
Table 9), Datastream UK equal-weighted index as the proxy for the market index. 
Table 6 presents abnormal returns for the three sub-groups of additions to the FTSE 
Small Cap index. In examining the three sub-groups of additions to the FTSE SmallCap 
index, I find that the price effects for downward additions are substantially different from 
the price effects for pure and upward additions. This is because pure and upward 
additions are stocks new to the FTSE SmallCap index or promoted from the FTSE 
Fledgling index while downward additions are stocks demoted from the FTSE 250 index. 
It is, therefore, not a surprise that downward additions experience a significant pre-event 
cumulative loss of 12.86% over the period of [ED-30, ED-II]. I also find a significant 
abnormal return of -0.95% and 1.27% on the announcement and effective day, 
respectively. Thus, the abnormal return on the announcement day is offset on the 
effective day. Note that no significant cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is found over 
the post-event period. 
Upward additions experience significant pre-event cumulative gain of 10.72% and 
3.06% over the period of [ED-30, ED-II] and [ED-l 0, ED-7], respectively. Also, there is 
a significant abnormal return of 0.80% on the announcement day, 2.09% on the effective 
day, and 3.79% over the period of [AD+ 1, ED-I]. The long term CAR over the period of 
[AD, ED+60] is still positive and significant (according to CDA I-Test and Sign test). 
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Pure additions are associated with a significant pre-event cumulative gain of 1.68% 
over the period of [ED-I 0, ED-7]. Also, there is a significant abnormal return of 1.19% 
on the announcement day, 1.73% on the effective day, and 4.46% over the period of 
[AD+ 1, ED-I]. However, the long term CAR over the period of [AD, ED+60] is -1.63%. 
Table 7 present abnormal returns for three sub-groups of deletion in the FTSE 
Small Cap index. Given that upward deletions are stocks promoted to the FTSE 250 index, 
it is not a surprise that they recorded a significant CAR of 11.06% over the pre-event 
period of[ED-30, ED-ll]. The abnormal returns on the announcement and effective day 
are negative but economically and statistically insignificant. But I find a significant and 
negative CAR of 1.64% over the period of [AD+ 1, ED-I]. The long term CAR is 1.10% 
over the period of [AD, ED+60]. In contrast to the upward deletions, downward deletions 
recorded significant CARs of -9.05% and -3.62% over the period of [ED-30, ED-II] and 
[ED-IO, ED-7], respectively. Moreover, downward deletions lose 5.75% over the period 
of[AD+l, ED-I] and 3.18% on the effective day. But the CAR over the period of [AD, 
ED] offset completely in the post-event period of [ED+1, ED+20]. 
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Table 6: Price Effects for Stocks Added to the FTSE SmallCap Index 
Abnormal returns are calculated using the market-adjusted model. Value-weighted FTSE 
Small Cap Index is used as a proxy for the market return. Panels A, B, and C report 
abnormal returns for the announcement day (AD), effective day (ED), and the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) for stocks newly added to the index (pure additions), stocks 
promoted from the FTSE Fledgling Index (upward additions), and stocks demoted from 
the FTSE 250 index (downward additions), respectively. Three test statistics (t-test with 
CDA, generalized sign test, and rank test) are reported. 
Period CAR CDA t sign z rank z 
Panel A Pure addition to the index (N=187) 
ED-30,ED-11 1.09% 1.079 4.118*** 1.427 
ED-I0,ED-7 1.68% 3.722*** 5.585*** 3.022** 
AD 1.19% 5.241*** 7.639*** . 4.947*** 
AD+l,ED-l 4.46% 8.817*** 9.107*** 7.658*** 
ED 1.73% 7.631*** 6.759*** 4.283*** 
ED+l,ED+10 -2.18% -3.051** -2.486* -3.402*** 
ED+11,ED+20 -0.22% -0.314 -0.431 -1.041 
ED+21,ED+30 -1.93% -2.704** -2.926** -2.240* 
ED+31,ED+60 -4.66% -3.764*** -1.165 -1.507 
AD,ED+60 -1.63% -0.882 1.476 -0.371 
Panel B Upward addition from the FTSE Fledgling Index (N=196) 
ED-30,ED-ll 10.72% 10.341 *** 8.308*** 3.928*** 
ED-I0,ED-7 3.06% 6.605*** 6.869*** 4.392*** 
AD 0.80% 3.458*** 6.725*** 3.446*** 
AD+l,ED-l 3.79% 7.311*** 9.891 *** 7.303*** 
ED 2.09% 9.001*** 8.020*** 4.921 *** 
ED+l,ED+10 -1.57% -2.138* -2.915** -3.011** 
ED+11,ED+20 0.64% 0.879 0.682 -0.541 
ED+21,ED+30 0.15% 0.202 1.689$ 0.129 
ED+31,ED+60 0.30% 0.239 1.257 -1.031 
AD,ED+60 6.20% 3.271** 3.704*** 1.005 
Panel C Downward addition from the FTSE 250 Index (N=289) 
ED-30,ED-ll -12.86% -9.940*** -7.188*** -8.681*** 
ED-I0,ED-7 -0.59% -1.023 -1.168 -1.797$ 
AD -0.95% -3.278** -3.647*** -3.062** 
AD+l,ED-l 
ED 
ED+l,ED+10 
ED+11,ED+20 
ED+21,ED+30 
ED+ 31 ,ED+60 
AD,ED+60 
-1.04% 
1.27% 
1.68% 
-1.28% 
1.27% 
-2.91% 
-1.95% 
-1.61 0.72 0.704 
4.399*** 
1.837$ 
-1.396 
1.392 
-1.838$ 
-0.825 
3.317*** 
2.608** 
0.956 
1.074 
0.484 
2.018* 
3.278** 
2.450* 
0.275 
0.297 
-0.99 
0.724 
The symbols $, *, * *, and * * * denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1 % and 0.1 % 
levels, respectively, using a two-tail test 
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Table 7: Price Effects for Stocks Deleted from the FTSE SmallCap Index 
Abnormal returns are calculated using the market-adjusted model. Value-weighted FTSE 
SmallCap Index is used as a proxy for the market return. Panels A, B, and C report 
abnormal returns for the announcement day (AD), effective day (ED), and the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) for stocks deleted from the index (pure deletions), stocks 
promoted to the FTSE 250 index (upward deletions), and stocks demoted to the FTSE 
Fledgling Index (downward deletions), respectively. Three test statistics (I-test with 
CDA, generalized sign test, and rank test) are reported. 
Panel A 
Panel B 
Panel C 
Period CAR CDA t sign z 
Pure deletion from the index (N=30) 
ED-30, ED-ll -3.66% -1.750$ -0.006 
ED-IO, ED-7 -1.23% -1.316 -1.836$ 
AD -0.68% -1.458 -1.104 
AD+1,ED-l -6.95% -6.651*** -4.031*** 
ED -4.03% -8.624*** -2.934** 
ED+l,ED+10 2.81% 1.901$ -0.006 
ED+ II,ED+20 -3.86% -2.612** -0.372 
ED+21,ED+30 1.22% 0.823 2.190* 
ED+31,ED+60 -1.05% -0.409 -0.006 
AD,ED+60 -12.54% -3.279** -0.738 
Upward deletion to the FTSE 250 Index (N=203) 
rankz 
-2.482* 
-2.665** 
-1.027 
-3.989*** 
-2.948** 
-0.385 
-2.557* 
1.616 
-0.161 
-2.195* 
ED-30, ED-II 11.06% 10.160*** 9.053*** 6.503*** 
ED-I0, ED-7 2.00% 4.107*** 4.132*** 2.467* 
AD -0.07% -0.281 -1.915$ -1.297 
AD+1,ED-l -1.64% -3.016** -2.899** -1.896$ 
ED -0.23% -0.935 -1.212 -1.232 
ED+l,ED+10 -0.98% -1.279 -1.212 -1.671$ 
ED+ 1l,ED+20 1.02% 1.328 2.304* 0.271 
ED+21,ED+30 1.26% 1.636 2.444* -0.636 
ED+31,ED+60 1.74% 1.305 1.741$ 0.21 
AD,ED+60 1.10% 0.552 1.601 -1.473 
Downward deletion to the FTSE Fledgling Index (N=299) 
ED-30, ED-II -9.05% -6.232*** -5.257*** -4.673*** 
ED-IO, ED-7 -3.62% -5.565*** -3.862*** -3.215** 
AD -1.07% -3.301 *** -1.886$ -1.627 
AD+l,ED-l -5.75% -7.915*** -9.327*** -4.994*** 
ED -3.18% -9.795*** -4.676*** -3.638*** 
ED+l,ED+1O 7.73% 7.522*** 4.742*** 1.044 
ED+ll,ED+20 2.90% 2.824** 2.068* 1.343 
ED+21,ED+30 1.48% 1.441 2.417* 0.585 
ED+31,ED+60 -0.87% -0.491 1.603 0.22 
AD,ED+60 1.23% 0.463 2.068* -0.712 
The symbols $, *, * *, and * * * denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1 % and 
0.1 % levels, respectively, using a two-tail test 
33 
Table 8: Price Effects for Stocks Added to the FTSE SmallCap Index 
Abnormal returns are calculated using the market-adjusted model. Value-weighted FTSE 
All-Share Index is used as a proxy for the market return. Panels A, B, and C report 
abnormal returns for the announcement day (AD), effective day (ED), and the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) for stocks newly added to the index (pure additions), stocks 
promoted from the FTSE Fledgling Index (upward additions), and stocks demoted from 
the FTSE 250 index (downward additions), respectively. Three test statistics (t-test with 
CDA, generalized sign test, and rank test) are reported. 
Period CAR CDA t sign z rank z 
Panel A Pure addition to the index (N= 187) 
ED-30,ED-11 1.67% 1.123 4.573*** 1.757$ 
ED-1O,ED-7 2.31% 3.484*** 5.891 *** 4.079*** 
AD 1.24% 3.744*** 6.769*** . 3.918*** 
AD+l,ED-l 3.83% 5.159*** 6.769*** 4.588*** 
ED 1.40% 4.224*** 2.670** 1.848$ 
ED+l,ED+1O -2.00% -1.907$ -2.745** -2.201 * 
ED+11,ED+20 0.54% 0.516 0.036 0.711 
ED+21,ED+30 -2.08% -1.985* -2.599** -1.654$ 
ED+31,ED+60 -4.91% -2.705** -2.453* -1.151 
AD,ED+60 -1.98% -0.731 1.207 -0.027 
Panel B Upward addition from the FTSE Fledgling Index (N=196) 
ED-30,ED-11 11.82% 7.226*** 8.013*** 3.072** 
ED-I0,ED-7 4.11% 5.622*** 7.155*** 4.082*** 
AD 0.79% 2.167* 5.867*** 2.114* 
AD+l,ED-l 3.18% 3.888*** 6.725*** 3.252** 
ED 1.64% 4.470*** 3.290*** 1.804$ 
ED+1,ED+1O -0.26% -0.223 -1.576 -0.834 
ED+11,ED+20 3.25% 2.809** 3.863*** 1.837$ 
ED+21,ED+30 -0.28% -0.244 -0.288 -0.47 
ED+31,ED+60 -0.26% -0.131 -0.288 -0.954 
AD,ED+60 8.06% 2.690** 3.577*** 0.934 
Panel C Downward addition from the FTSE 250 Index (N=289) 
ED-30,ED-ll -12.72% -8.363*** -6.762*** -5.900*** 
ED-I0,ED-7 -0.59% -0.863 -0.52 -0.852 
AD -0.96% -2.820** -3.111 ** -2.079* 
AD+1,ED-l -1.57% -2.063* -0.873 -0.429 
ED 1.09% 3.204** 3.132** 2.489* 
ED+l,ED+10 0.85% 0.789 2.425* 0.731 
ED+11,ED+20 -0.43% -0.4 2.190* 1.328 
ED+21,ED+30 0.93% 0.866 0.187 0.274 
ED+31,ED+60 -2.00% -1.073 -0.52 -0.223 
AD,ED+60 -2.09% -0.749 1.601 0.685 
The symbols $, *, * *, and * * * denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1 % and 0.1 % 
levels, respectively, using a two-tail test 
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Table 9: Price Effects for Stocks Deleted from the FTSE Small Cap Index 
Abnonnal returns are calculated using the market-adjusted model. Value-weighted FTSE 
All-Share Index is used as a proxy for the market return. Panels A, B, and C report 
abnonnal returns for the announcement day (AD), effective day (ED), and the cumulative 
abnonnal returns (CAR) for stocks deleted from the index (pure deletions), stocks 
demoted to the FTSE Fledgling Index (downward deletions), and stocks promoted to the 
FTSE 250 index (upward deletions), respectively. Three test statistics (I-test with CDA, 
generalized sign test, and rank test) are reported. 
Period CAR CDAt sign z rankz 
Panel A Pure deletion from the index (N=30) 
ED-30, ED-II -2.80% -0.867 -0.631 -1.001 
ED-I0, ED-7 0.41% 0.284 -0.266 0.681 
AD -0.92% -1.277 -2.092* -1.205 
AD+l,ED-l -7.75% -4.798*** -5.014*** -3.701 *** 
ED -4.22% -5.838*** -3.553*** -3.023** 
ED+l,ED+10 4.98% 2.180* 1.56 1.273 
ED+11,ED+20 -1.03% -0.45 0.83 0.089 
ED+21,ED+30 0.26% 0.115 1.925$ 0.245 
ED+ 31 ,ED+60 -0.85% -0.215 0.83 -0.151 
AD,ED+60 -9.53% -1.611 -1.361 -1.007 
Panel B Downward deletion to the FTSE Fledgling Index (N=299) 
ED-30, ED-II -8.45% -3.598*** -4.229*** -2.633** 
ED-10, ED-7 -2.85% -2.719** -3.534*** -1.342 
AD -1.04% -1.984* -0.871 -1.125 
AD+I,ED-1 -6.47% -5.511*** -11.292*** -4.451*** 
ED -3.64% -6.931*** -9.324*** -3.694*** 
ED+1,ED+10 8.50% 5.124*** 5.150*** 1.841$ 
ED+11,ED+20 4.39% 2.646** 2.718** 1.598 
ED+21,ED+30 0.84% 0.508 -0.524 0.185 
ED+ 31 ,ED+60 -1.56% -0.543 0.287 -0.144 
AD,ED+60 1.03% 0.24 1.097 -0.501 
Panel C Upward deletion to the FTSE 250 Index (N=203) 
ED-30, ED-II 10.66% 7.925*** 8.616*** 3.925*** 
ED-10, ED-7 1.94% 3.221** 2.158* 1.504 
AD -0.16% -0.539 0.473 -0.796 
AD+l,ED-1 -2.15% -3.197** -4.440*** -2.231 * 
ED -0.31% -1.018 -3.036** -1.901$ 
ED+l,ED+10 -1.61% -1.693$ -3.036** -2.441 * 
ED+11,ED+20 2.32% 2.440* 3.703*** 1.53 
ED+21,ED+30 0.87% 0.915 1.597 -0.42 
ED+ 31 ,ED+60 3.17% 1.921$ 3.141 ** 1.108 
AD,ED+60 2.13% 0.864 1.597 -0.712 
The symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1 % and 
0.1 % levels, respectively, using a two-tail test 
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Figure 1: Cumulative abnormal returns for pure additions and deletions in the 
FTSE SmallCap Index over the period of [ED-30, ED+60]. The trading day ED is 
the effective day and the trading day AD is the announcement day. 
Consequently, the long term CAR over the period of [AD, ED+60] is slightly above 
zero. Pure deletions do not experience any significant abnormal price changes until the 
day after the announcement day. I find a loss of 6.95% for pure deletions over the period 
[AD+1, ED-I]. Moreover, another loss of 4.03% is recorded for pure deletions on the 
effective day. But the negative abnormal return on the effective day is offset in ten days. 
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Figure 2: Cumulative abnormal returns for downward additions and upward 
deletions in the FTSE SmallCap Index over the period of [ED-30, ED+60]. The 
trading day ED is the effective day and the trading day AD is the announcement day. 
I also find that there is not any significant abnormal price change during the post- event 
period. 
Figure 1 plots the CARs for pure additions and deletions from ED-30 to ED+60. The 
graph shows that there is an upward (downward) trend starting from ED-18 for pure 
additions (pure deletions). There is a very small reversal for both sub-groups on ED+ 1. 
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Figure 3: Cumulative abnormal returns for upward additions and downward 
deletions in the FrSE SmallCap Index over the period of [ED-30, ED+60]. The 
trading day ED is the effective day and the trading day AD is the announcement day. 
The price, however, reverts completely after ED+60 for pure additions only. Figure 2 
plots the CARs for downward additions and upward deletions. These two sub-groups are 
the shifts between the FTSE SmallCap and FTSE Fledgling indices. The graph shows that 
the upward (downward) trend starting from ED-30 for upward deletions (downward 
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additions). There is a short-lived reversal on the announcement day (effective day) for 
upward deletions (downward additions). Visually, it is obvious that the price reversal is 
temporary. Figure 3 plots the CARs for upward additions and downward deletions. These 
two sub-groups are the shifts between the FTSE 250 and FTSE SmallCap indices. The 
graph shows that the upward (downward) trend starting from ED-30 for upward additions 
(downward deletions) and that there is a price reversal on ED+l. Visually, it is obvious 
that the price reversal for upward additions is much smaller than the price reversal for 
downward deletions. 
Based on the abnormal return analysis, it is obvious that all sub-groups experience 
pre-event trends. In addition, because the price reversal is temporary, except pure 
additions, and part of the change in price seems to be permanent by visual observation, I 
must test this conclusion and identify the factors, which cause the permanent increase in 
stock price. 
4.1.2 The Canadian Sample 
In this section, I perform abnormal return analysis for addition to and deletion from 
the S&P/TSX SmallCap Index. I calculate abnormal returns from the market adjusted and 
market models for firms added to or deleted from the S&P/TSX Small Cap index. 
Under the market model, the expected return for each stockj on day t is given by: 
E(Rj,t) = aj + PjRm,t + Cj,t· 
Consequently, the abnormal return for each stockj on day t is give by: 
(4) 
(5) 
where Rj ,t and Rm,t are defined as above. This market model is estimated over a I80-day 
long estimation window. The effective day (ED) is the last trading day before the actual 
changes takes place and the announcement day (AD) is the first trading day after the day 
on which Standard and Poor's releases the change to the public. Unlike my UK sample, 
the number of days between the announcement and effective days varies for different 
events. Consequently, the event window [AD-30, ED+60] does not have a fixed length. 
The market model estimates are estimated over a post-event period of [ED+6I, ED+240]. 
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Similar to my UK sample, the crude dependence adjusted t-test, sign test, and rank 
test are used to test for the significance. For robustness checks, I use returns on both 
CFMRC daily equally-weighted and value-weighted index as the market return proxies22 • 
This is because a value-weighted index tends to assign more weights on large-cap stocks, 
but my samples consist of only small-cap stocks. Nevertheless, the results using either 
CFMRC daily equally-weighted or value-weighted index are qualitatively the same. 
Table 10 and Table 11 present abnormal returns for additions and deletions in the 
S&P/TSX SmallCap index, respectively. As shown in these two tables, it is not a surprise 
that pure additions and promotions result in a positive effect on the stock price while pure 
deletions and demotions results in a negative effect on the stock price. 
Specifically, in Panel A of Table 10, pure additions experience a significant gain of 2% 
on the announcement day and additional 2.12% on the effective day (significant at 0.1% 
level according to the crude dependent adjusted t-Test). There is a sign of price reversal 
as the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over the period of [AD, ED+ 10] declines from 
2.11 % to -0.91% when extending this period to [AD, ED+60]. In contrast, downward 
additions experience significant loss on the announcement day (-3.7%) and effective day 
(-4.79%). Note that the only positive CAR for downward additions appears over the 
period of [AD, ED+10]. Also, the price is volatile as the price loses more than 6% from 
the period of [AD, ED+I0] to [AD, ED+20] and gains more than 9% from the period of 
[AD, ED+50] to [AD, ED+60]. For the same two sub-groups of additions in S&P/TSX 
SmallCap index, the results under the market model, using a 180-day long post-event 
estimation window, are shown in Panel B of Table 10. The results are consistent with 
those described above except that, for pure additions, the price reverted completely at the 
end of event window [AD, ED+40], but then starts to increase. Figure 4 plots the CAR 
for pure additions and deletions over the period of [AD-30, ED+60]. The announcement 
period, the period of [AD, ED], is compressed into one day and the abnormal returns over 
this period are compounded together. As shown in the graph, the announcement period 
CAR reverts slowly for pure additions while it reverts quickly for pure deletions. 
22 In my abnormal return analysis for the UK sample, I use the FTSE Small Cap index for the market proxy 
in order to control for the size factor. However, the data for S&P/TSX SmallCap index on CFMRC 
database is only available after June 1 st, 2002 while my sample period starts in May 1999. 
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Table 10: Price Effects for Stocks Added to the S&PITSX SmallCap Index 
Panels A and B report abnormal returns for the announcement day (AD), effective day 
(ED), and the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for stocks newly added to the index 
(pure additions) and stocks demoted from the S&P/TSX MidCap index (downward 
additions), respectively. Abnormal returns are calculated using the market-adjusted model 
(shown in Panel A) and market model (shown in Panel B). CFMRC daily value-weighted 
index is used as a proxy for the market return. Three test statistics (I-test with CDA, 
generalized sign test, and rank test) are reported. 
Panel A Period CAR CDA t sign z rank z 
MAR Pure additions (N=31 0) 
[AD-30,AD-ll] 6.95% 5.323*** 7.248*** 3.168** 
[AD-I0,AD-l] 4.69% 5.085*** 7.021*** 4.070*** 
AD 2.00% 6.851*** 6.990*** 4.256*** 
[AD+l,ED-lt 1.12% 1.431 3.553*** -0.297 
ED 2.12% 6.460*** 1.785$ 1.401 
[ED+ 1 ,ED+1 0] -1.58% -1.522 -3.900*** -1.536 
[ED+ll,ED+20] -1.82% -1.750$ -1.512 -1.227 
[ED+21,ED+30] -1.17% -1.125 -2.536* -1.135 
CARs starting from AD of Pure additions 
[AD,ED+lO] 2.11% 1.611 -0.712 0.843 
[AD,ED+20] 0.25% 0.147 -1.806$ -0.816 
[AD,ED+30] -0.76% -0.377 -0.531 -1.024 
[AD,ED+40] -0.80% -0.33 -0.426 0.771 
[AD,ED+50] -0.32% -0.121 0.146 -0.302 
[AD,ED+60] -0.91% -0.309 -0.51 0.299 
Downward additions (N=25) 
[AD-30,AD-ll] -20.26% -2.087* -0.845 -1.108 
[AD-l O,AD-l] -0.47% -0.068 1.57 1.069 
AD -3.70% -1.705$ -1.248 -1.684$ 
[AD+l,ED-lt -7.70% -0.612 -0.005 -0.432 
ED -4.79% -2.238* -2.875** -3.182** 
[ED+ 1 ,ED+ 10] 1.29% 0.191 0.747 0.512 
[ED+ll,ED+20] -6.18% -0.913 -0.058 -1.657$ 
[ED+21,ED+30] -3.24% -0.478 0.747 -0.585 
CARs starting from AD for Downward additions 
[AD,ED+10] -6.83% -0.862 -0.11 -1.378 
[AD,ED+20] -13.45% -1.277 -0.536 -1.146 
[AD,ED+30] -16.69% -1.327 -0.134 -0.684 
[AD,ED+40] -17.13% -1.192 -0.14 -0.426 
[AD,ED+50] -19.97% -1.247 1.055 -0.854 
[AD,ED+60] -10.73% -0.617 0.678 0.042 
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Table 10 (continued) 
Panel B Period CAR CDAt sign z rankz 
MM Pure addition (N=31 0) 
[AD-30,AD-11] 7.84% 5.969*** 7.285*** 3.211 ** 
[AD-1 0,AD-1] 4.87% 5.251 *** 7.740*** 3.762*** 
AD 2.10% 7.156*** 7.029*** 4.231*** 
[AD+1,ED-1t 1.21% 1.604 2.955** 0.358 
ED 2.13% 6.612*** 2.186* 1.45 
[ED+ 1 ,ED+ 1 0] -1.26% -1.238 -2.475* -1.634 
[ED+ 11 ,ED+20] -1.24% -1.22 -0.883 -1.146 
[ED+21,ED+30] -0.64% -0.632 -2.020* -1.027 
CARs starting from AD 
[AD,ED+10] 2.60% 2.033* 0.416 1.149 
[AD,ED+20] 1.08% 0.648 0.244 -0.407 
[AD,ED+30] 2.09% 1.043 -0.416 -1.241 
[AD,ED+40] 0.65% 0.275 -0.665 -0.011 
[AD,ED+50] 2.44% 0.932 1.981 * 0.056 
[AD,ED+60] 2.17% 0.753 0.773 0.539 
Downward addition (N=25) 
[AD-30,AD-11] -17.34% -1.794$ -0.864 -0.574 
[AD-10,AD-1] -0.48% -0.071 1.55 1.038 
AD -4.60% -2.130* -0.864 -1.596 
[AD+1,ED-1t -8.34% -0.669 0.584 -0.051 
ED -4.64% -2.181* -2.893** -3.177** 
[ED+ 1 ,ED+ 10] 1.92% 0.285 0.727 0.426 
[ED+ 11,ED+20] -5.43% -0.808 -0.077 -1.445 
[ED+21,ED+30] -0.70% -0.104 0.325 -0.26 
CARs starting from AD 
[AD,ED+10] -7.84% -0.996 1.153 -1.116 
[AD,ED+20] -13.95% -1.327 -0.496 -0.797 
[AD,ED+30] -16.63% -1.32 0.273 -0.036 
[AD,ED+40] -18.19% -1.265 0.262 -0.135 
[AD,ED+50] -20.43% -1.276 1.108 -0.397 
[AD,ED+60] -11.46% -0.66 0.33 0.246 
#The CAR over period of [AD+1, ED-I] is computed only when there is at least one 
trading day between the announcement day and effective day. The symbols $, *,**, and 
* * * denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1 % and 0.1 % levels, respectively, 
using a two-tail test 
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Table 11: Price Effects for Stocks Deleted from the S&PITSX SmallCap Index 
Panels A and B report abnormal returns for the announcement day (AD), effective day 
(ED), and the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for stocks deleted from the index (pure 
deletions) and stocks promoted to the S&P/TSX MidCap index (upward deletions), 
respectively. Abnormal returns are calculated using the market-adjusted model (shown in 
Panel A) and market model (shown in Panel B). CFMRC daily value-weighted index is 
used as a proxy for the market return. Three test statistics (t-test with CDA, generalized 
sign test, and rank test) are reported. 
Panel A Period CAR CDA t sign z rank z 
MAR Pure deletions (N=179) 
[AD-30,AD-ll] -10.67% -4.401*** -3.757*** -3.806*** 
[AD-l O,AD-l] -4.23% -2.468* -2.409* -3.192** 
AD -2.68% -4.947*** -4.748*** -5.136*** 
[AD+l,ED-l]# -1.65% -1.415 -1.433 -1.136 
ED -3.26% -6.288*** -3.775*** -3.510*** 
[ED+ 1 ,ED+ 10] 6.71% 4.094*** 4.576*** 2.782** 
[ED+11,ED+20] 2.01% 1.228 2.773** 1.722$ 
[ED+21,ED+30] 2.41% 1.469 -0.23 0.369 
CARs starting from AD for Pure deletions 
[AD,ED+I0] -0.11% -0.054 -0.414 0.081 
[AD,ED+20] 1.66% 0.618 1.934$ 0.765 
[AD,ED+30] 3.92% 1.238 2.402* -0.764 
[AD,ED+40] 3.16% 0.867 1.837$ -0.082 
[AD,ED+50] 5.83% 1.442 3.106** -0.314 
[AD,ED+60] 4.87% 1.073 1.831$ 0.096 
Upward deletions (N=72) 
[AD-30,AD-l1] 0.17% 0.115 0.486 1.16 
[AD-I0,AD-l] -1.36% -1.261 -0.929 -1.768$ 
AD 0.16% 0.46 2.137* 1.313 
[AD+l,ED-lt -0.38% -0.32 0.763 -0.428 
ED 0.04% 0.114 1.666$ 0.858 
[ED+l,ED+10] 0.15% 0.136 0.723 -0.917 
[ED+11,ED+20] 0.15% 0.135 0.723 0.851 
[ED+21,ED+30] -0.58% -0.528 0.959 -0.35 
CARs starting from AD for Upward deletions 
[AD,ED+I0] 0.12% 0.102 0.508 -0.779 
[AD,ED+20] 0.27% 0.169 -0.406 -0.102 
[AD,ED+30] -0.31% -0.163 -0.191 -1.328 
[AD,ED+40] 0.41% 0.185 0.757 -0.751 
[AD,ED+50] -0.24% -0.095 0.77 0.625 
[AD,ED+60] -0.83% -0.293 -0.11 0.243 
43 
Table 11 (continued) 
Panel B Period CAR CDAt sign z rankz 
MM Pure deletions (N=179) 
[AD-30,AD-ll] -10.19% -4.352*** -2.806** -3.585*** 
[AD-l O,AD-l] -4.15% -2.506* -3.256** -3.373*** 
AD -2.62% -5.010*** -5.000*** -5.419*** 
[AD+l,ED-lt -2.35% -2.127* -0.52 -0.673 
ED -4.23% -8.563*** -2.689** -3.571*** 
[ED+ 1 ,ED+ 10] 6.83% 4.378*** 4.774*** 2.990** 
[ED+ II,ED+20] -2.67% -1.710$ 2.216* 1.232 
[ED+21,ED+30] -0.60% -0.387 -0.493 0.545 
CARs starting from AD for Pure deletions 
[AD,ED+lO] -1.20% -0.583 0.618 0.595 
[AD,ED+20] -1.54% -0.59 1.562 0.954 
[AD,ED+30] 2.10% 0.68 3.079** -0.868 
[AD,ED+40] -1.44% -0.408 2.624** -0.908 
[AD,ED+50] 3.23% 0.82 2.909** -0.314 
[AD,ED+60] 1.34% 0.305 2.265* -0.319 
Upward deletions (N=72) 
[AD-30,AD-ll] -0.09% -0.06 0.528 0.647 
[AD-I0,AD-l] -0.88% -0.828 0.056 -1.334 
AD 0.17% 0.495 1.471 1.297 
[AD+l,ED-lt -0.29% -0.256 0.284 -0.51 
ED 0.11% 0.31 1.227 1.032 
[ED+l,ED+10] 0.11% 0.098 -0.423 -0.708 
[ED+ II,ED+20] -0.10% -0.095 0.52 0.713 
[ED+21,ED+30] -0.42% -0.391 0.52 0.031 
CARs starting from AD for Upward deletions 
[AD,ED+10] 0.15% 0.134 0.584 -0.7 
[AD,ED+20] 0.37% 0.239 0.851 -0.324 
[AD,ED+30] -0.34% -0.181 -0.063 -0.525 
[AD,ED+40] 0.52% 0.24 0.635 -0.581 
[AD,ED+50] -0.33% -0.136 0.394 0.917 
[AD,ED+60] 0.12% 0.045 -0.292 0.284 
#The CAR over period of [AD+1, ED-I] is computed only when there is at least one 
trading day between the announcement day and effective day. The symbols $, *,**, and 
* * * denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1 % and 0.1 % levels, respectively, 
using a two-tail test 
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Figure 4: Cumulative abnormal returns for pure additions and deletions in the 
S&PITSX SmailCap index over the period of [AD-30, ED+60]. The period of [AD, 
ED] is compressed into the day zero. 
Results for deletions in S&P/TSX SmallCap index under market adjusted model are 
shown in Panel A of Table 11. Pure deletions experience significant losses of 2.68% on 
the announcement day and of 3.26% on the effective day, respectively. There is an 
obvious sign of price reversal as the CAR is close to zero over the period of [AD, ED+ 1 0] 
and becomes even more positive over the period of [AD, ED+60]. 
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Figure 5: Cumulative abnormal returns for downward additions and upward 
deletions in the S&PITSX SmaliCap index over the period of [AD-30, ED+60]. The 
period of [AD, ED] is compressed into the day zero. 
For upward additions, there is not much evidence since the abnormal returns are 
economically and statistically insignificant. In Panel B of Table 11, results from the 
market model, using 180-day long post-event estimations are consistent with what I 
described above. Figure 5 plots the CAR for downward additions and upward deletions 
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over the period of [AD-30, ED+60]. Similar to Figure 4, the announcement period, the 
period of [AD, ED], is compressed into one day and the abnormal returns over this period 
are compounded together. As shown in graph, changes in CAR of upward deletions are 
not obvious during the period of [AD-30, ED+60], but those of downward additions are 
volatile. Note that there is a quick reversal after the announcement period for downward 
additions. 
4.2 Trading Volume Analysis 
To evaluate the finding in abnormal return analysis, I examine the trading volume 
changes around index changes by following Biktimirov, Cowan, and Jordan's (2004) 
strategy, which is similar to those in Campbell and Wasley (1996). The first step is to 
calculate the trading volume measurement as the percentage of outstanding shares traded 
on day t for stockj: 
VOLj,t X 100 
tj,t = NOSH. ' 
'j,t 
(6) 
where VOLj,t is the number of shares traded for stock j on day t adjusted for capital 
changes, and NOS~,t is the firm's total number of shares outstanding23 on day t. Rather 
than using this raw data, I apply the nature logarithm transformation and add a small 
number, 0.000255, to prevent taking the logarithm of zero 24 • Therefore, the natural 
logarithm transformed percentage of shares outstanding is given by: 
(
VOLj,t X 100 ) 
vt,t = In NOSH- + 0.000255 , 
'j ,t 
(7) 
where VOLj,t and NOS~,t are defined as in equation (6). Next, I use the market model 
approach to estimate expected trading volume. Thus, the market model abnormal trading 
volume is given by: 
23 Datastream defines the variable VOL as "the number of shares traded for a stock on a particular day 
adjusted for capital changes." Datastream defines the variable NOSH as "the total number of ordinary 
shares that represent the capital of the company." 
24 See Ajinkya and Jain (1989) and Cready and Romana (1991) show the importance oflog transformation 
of the volume data to approximate a normal distribution. As in Cready and Ramanan (1991), they add 
0.000255 to the daily percentage of shares outstanding to accommodate zero volume 
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(8) 
where aj and Pj are ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates estimate over a 180-trading-
day estimation window. 
The market volume measure for a day t is given by: 
(9) 
where Nt is the number of stocks in the market index proxy on day t. 
4.2.1 The UK Sample 
I use the FTSE All-Share index as the market index proxy. Given that the 
composition of the index changes from one year to another, I calculate each year's daily 
market volume measure using January's constituent lisr5 for that year from 1998 to 2009. 
For robustness checks, I use different test statistics and estimation periods. I use both 
a parametric t-test and a non-parametric rank test, both test statistics are reported. I notice 
that the standard t-test gives significant results to large number of days because the 
underlying data is not close to the normal distribution. In addition, Campbell and Wasley 
(1996) find that the non-parametric rank test is always more powerful in detecting 
abnormal trading volume than the parametric test. Therefore, my discussion about the 
abnormal trading volume results is based on the rank tesr6. 
I use both the pre-event estimation window, which runs for 180 trading days from 
ED-210 to ED-31, and post-event estimation, which runs for 180 trading days from 
ED+61 to ED+240. The results using different estimation windows are qualitatively the 
same. Therefore, to be consistent with the volume event study method in Lynch and 
Mendenhall (1997), Biktimirov, Cowan, and Jordan (2004), and Mase (2007), I discuss 
the results based on the pre-event estimation window. 
25 For example, January 1998's constituent list (Datastream constituent list variable LFTALLSHOI98) is 
used for the year 1998 
26 Results using either rank test or standard t-test are qualitatively similar. 
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It is critical to estimate the normal daily trading volume correctly. The normal return 
is defined as the expected return without the event taking place. It is important to 
eliminate any overlaps and infrequently traded stocks to prevent them influencing the 
parameter estimates. Therefore, I applied two screens to the sample. The first screen 
removes stocks for which the estimation period overlapped with another index change. 
The second removes stocks having more than 100 non-trading days in the 180-day 
estimation period. These two screens are applied to both estimation windows. Stocks 
must have no more than 100 non-trading days and have no overlap in the 180 days period 
of [ED-210, ED-31] to be included in the analysis when using the pre-event estimation 
window. Similarly, Stocks must have no more than 100 non-trading days and have no 
overlap in the 180 days period of[ED+61, ED+240] to be included in the analysis when 
using the post-event estimation window. 
Table 12 and Table 13 report the percentage abnormal trading volume for additions 
and deletions in the FTSE SmallCap index using pre-event estimation window, 
respectively. Table 14 and Table 15 report abnormal trading volume for additions and 
deletions in FTSE SmallCap index using post-event estimation window, respectively. As 
shown in those four tables, additions and deletions in the FTSE SmallCap index 
experience significant increase in trading volume on the effective day. Trading volume 
peaks on the effective day and then returns to normal. In additions, using a different 
estimation window does not affect the major conclusion. 
In Table 12 and Table 13, the abnormal trading volume on the effective day ranges 
from 115% significantly higher than normal daily trading volume for downward additions 
to 276% significantly higher than normal daily trading volume for pure deletions. For 
pure additions and upward additions, significant abnormal trading volume starts on AD+ 1 
and remains significant over the period of [AD+ 1, ED]. The percentage abnormal trading 
volumes increase from the 144% on ED-5 to 254% on the effective day for pure additions. 
Similarly, the percentage abnormal trading volumes increase from 120% on ED-5 to 242% 
on the effective day for pure additions. Trading volume is much higher than normal over 
the period of [AD+1, ED]. Consequently, the mean CARs for the same period are 5.23% 
and 4.82%, which are both economically and statistically significant, for pure additions 
and upward additions, respectively. 
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In contrast, significant abnormal trading volume starts on ED-1 and the percentage 
abnormal trading volumes peak at 115% on the effective day for downward additions. 
This number is about 140% lower than those of pure and upward additions. It is 
consistent with the abnormal return analysis that downward additions experience relative 
small price reactions around the effective day when compare to those of pure and upward 
additions. Finally, the significant abnormal trading volume continues until ED+ 1 for all 
three subsets of index additions. 
For pure deletions, significant abnormal trading volumes over period [ED-3, ED+1] 
remain above 211 % for all five trading days and peak at 276% on the effective day. This 
confirms the economically and statistically significant abnormal returns of pure deletions 
for the same period. For downward deletions, significant abnormal trading volume starts 
on ED-4 and continues until ED+8. The largest percentage abnormal trading volume of 
259% is associated with a significant abnormal return of -3.64% on the effective day. 
Finally, significant abnormal trading volumes start on the effective day and remains in 
the following two trading days for upward deletions. Despite that, on the effective day, 
the percentage abnormal trading volume is significant, but the abnormal return is 
economically and statistically insignificanr7• 
Figure 6 and Figure 7 plot the daily abnormal trading volume for the index additions 
and deletions, respectively, using pre-event estimation window. It is not a surprise that, 
for all changes, the peak of the daily abnormal trading volume histogram happens on the 
effective day, and then this peak returns to normal after the event. Note that downward 
additions seem to experience a permanent decrease in daily trading volume based on the 
daily abnormal trading volume histogram. In contrast, upward deletions seem to 
experience a permanent increase in daily trading volume based on the daily abnormal 
trading volume histogram. 
27 The "crude dependent" adjusted t statistic is insignificant result and tank z statistic is only significant at 
10% level on the effective day. 
Table 12: Abnormal Trading Volume of Additions in the FTSE SmallCap Index Using Pre-event Estimation Window 
The market model abnormal trading volume (AYt) is estimated using procedures described in Campbell and Wasley (1996). The 
market index is the value-weighted FTSE All Share Index and parameters are estimated over a pre-event period of 180 days (ED-210, 
ED-31). 
Pure additions (N=108) Downward additions (N=212) Upward additions (N=186) 
Day AYt RankZ t AYt RankZ t AYt RankZ t 
AD-24 0.314 -0.081 1.884 0.277 1.414 3.810*** 0.304 -0.150 2.472* 
AD-20 
-0.088 -1.363 -0.538 0.120 0.556 1.503 0.593 1.049 5.041 *** 
AD-15 0.388 -0.160 2.418* 0.151 1.322 1.741 0.474 0.557 3.951 *** 
AD-I0 0.424 -0.047 2.556* 0.135 0.443 1.448 0.333 0.217 2.954** 
AD-5 0.565 0.069 3.028** 0.237 0.954 2.792** 0.443 0.510 3.517*** 
AD-4 0.483 -0.108 2.575* 0.200 0.719 2.457* 0.462 0.401 4.030*** 
AD-3 0.565 0.054 3.254** 0.188 0.486 2.180* 0.884 1.819 7.866*** 
AD-2 0.484 0.047 2.691 ** 0.253 0.864 3.000** 0.668 0.912 5.081 *** 
AD-l 0.558 0.139 3.497*** 0.202 0.956 2.376* 0.603 0.926 5.163*** 
AD 1.314 1.770 7.495*** 0.292 1.422 3.385*** 0.994 2.168* 8.861 *** 
ED-5 1.439 2.326* 8.699*** 0.399 1.957 5.202*** 1.205 1.989* 11.114*** 
ED-4 1.560 2.316* 9.517*** 0.245 1.454 3.107** 1.267 2.749** 11.582*** 
ED-3 1.715 2.983** 11.062*** 0.358 2.312* 4.461 *** 1.482 2.908** 13.714*** 
ED-2 1.992 3.337*** 12.864*** 0.259 1.731 3.443*** 1.535 3.672*** 15.351 *** 
ED-l 2.189 3.710*** 15.574*** 0.463 2.690** 6.057*** 1.617 3.875*** 16.427*** 
ED 2.541 4.404*** 19.907*** 1.155 7.419*** 18.528*** 2.417 4.041*** 27.875*** 
ED+l 1.353 2.318* 8.118*** 0.408 2.706** 5.309*** 0.916 6.087*** 7.465*** 
ED+2 1.135 1.641 6.126*** 0.396 1.861 4.584*** 0.762 1.644 5.391 *** 
ED+3 0.781 1.158 3.993*** 0.319 1.528 3.626*** 0.507 0.803 3.266** 
ED+4 0.692 0.887 3.364** 0.222 0.955 2.755** 0.496 0.664 3.163** 
CJ1 
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Table 12 (continued) 
ED+5 0.527 0.787 1.696 0.241 1.139 2.527* 0.088 0.561 
ED+6 0.528 0.826 1.850 0.060 -0.346 0.672 0.180 0.219 
ED+7 0.851 1.168 2.826** 0.104 0.507 1.178 0.110 0.529 
ED+8 0.633 0.336 3.361 * 0.121 0.769 1.289 0.672 1.229 
ED+9 0.765 0.485 4.131*** 0.250 1.155 3.312** 0.618 1.085 
ED+I0 1.076 1.263 6.580*** 0.299 1.048 3.519*** 0.737 1.157 
ED+15 0.795 0.778 4.090*** 0.182 0.281 2.203* 0.610 1.042 
ED+20 0.748 0.665 4.223*** 0.141 0.013 1.689 0.278 0.078 
ED+25 0.796 0.861 4.242*** 0.015 -0.255 0.182 0.350 0.065 
ED+30 0.351 -0.209 2.013* -0.012 -0.320 -0.128 0.242 -0.321 
ED+40 0.408 -0.393 2.358* -0.009 -0.533 -0.104 0.404 -0.032 
ED+50 0.229 -0.673 1.526 -0.115 -1.656 -1.239 0.157 -0.617 
ED+60 0.274 -0.502 1.345 -0.227 -2.297 -2.676 0.296 -0.139 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance atthe 5%, 1 % and 0.1 % levels, respectively, using a two-tail test. 
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Table 13: Abnormal Trading Volume of Deletions in the FTSE SmallCap Index Using Pre-event Estimation Window 
The market model abnormal trading volume (A Yt) is estimated using procedures described in Campbell and Wasley (1996). The 
market index is the value-weighted FTSE All Share Index and parameters are estimated over a pre-event period of 180 days (ED-210, 
ED-31). 
Pure deletions (N=28) Downward deletions (N=277) Upward deletions (N=134) 
Day AYt RankZ t AYt RankZ t AYt RankZ t 
AD-24 0.590 -0.016 1.596 0.312 -0.011 2.841 *** 0.190 0.422 1.554 
AD-20 0.232 -0.496 0.533 0.157 -0.312 1.454 0.259 0.544 1.868 
AD-15 
-0.107 -0.949 -0.296 0.250 -0.043 2.227** 0.101 -0.108 0.741 
AD-10 0.345 -0.379 0.820 0.276 -0.045 2.487* 0.113 -0.205 0.779 
AD-5 0.648 -0.067 1.765 0.303 0.070 2.944** 0.326 0.691 2.871 ** 
AD-4 0.703 0.105 1.785 0.391 0.318 3.920*** 0.344 0.778 3.102** 
AD-3 0.433 -0.321 1.096 0.539 0.778 5.419*** 0.345 0.525 3.003** 
AD-2 0.034 -0.648 0.130 0.399 0.407 3.738*** 0.299 0.416 2.847** 
AD-1 0.006 -0.940 0.020 0.288 0.201 2.646** 0.336 0.549 2.916** 
AD 1.036 0.645 2.695* 0.696 1.168 6.008*** 0.644 1.746 5.285*** 
ED-5 0.726 0.092 1.601 0.915 1.591 8.977*** 0.335 0.526 2.950** 
ED-4 1.416 1.227 3.423*** 1.225 2.636** 12.731 *** 0.384 0.946 3.468*** 
ED-3 2.111 2.335* 7.069*** 1.226 2.655** 13.675*** 0.549 1.405 4.954*** 
ED-2 2.655 2.388* 6.905*** 1.379 2.926** 14.467*** 0.609 1.723 5.999*** 
ED-1 2.629 2.536* 6.934*** 1.440 3.169** 15.454*** 0.577 1.692 5.478*** 
ED 2.764 2.843** 8.401*** 2.586 5.803*** 35.135*** 1.549 5.516*** 18.062*** 
ED+1 2.329 2.110* 5.441 *** 2.054 4.130*** 17.947*** 0.950 3.157** 9.112*** 
ED+2 1.969 1.871 5.334*** 1.449 2.906** 12.003*** 0.791 2.318* 6.974*** 
ED+3 1.504 1.433 3.634** 1.545 3.020** 12.421 *** 0.530 0.081 3.735*** 
ED+4 0.683 0.003 1.345 1.776 3.168** 11.627*** 0.470 0.161 3.835*** 
VI 
N 
Table 13 (continued) 
ED+5 1.870 1.387 3.541 ** 1.625 2.842** 10.690*** 0.567 0.061 3.827*** 
ED+6 1.955 1.544 3.767** 1.351 2.468* 8.883*** 0.477 0.108 3.477*** 
ED+7 1.588 0.952 3.839*** 1.248 2.357* 10.128*** 0.474 0.183 4.204*** 
ED+8 2.328 2.199 6.079*** 1.023 2.061 * 8.823*** 0.579 0.054 5.235*** 
ED+9 1.694 1.384 4.294*** 0.982 1.756 8.739*** 0.546 0.053 5.516*** 
ED+I0 1.374 1.232 3.704*** 0.680 0.984 6.311 *** 0.448 0.090 4.279*** 
ED+15 1.659 1.488 4.317*** 0.634 0.808 5.866*** 0.481 1.642 3.631 *** 
ED+20 1.062 0.482 2.532* 0.613 0.852 6.492*** 0.637 1.635 5.943*** 
ED+25 0.845 0.421 2.503* 0.356 0.327 3.581 *** 0.580 1.692 5.414*** 
ED+30 0.347 -0.377 1.053 0.296 0.117 2.696** 0.384 0.836 3.215** 
ED+40 0.563 0.081 1.636 0.325 -0.122 3.195** 0.590 1.406 5.248*** 
ED+50 0.568 -0.356 1.762 0.050 -0.702 0.459 0.433 0.848 3.656*** 
ED+60 0.523 -0.070 1.479 0.038 -0.766 0.359 0.202 0.057 1.532 
The symbols *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1 % and 0.1 % levels, respectively, using a two-tail test. 
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Table 14: Abnormal Trading Volume of Additions in the FTSE SmallCap Using Post-event Estimation Window 
The market model abnormal trading volume (AvD is estimated using procedures described in Campbell and Wasley (1996). The 
market index is the value-weighted FTSE All Share Index and parameters are estimated over a post-event period of 180 days (ED+61, 
ED+240). 
Pure additions (N=153) Downward additions (N=198) Upward additions (N= 177) 
Day AYt RankZ t AYt RankZ t AYt RankZ t 
AD-24 0.344 0.485 2.324* 0.635 1.967 7.102*** 0.437 0.529 3.413*** 
AD-20 0.080 -0.388 0.510 0.461 1.511 5.088*** 0.603 1.209 4.263*** 
AD-15 0.421 0.805 3.116** 0.481 1.726 4.633*** 0.488 0.749 3.912*** 
AD-I0 0.535 0.704 3.73*** 0.483 1.439 5.227*** 0.559 0.891 4.547*** 
AD-5 0.455 0.601 3.031 ** 0.663 1.831 7.572*** 0.548 1.058 4.235*** 
AD-4 0.377 0.418 2.47* 0.556 1.638 6.612*** 0.550 0.989 5.058*** 
AD-3 0.522 0.732 3.618*** 0.676 2.090* 7.460*** 1.034 2.073* 9.697*** 
AD-2 0.399 0.666 2.556* 0.660 1.937 7.157*** 0.722 1.166 6.08*** 
AD-I 0.642 0.965 4.437*** 0.624 1.861 6.882*** 0.619 1.176 5.688*** 
AD 1.309 2.793** 9.396*** 0.622 1.865 7.199*** 1.103 2.168* 10.075*** 
ED-5 1.498 3.377*** 11.856*** 0.716 2.139* 8.608*** 1.354 2.836** 12.859*** 
ED-4 1.570 3.391*** 12.147*** 0.616 1.987* 6.834*** 1.393 2.897** 14.112*** 
ED-3 1.730 3.936*** 13.736*** 0.711 2.356* 8.746*** 1.557 3.366*** 16.120*** 
ED-2 1.866 4.185*** 14.833*** 0.657 2.241* 7.754*** 1.653 3.455*** 16.937*** 
ED-l 2.146 4.852*** 20.284*** 0.789 2.445* 9.127*** 1.730 3.563*** 16.190*** 
ED 2.597 5.678*** 27.742*** 1.518 5.334*** 23.845*** 2.530 5.086*** 30.238*** 
ED+l 1.464 3.465*** 10.757*** 0.763 2.528* 9.101 *** 1.389 2.914** 11.797*** 
ED+2 1.150 2.635** 9.156*** 0.608 1.761 6.947*** 1.189 2.454* 9.471 *** 
ED+3 1.006 2.275* 6.929*** 0.663 1.930 7.178*** 1.097 1.883 7.898*** 
ED+4 1.046 2.149* 7.433*** 0.503 1.569 5.591 *** 1.119 2.173* 8.865*** 
VI 
..p.. 
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Table 14 (continued) 
ED+5 0.868 1.826 5.090*** 0.472 1.361 4.557*** 1.104 2.213* 7.094*** 
ED+6 0.855 1.673 5.735*** 0.496 1.083 5.376*** 0.971 1.815 6.980*** 
ED+7 0.664 1.297 4.179*** 0.561 1.629 6.464*** 1.031 1.889 7.170*** 
ED+8 0.531 0.693 3.037** 0.584 1.661 6.371 *** 1.008 1.831 8.188*** 
ED+9 0.703 1.493 4.873*** 0.524 1.549 6.070*** 0.825 1.660 7.012*** 
ED+I0 0.671 1.166 4.991 *** 0.604 1.605 7.026*** 0.766 1.367 8.011 *** 
ED+15 0.450 0.818 3.022** 0.397 0.968 4.373*** 0.600 1.057 6.447*** 
ED+20 0.398 0.504 2.724** 0.328 0.631 3.701 *** 0.262 0.324 2.349* 
ED+25 0.314 0.342 2.105* 0.322 0.848 3.722*** 0.332 0.321 3.260** 
ED+30 
-0.008 -0.572 -0.056 0.230 0.342 2.434* 0.341 0.239 2.956** 
ED+40 0.245 0.215 0.948 0.243 0.482 2.580* 0.318 0.219 3.213** 
ED+50 0.088 -0.458 0.688 0.204 -0.084 2.196* 0.053 -0.450 0.548 
ED+60 0.041 -0.443 0.316 0.033 -0.575 0.366 0.031 -0.364 0.315 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1 % and 0.1 % levels, respectively, using a two-tail test. 
U"I 
U"I 
Table 15: Abnormal Trading Volume of Deletions in the FTSE SmallCap Index Using Post-event Estimation Window 
The market model abnormal trading volume (A \1;;) is estimated using procedures described in Campbell and Wasley (1996). The 
market index is the value-weighted FTSE All Share Index and parameters are estimated over a post-event period of 180 days (ED+61, 
ED+240). 
Pure deletions (N=27) Downward deletions (N=278) Upward deletions (N= 151) 
Day A\1;; RankZ t A\1;; RankZ t A\1;; RankZ t 
AD-24 
-0.328 -1.168 -1.002 0.239 -0.274 1.913 -0.126 -0.811 -0.991 
AD-20 
-0.803 -1.646 -1.913 0.074 -0.516 0.557 -0.029 -0.057 -0.198 
AD-15 
-0.552 -1.405 -1.462 0.171 -0.438 1.475 -0.201 -0.645 -1.577 
AD-I0 
-0.156 -0.975 -0.340 0.164 -0.406 1.402 -0.194 -0.827 -1.508 
AD-5 
-0.039 -0.770 -0.104 0.339 -0.052 3.015** -0.056 -0.466 -0.495 
AD-4 0.289 -0.120 0.719 0.350 0.011 3.457*** -0.016 0.033 -0.145 
AD-3 0.003 -0.675 0.008 0.477 0.388 4.256*** -0.068 -0.652 -0.611 
AD-2 
-0.544 -1.460 -1.467 0.443 0.285 3.866*** -0.091 -1.080 -0.877 
AD-l 
-0.301 -1.269 -0.986 0.251 -0.185 2.001 * 0.026 0.122 0.237 
AD 0.787 0.814 2.311 * 0.608 0.853 4.804*** 0.296 1.343 2.685** 
ED-5 0.255 -0.181 0.494 0.753 0.971 6.754*** 0.014 -0.294 0.136 
ED-4 1.065 1.331 2.187* 1.109 2.202* 10.988*** -0.004 0.230 -0.031 
ED-3 1.730 2.567* 5.639*** 1.215 2.489* 12.797*** 0.123 0.859 1.208 
ED-2 2.385 2.898** 6.179*** 1.329 2.720** 12.868*** 0.147 0.867 1.497 
ED-l 2.038 2.481* 4.707*** 1.405 2.846** 13.443*** 0.274 1.964* 2.690** 
ED 2.230 2.830** 5.925*** 2.485 5.605*** 29.273*** 1.054 7.602*** 15.256*** 
ED+l 1.942 2.439* 4.364*** 1.592 3.229** 13.161 *** 0.492 3.9689*** 5.174*** 
ED+2 1.564 1.753 3.548** 1.201 2.308* 9.923*** 0.393 2.617** 3.930*** 
ED+3 1.159 1.525 2.442* 1.250 2.166* 9.521 *** 0.326 2.520* 2.908** 
ED+4 0.214 -0.182 0.395 1.369 2.359* 8.667*** 0.259 1.582 2.426* 
c.n 
0'\ 
~~~~---------~-~---~- --~ 
Table 15 (continued) 
ED+5 1.130 1.189 1.739 1.269 2.331 * 8.667*** 0.427 2.582** 3.732*** 
ED+6 1.466 1.615 2.594* 1.172 2.089* 7.415*** 0.160 1.618 1.257 
ED+7 0.826 0.564 1.574 1.044 1.970* 8.557*** 0.376 1.904 4.122*** 
ED+8 1.547 1.893 3.937*** 0.886 1.569 6.796*** 0.209 1.430 2.243* 
ED+9 0.977 0.890 2.208 0.859 1.539 7.206*** 0.247 1.392 2.896** 
ED+I0 0.909 0.938 1.977 0.673 0.888 5.948*** -0.047 0.199 -0.508 
ED+15 1.081 1.056 ·2.629* 0.610 0.706 5.390*** 0.181 1.633 1.603 
ED+20 0.678 0.539 1.788 0.626 0.713 6.139*** 0.261 1.260 3.086** 
ED+25 0.244 -0.094 0.640 0.274 -0.010 2.689** 0.249 1.911 2.691 ** 
ED+30 
-0.118 -0.855 -0.321 0.268 0.047 2.526* 0.131 0.649 1.250 
ED+40 
-0.030 -0.272 -0.085 0.295 -0.338 2.884** 0.102 0.419 0.965 
ED+50 0.026 -0.447 0.087 0.009 -0.887 0.083 -0.055 -0.537 -0.609 
ED+60 0.034 -0.549 0.092 0.096 -0.828 0.987 -0.105 -1.132 -1.126 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1 % and 0.1 % levels, respectively, using a two-tail test. 
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Figure 6: Daily abnormal trading volume for additions to the FTSE SmallCap Index 
using pre-event estimation window. 
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Figure 7: Daily abnormal trading volume for deletions from the FTSE SmallCap 
Index using pre-event estimation window. 
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4.2.2 The Canadian Sample 
I use all stocks in the CFMRC database as the market portfolio proxy. For any day, 
the daily market volume measurement is the average of daily stock volume measurement 
across all stocks on that day. 
Similar to my UK sample, two statistics, standard t-Test and rank test, are reported. I 
also use different estimation windows. The pre-event estimation window covers the 
period of [AD-210, AD-30]. Post-event estimation window covers the period of [ED+60, 
ED+240]. 
Returns for different estimation windows are reported. But, to be consistent with my 
UK sample, I discuss the results based the pre-event estimation window. 
In addition, two screens are applied to the sample for pre-event estimation window as 
well as the post-event estimation window to eliminate any potential bias. The first screen 
removes stocks for which the estimation window overlapped with another index changes. 
The second screen removes stocks having more than 100 non-trading days in the ISO-day 
long estimation window. 
Table 16 and Table 17 report abnormal trading volume for additions and deletions in 
the S&P/TSX SmallCap index. In these two tables, Panel A shows the results using pre-
event estimation window [AD-210, AD-31] and Panel B shows the results using post-
event estimation window [ED+61, ED+240]. As shown in those two tables, all four sub-
groups experience significant increases in trading volume on the effective day and the 
announcement day. Trading volume peaks on the effective day and then returns to normal. 
In additions, using different estimation windows do not affect the major conclusion. 
As shown in Panel A of Table 16 and Table 17, the percentage abnormal trading 
volume on the effective day ranges from 90% for downward additions to 202.6% for pure 
deletions. On the announcement day, the percentage abnormal trading volume ranges 
from 66.2% for downward additions to 110.4% for pure additions. 
For pure additions, the announcement day trading volume is 110% and, on the 
effective day, it is 199%. With downward additions, the trading volume spike occurs only 
on the announcement day and effective day, when the abnormal trading volume is 66.2% 
and 90%, respectively. Table 17 shows that deletions experience similar abnormal 
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Table 16: Abnormal Trading Volume of Additions in the S&PITSX SmallCap Index 
The market model abnormal trading volume (A \'t) is estimated using procedures 
described in Campbell and Wasley (1996). The market portfolio consists of all stocks in 
CFMRC database. Parameters are estimated over a pre-event period of [AD-210, AD-31] 
(panel A) and over a post-event ~eriod of [ED+61 , ED+240] (panel B). 
Panel A Pure additions Downward additions 
Pre-event N=310 N=25 
Day AV RankZ t AV RankZ t 
AD-30 0.192 0.220 2.607*** 0.128 0.035 0.571 
AD-20 0.232 0.846 3.704*** 0.087 -0.305 0.346 
AD-15 0.253 1.041 4.136*** 0.147 0.331 0.753 
AD-10 0.301 1.655 4.246*** 0.117 0.339 0.489 
AD-9 0.273 0.790 3.817*** -0.246 -1.295 -1.070 
AD-8 0.254 0.917 3.571 *** 0.162 0.248 0.753 
AD-7 0.287 1.089 4.171 *** 0.318 1.544 1.943 
AD-6 0.351 0.928 5.676*** 0.204 0.858 1.062 
AD-5 0.326 1.376 4.970*** 0.320 1.679 2.097* 
AD-4 0.276 0.342 3.827*** -0.115 -0.778 -0.669 
AD-3 0.306 0.693 4.112*** 0.400 1.380 1.768 
AD-2 0.348 0.996 4.499*** 0.042 -0.510 0.224 
AD-1 0.499 2.081 * 6.513*** 0.315 0.895 1.643 
AD 1.104 4.543*** 12.558*** 0.662 2.931** 2.824** 
ED-l# 0.839 3.885*** 12.309*** 0.303 0.824 1.490 
ED 1.999 8.268*** 24.222*** 0.900 4.388*** 5.375*** 
ED+1 0.910 4.454*** 13.488*** 0.435 1.797 2.388* 
ED+2 0.639 2.163* 8.695*** 0.281 0.999 1.414 
ED+3 0.550 1.976* 7.736*** 0.450 1.574 2.203* 
ED+4 0.377 0.811 5.409*** 0.202 0.903 0.971 
ED+5 0.269 0.165 3.992*** 0.231 0.488 1.040 
ED+6 0.364 0.848 5.440*** 0.329 1.192 1.382 
ED+7 0.387 0.963 5.700*** 0.524 1.820 2.196* 
ED+8 0.388 0.958 5.440*** 0.222 0.399 0.859 
ED+9 0.433 1.316 6.870*** 0.357 1.478 1.475 
ED+10 0.428 1.305 6.336*** 0.613 2.288* 2.718* 
ED+15 0.225 0.146 3.190** 0.284 0.830 0.929 
ED+20 0.209 0.082 3.066** 0.088 0.103 0.413 
ED+30 0.187 -0.107 2.770** 0.542 1.853 1.718 
ED+40 0.313 1.356 4.826*** 0.195 0.678 0.783 
ED+50 0.178 0.011 2.816** 0.348 0.214 1.136 
ED+60 0.159 0.106 2.562* 0.470 1.863 2.057 
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Table 16 (continued) 
Panel B Pure additions Downward additions 
Post-event N=296 N=25 
Day AV RankZ t AV RankZ t 
AD-30 0.054 0.117 0.663 0.068 -0.116 0.232 
AD-20 0.085 0.736 1.252 -0.032 -0.281 -0.107 
AD-15 0.121 0.873 1.838 -0.001 0.149 -0.007 
AD-10 0.151 1.447 2.123* -0.044 0.215 -0.165 
AD-9 0.136 0.718 1.907 -0.457 -1.170 -1.789 
AD-8 0.099 0.828 1.473 0.007 -0.069 0.029 
AD-7 0.153 1.200 2.577* 0.188 0.958 1.392 
AD-6 0.254 1.425 4.449*** -0.014 0.138 -0.092 
AD-5 0.246 1.833 3.999*** 0.162 1.041 1.245 
AD-4 0.158 0.464 2.301 * -0.265 -1.027 -1.513 
AD-3 0.152 0.669 2.179* 0.240 1.057 1.060 
AD-2 0.233 1.309 3.23** -0.087 -0.460 -0.419 
AD-1 0.391 2.293* 5.227*** 0.183 0.646 0.886 
AD 1.012 4.942*** 12.42*** 0.388 2.003* 1.367 
ED-1# 0.736 4.033*** 11.715*** 0.165 0.486 0.754 
ED 1.908 8.181*** 25.462*** 0.791 3.451 *** 4.203*** 
ED+1 0.798 4.727*** 14.139*** 0.340 1.417 1.772 
ED+2 0.501 2.426* 8.114*** 0.171 0.691 0.866 
ED+3 0.426 2.110* 6.735*** 0.324 1.166 1.703 
ED+4 0.260 1.024 4.079*** 0.092 0.383 0.397 
ED+5 0.130 0.150 2.076* 0.106 0.097 0.452 
ED+6 0.214 0.665 3.546*** 0.244 0.823 0.966 
ED+7 0.208 0.616 3.210** 0.371 1.030 1.449 
ED+8 0.206 0.678 3.240** 0.078 0.076 0.301 
ED+9 0.294 1.263 4.931 *** 0.266 1.041 1.270 
ED+10 0.281 1.065 4.64*** 0.538 1.947 2.659* 
ED+15 0.087 0.141 1.369 0.213 0.563 0.760 
ED+20 0.036 -0.073 0.62 0.017 0.274 0.091 
ED+30 0.067 -0.220 1.133 0.568 2.006* 2.067* 
ED+40 0.160 1.191 2.883** 0.242 1.016 1.157 
ED+50 0.006 -0.177 0.108 0.401 0.597 1.434 
ED+60 0.012 -0.037 0.225 0.387 1.678 2.023 
#The A V for day ED-1 is computed only when there is at least one trading day between 
the announcement day and effective day. The symbols *, * *, and * * * denote statistical 
significance at the 5%, 1 % and 0.1 % levels, respectively, using a two-tail test 
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Table 17: Abnormal Trading Volume of Deletions in the S&PtrSX SmallCap Index 
The market model abnormal trading volume (AVt ) is estimated using procedures 
described in Campbell and Wasley (1996). The market portfolio consists of all stocks in 
CFMRC database. Parameters are estimated over a pre-event period of [AD-21 0, AD-31] 
(Panel A) and over a post-event period of [ED+61 , ED+240] (Panel B). 
Panel A Pure deletions Upward deletions 
Pre-event N=178 N=72 
Day AV RankZ t AV RankZ t 
AD-30 0.043 0.218 0.422 0.113 0.548 1.153 
AD-20 0.182 0.682 1.821 -0.045 -0.498 -0.392 
AD-15 0.046 -0.166 0.497 0.055 0.218 0.446 
AD-I0 0.135 0.860 1.382 0.051 0.100 0.461 
AD-9 0.252 1.243 2.510* -0.087 -0.817 -0.723 
AD-8 0.427 1.988* 4.422*** -0.089 -0.756 -0.887 
AD-7 0.306 1.310 3.151 ** -0.019 -0.573 -0.143 
AD-6 0.255 1.067 2.608** -0.140 -1.386 -1.169 
AD-5 0.237 1.188 2.485* -0.101 -1.473 -0.732 
AD-4 0.249 1.407 2.580* -0.050 -0.613 -0.397 
AD-3 0.426 2.066* 4.414*** -0.058 -0.852 -0.478 
AD-2 0.313 1.768 3.645*** -0.154 -1.685 -1.334 
AD-1 0.285 1.316 3.216** 0.107 -0.091 0.854 
AD 0.719 3.937*** 8.054*** 0.732 5.348*** 6.794*** 
ED-1# 0.873 3.946*** 9.939*** 0.226 0.813 1.695 
ED 2.026 7.529*** 21.420*** 0.940 6.747*** 9.453*** 
ED+1 0.904 4.331 *** 10.204*** 0.334 2.010* 2.757** 
ED+2 0.400 1.687 4.177*** 0.136 0.818 1.175 
ED+3 0.438 2.073* 4.669*** 0.237 1.237 1.807 
ED+4 0.314 1.635 3.437*** 0.029 0.158 0.285 
ED+5 0.213 0.880 2.221 * 0.048 0.023 0.448 
ED+6 0.160 0.697 1.580 0.101 0.164 0.831 
ED+7 0.174 0.520 1.494 0.180 0.610 1.479 
ED+8 0.334 1.410 3.343** 0.084 1.024 0.765 
ED+9 0.166 0.904 1.781 0.153 1.171 1.404 
ED+1O 0.351 1.157 3.316*** 0.155 0.896 1.354 
ED+15 0.103 0.066 1.024 0.090 0.358 0.799 
ED+20 -0.106 -0.747 -1.047 0.041 0.341 0.369 
ED+30 -0.141 -0.671 -1.427 -0.265 -1.572 -2.174* 
ED+40 -0.267 -1.231 -2.819** -0.198 -1.525 -1.903 
ED+50 -0.301 -0.975 -2.706** -0.114 -0.752 -1.057 
ED+60 -0.220 -1.275 -2.456* 0.053 0.144 0.487 
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Table 17 (continued) 
Panel B Pure deletions Upward deletions 
Post-event N=171 N=70 
Day AV RankZ t AV RankZ t 
AD-30 0.332 0.449 2.425* 0.182 0.990 1.683 
AD-20 0.521 1.111 4.434*** -0.007 0.148 -0.062 
AD-15 0.382 0.549 3.191 ** 0.087 0.453 0.737 
AD-I0 0.436 1.066 3.925*** 0.078 0.585 0.792 
AD-9 0.586 1.582 4.895*** -0.077 -0.567 -0.677 
AD-8 0.759 2.188* 6.583*** -0.062 -0.355 -0.614 
AD-7 0.646 1.844 6.001 *** -0.006 -0.067 -0.055 
AD-6 0.580 1.274 4.935*** -0.189 -1.270 -1.716 
AD-5 0.596 1.579 5.380*** -0.059 -0.724 -0.459 
AD-4 0.570 1.534 4.710*** -0.014 -0.190 -0.104 
AD-3 0.771 2.157* 6.567*** -0.041 -0.049 -0.318 
AD-2 0.671 2.080* 6.724*** -0.158 -1.620 -1.452 
AD-l 0.598 1.547 5.779*** 0.116 0.418 0.952 
AD 1.065 3.492*** 9.431*** 0.731 5.491*** 6.702*** 
ED-l# 1.260 3.855*** 11.557*** 0.235 1.372 1.909 
ED 2.402 6.664*** 20.545*** 0.949 6.921 *** 9.660*** 
ED+l 1.308 4.243*** 11.846*** 0.312 2.280* 2.889** 
ED+2 0.742 2.053* 6.775*** 0.126 0.861 1.223 
ED+3 0.792 2.480* 7.990*** 0.259 1.860 2.172* 
ED+4 0.653 1.921 6.130*** 0.039 0.383 0.397 
ED+5 0.524 1.436 5.081 *** 0.043 0.185 0.44 
ED+6 0.513 1.310 4.655*** 0.110 0.512 0.908 
ED+7 0.524 1.181 4.499*** 0.231 1.394 1.842 
ED+8 0.734 1.977* 6.907*** 0.167 1.916 1.402 
ED+9 0.578 1.699 5.933*** 0.229 1.972* 1.999* 
ED+I0 0.734 1.716 5.912*** 0.180 1.502 1.778 
ED+15 0.455 0.711 3.776*** 0.183 1.156 1.573 
ED+20 0.230 -0.067 2.048* 0.087 0.788 0.874 
ED+30 0.238 0.213 2.229* -0.151 -0.793 -1.376 
ED+40 0.118 -0.264 1.040 -0.116 -1.075 -1.23 
ED+50 0.092 -0.125 0.777 -0.020 -0.118 -0.234 
ED+60 0.155 -0.468 1.468 0.145 0.977 1.538 
#The A V for day ED-l is computed only when there is at least one trading day between 
the announcement day and effective day. The symbols *,**, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 5%, 1 % and 0.1 % levels, respectively, using a two-tail test 
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trading volumes on the announcement day and the effective day. Upward deletions are 
affected less than pure deletions on both the announcement day and effective day. 
4.3 Differentiating between Temporary and Permanent Price Effects 
Obviously, results shown in abnormal return and volume analyses consistently show 
that additions and deletions of the FTSE SmallCap index are associated with significant 
price and volume effects. Now, the question is whether the reactions associated with the 
additions and deletions ofthe FTSE Small Cap index are temporary or permanent. 
In this section, I examine the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over various post-
event periods to differentiate between temporary and permanent price effects. If the price 
effects are temporary, the abnormal price reaction should be reverted after the event takes 
place. Table 18 and Table 19 present the CARs for various periods that start from ED-30 
to any day up to day ED+60 for additions and deletions in the FTSE SmallCap index, 
respectively. 
As shown in Table 18, the results for pure additions show that there is no significant 
pre-event upward trend until ED-I0 and the CAR increases rapidly after that. On the 
effective day, the largest CAR of 10.15% is reached and starting to decline. Note that this 
decline in the CARs after the effective day clearly shows that price reversal exists in the 
post-event window [ED+ 1, ED+60]. 
Results for downward additions show that the CAR is negative and strongly 
significant since the beginning of the event window [ED-30, ED+60]. The CAR declines 
rapidly and reaches -15.68% on ED+2. I also find that there is a price reversal during the 
effective day and few days after. However, the impact of this price reversal is small and 
short-lived as the post-event CARs stay at almost the same level. 
Results for upward additions show that the CAR is economically and statistically 
significant for the entire event window [ED-30, ED+60]. The CAR increases rapidly and 
reaches 20.45% on the effective day. Similar to downward additions, I find a small and 
short-lived price reversal over the few days after the effective day. After that, the upward 
trend continues as shown in Figure 3. 
As shown in Table 19, pure deletions experience different pattern from pure additions. 
Significant CARs appear after the announcement day and decreases rapidly. A short-lived 
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price reversal happens after the effective day but does not bring the CAR back to the 
original level. The CARs over the period of [ED, ED+60] do not experience significant 
change. By the end ofED+60, the CAR is still negative and economically significant. 
CAR for downward deletions is negative and strongly significant since the beginning 
of the event window [ED-30, ED+60]. The CAR declines rapidly and reaches -22.67% on 
the effective day. I also find that there is a price reversal after the effective day and CAR 
is brought back to as high as -8.54%. However, by the end of ED+60, there is still an 
economically significant CAR of -11.44% indicates that the price reversal after the 
effective day is partial and short-lived. 
It is obvious that the CAR for upward deletions is economically and statistically 
significant for the entire event window [ED-30, ED+60]. The CAR increases rapidly and 
reaches 13.06% on ED-7 (also can be expressed as AD-I). Again, the decline in CAR 
clearly supports the existence of price reversal. However, any reversal disappears around 
ED+5 as shown in Figure 2. 
For all FTSE SmallCap index changes except pure additions, the price reversal 
disappears soon after the effective day. Pure additions is the only sub-groups experience 
complete price reversal. The pre-event trend is not a surprise because of the mechanics 
use to in review FTSE indices. The changes to FTSE SmallCap index are foreseeable for 
every investor, so it is possible to anticipate the event and trade in advance. According to 
the price pressure hypothesis, the CAR built up though the pre-event trend should revert 
completely after the event. However, for five sub-groups I find that the CAR built up 
though the pre-event trend is permanent. Therefore, in the next two sections, I examine 
the possible factors that cause the permanent price reaction. 
4.4 Institutional Ownership Analysis 
To examine institutional ownership changes around the index changes in the FTSE 
SmallCap index, I use the procedures described in Biktimirov, Cowan, and Jordan's 
(2004) that are an extension of those used by Pruitt and Wei (1989). However, my 
procedure is simpler since the percentages of institutional shareholdings can be directly 
obtained from Thomson Datastream database. Thomson Datastream database defines the 
percentages of institutional shareholdings as the percentage of total shares in issue held as 
Table 18: Cumulative Abnormal Return for Additions in the FTSE SmallCap Index Starting From ED-30. 
This table shows the cumulative abnormal returns, CAR, for various periods which start from ED-30 to any day t up to ED+60 using 
the market-adjusted model and the FTSE SmallCap value-weighted index as the market index proxy. The day 0 is the effective day, 
and the ED-6 is the announcement day. Three two statistics, t-test with CDA and Rank test are reported (As robustness check, I also 
check the Generalized Sign test statistic and find that the results are gualitativel~ the same). 
Pure additions (N=187) Downward additions (N=289) UQward additions (N=196) 
Period CAR CDAt rankz CAR CDAt rankz CAR CDAt rankz 
[ED-30,ED-29] 0.13% 0.398 0.386 -1.33% -3.248** -3.060** 1.49% 4.542*** 2.023* 
[ED-30,ED-25] 0.15% 0.274 -0.46 -4.33% -6.115*** -5.633*** 3.81% 6.720*** 2.056* 
[ED-30,ED-20] -0.18% -0.245 -0.085 -8.20% -8.547*** -7.236*** 6.44% 8.374*** 1.960$ 
[ED-30,ED-15] 0.62% 0.685 0.769 -10.31 % -8.907*** -7.874*** 8.16% 8.803*** 2.982** 
[ED-30,ED-I0] 1.35% 1.301 1.378 -13.10% -9.884*** -8.929*** 11.27% 10.617*** 4.096*** 
[ED-30,ED-9] 1.82% 1.713$ 1.702$ -13.19% -9.721 *** -9.051 *** 12.22% 11.239*** 4.629*** 
[ED-30,ED-8] 2.59% 2.384* 2.170* -13.95% -10.053*** -9.118*** 12.87% 11.584*** 4.978*** 
[ED-30,ED-7] 2.78% 2.504* 2.536* -13.45% -9.492*** -8.658*** 13.78% 12.136*** 5.379*** 
[ED-30,AD] 3.96% 3.502*** 3.474*** -14.40% -9.956*** -9.095*** 14.58% 12.582*** 5.959*** 
[ED-30,ED-5] 4.78% 4.146*** 3.921 *** -15.06% -10.212*** -9.352*** 15.50% 13.l20*** 6.351 *** 
[ED-30,ED-4] 6.03% 5.128*** 4.609*** -15.16% -10.084*** -9.069*** 16.41% 13.632*** 6.952*** 
[ED-30,ED-3] 6.65% 5.555*** 5.241*** -15.34% -10.025*** -8.750*** 17.03% 13.890*** 7.503*** 
[ED-30,ED-2] 7.76% 6.372*** 5.930*** -15.68% -10.068*** -8.509*** 17.27% 13.841 *** 7.839*** 
[ED-30,ED-l ] 8.42% 6.796*** 6.298*** -15.44% -9.745*** -8.016*** 18.37% 14.471*** 8.422*** 
[ED-30,ED] 10.15% 8.056*** 6.965*** -14.17% -8.797*** -7.297*** 20.45% 15.852*** 9.168*** 
[ED-30,ED+ 1] 10.00% 7.813*** 6.945*** -13.50% -8.248*** -7.127*** 20.37% 15.537*** 8.960*** 
[ED-30,ED+2] 9.95% 7.655*** 6.766*** -13.55% -8.156*** -6.842*** 20.01% 15.031*** 8.643*** 
[ED-30,ED+3] 9.59% 7.268*** 6.342*** -13.58% -8.051*** -6.687*** 19.93% 14.752*** 8.376*** 
[ED-30,ED+4] 9.24% 6.904*** 5.968*** -13.35% -7.800*** -6.334*** 19.64% 14.328*** 8.018*** 
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Table 18 (continued) 
[ED-30,ED+5] 9.00% 6.628*** 5.556*** -13.18% -7.596*** -6.049*** 19.68% 
[ED-30,ED+6] 8.95% 6.502*** 5.406*** -13.30% -7.558*** -5.944*** 19.65% 
[ED-30,ED+7] 8.72% 6.251 *** 5.062*** -12.89% -7.227*** -5.631*** 19.86% 
[ED-30,ED+8] 8.42% 5.956*** 4.737*** -12.97% -7.183*** -5.485*** 19.82% 
[ED-30,ED+9] 8.34% 5.825*** 4.583*** -12.26% -6.699*** -5.095*** 19.33% 
[ED-30,ED+ 10] 7.97% 5.498*** 4.376*** -12.49% -6.742*** -5.135*** 18.89% 
[ED-30,ED+15] 7.75% 5.047*** 3.853*** -13.58% -6.920*** -4.963*** 19.00% 
[ED-30,ED+20] 7.74% 4.791 *** 3.463*** -13.76% -6.663*** -4.482*** 19.53% 
[ED-30,ED+25] 7.06% 4.170*** 2.864** -13.12% -6.060*** -4.350*** 19.58% 
[ED-30,ED+ 30] 5.81% 3.286** 2.259* -12.49% -5.529*** -3.978*** 19.68% 
[ED-30,ED+ 35] 4.75% 2.582** 1.683$ -11.03% -4.692*** -3.450*** 20.39% 
[ED-30,ED+40] 4.47% 2.346* 1.599 -12.00% -4.923*** -3.339*** 21.29% 
[ED-30,ED+45] 3.55% 1.798$ 1.346 -13.00% -5.155*** -3.185** 21.46% 
[ED-30,ED+50] 2.61% 1.281 1.013 -13.18% -5.062*** -3.304** 20.75% 
[ED-30,ED+55] 2.21% 1.055 0.996 -13.74% -5.124*** -3.725*** 20.41% 
[ED-30,ED+60] 1.14% 0.529 0.984 -15.40% -5.582*** -3.825*** 19.98% 
The symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%,5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively, using a two-tail test 
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Table 19: Cumulative Abnormal Return for Deletions in the FTSE SmallCap Index Starting From ED-30. 
This table shows the cumulative abnormal returns, CAR, for various periods which start from ED-30 to day t (up to ED+60) using the 
market-adjusted model and the FTSE SmallCap value-weighted index as the market index proxy. The day 0 is the effective day, and 
the day -6 is the announcement day. Three two statistics, t-test with CDA and Rank test are reported (As robustness check, I also 
check the Generalized Sign test statistic and find that the results are gualitativel~ the same). 
Pure deletions (N=30) Downward deletions (N=299) UEward deletions (N=203) 
Period CAR CDAt rankz CAR CDAt rankz CAR CDAt rankz 
[ED-30,ED-29] 0.03% 0.049 -0.109 -0.68% -1.472 -1.08 1.02% 2.966** 1.587 
[ED-30,ED-25] -0.91% -0.792 -1.896$ -1.89% -2.381 * -2.814** 3.61% 6.062*** 3.239** 
[ED-30,ED-20] -0.83% -0.537 -1.313 -3.76% -3.494*** -3.395*** 6.76% 8.371*** 4.701 *** 
[ED-30,ED-15] -2.09% -1.119 -1.956$ -6.00% -4.619*** -4.159*** 8.38% 8.604*** 5.183*** 
[ED-30,ED-I0] -4.26% -1.993* -2.916** -9.63% -6.473*** -4.868*** 11.89% 10.661*** 6.807*** 
[ED-30,ED-9] -4.74% -2.163* -3.153** -10.35% -6.796*** -4.974*** 12.41% 10.871*** 6.878*** 
[ED-30,ED-8] -4.99% -2.227* -3.304** -11.99% -7.698*** -5.426*** 12.94% 11.087*** 7.020*** 
[ED-30,ED-7] -4.89% -2.135* -3.354*** -12.67% -7.961 *** -5.579*** 13.06% 10.952*** 6.943*** 
[ED-30,AD] -5.57% -2.384* -3.491 *** -13.74% -8.460*** -5.791 *** 12.99% 10.674*** 6.544*** 
[ED-30,ED-5] -6.00% -2.520* -3.799*** -14.81% -8.944*** -5.987*** 12.96% 10.442*** 6.281 *** 
[ED-30,ED-4] -7.24% -2.982** -4.092*** -16.07% -9.522*** -6.165*** 12.59% 9.956*** 5.948*** 
[ED-30,ED-3] -9.44% -3.819*** -4.414*** -18.29% -10.644*** -6.579*** 12.51% 9.711*** 5.873*** 
[ED-30,ED-2] -10.98% -4.367*** -4.534*** -18.25% -10.432*** -7.056*** 12.07% 9.208*** 5.650*** 
[ED-30,ED-l] -12.51% -4.891*** -4.816*** -19.49% -10.955*** -7.325*** 11.35% 8.513*** 5.200*** 
[ED-30,ED] -16.54% -6.361*** -5.267*** -22.67% -12.536*** -7.860*** 11.12% 8.206*** 4.894*** 
[ED-30,ED+ 1] -16.28% -6.163*** -5.287*** -21.30% -11.592*** -7.466*** 10.69% 7.768*** 4.624*** 
[ED-30,ED+2] -15.94% -5.942*** -5.182*** -21.03% -11.269*** -7.353*** 10.47% 7.490*** 4.362*** 
[ED-30,ED+3] -15.04% -5.524*** -5.011 *** -19.78% -10.445*** -7.077*** 10.41% 7.338*** 4.232*** 
[ED-30,ED+4] -15.22% -5.507*** -5.006*** -19.34% -10.066*** -6.993*** 9.98% 6.931 *** 3.870*** 
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Table 19 (continued) 
[ED-30,ED+5] -15.30% -5.458*** -5.136*** -18.30% -9.391 *** -6.783*** 10.04% 
[ED-30,ED+6] -15.69% -5.522*** -5.235*** -17.30% -8.755*** -6.715*** 9.97% 
[ED-30,ED+ 7] -15.71 % -5.456*** -5.439*** -17.01% -8.494*** -6.795*** 10.04% 
[ED-30,ED+8] -15.55% -5.330*** -5.425*** -16.54% -8.156*** -6.849*** 9.95% 
[ED-30,ED+9] -14.35% -4.859*** -5.102*** -15.71% -7.648*** -6.647*** 10.25% 
[ED-30,ED+10] -13.73% -4.592*** -4.770*** -14.94% -7.185*** -6.319*** 10.14% 
[ED-3 O,ED+ 15] -14.83% -4.681*** -4.845*** -12.82% -5.819*** -5.620*** 10.99% 
[ED-30,ED+20] -17.59% -5.274*** -5.409*** -12.04% -5.192*** -5.071 *** 11.16% 
[ED-30,ED+25] -16.80% -4.808*** -4.655*** -11.84% -4.871*** -4.670*** 11.35% 
[ED-30,ED+ 30] -16.38% -4.489*** -4.292*** -10.56% -4.164*** -4.400*** 12.42% 
[ED-30,ED+35] -17.26% -4.549*** -4.391*** -10.42% -3.950*** -4.417*** 12.68% 
[ED-30,ED+40] -18.09% -4.597*** -4.338*** -8.54% -3.121 ** -3.768*** 12.74% 
[ED-30,ED+45] -19.07% -4.684*** -4.306*** -9.36% -3.305*** -3.633*** 13.28% 
[ED-30,ED+50] -19.75% -4.698*** -4.440*** -9.71% -3.320*** -3.646*** 14.49% 
[ED-30,ED+55] -20.21% -4.665*** -4.387*** -11.35% -3.769*** -3.699*** 14.35% 
[ED-30 ,ED+60] -17.42% -3.910*** -3.606*** -11.44% -3.691*** -3.476*** 14.16% 
The symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1 % levels, respectively, using a two-tail test 
6.877*** 
6.735*** 
6.691*** 
6.549*** 
6.661*** 
6.504*** 
6.659*** 
6.420*** 
6.233*** 
6.533*** 
6.414*** 
6.211 *** 
6.257*** 
6.617*** 
6.357*** 
6.098*** 
3.723*** 
3.564*** 
3.563*** 
3.435*** 
3.588*** 
3.430*** 
3.540*** 
3.196** 
2.816** 
2.664** 
2.429* 
2.300* 
2.288* 
2.486* 
2.299* 
2.302* 
""-1 
o 
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long-term strategic holdings by investment banks or institutions seeking a long-term 
return28• The data is only available since May 2002. To have two months available data 
prior to the event, only additions and deletions that occur on or after September 2002 
Quarterly review are included in the institutional ownership analysis. 
First, I calculate the mean percentages of institutional shareholdings over the two 
months before and after the month in which the addition or deletion occurs (denote as 
NOSHI0,pre and NOSHI0,post respectively). I then test for significant differences using 
the standard I-test and non-parametric generalized sign test. The two-month period is 
sufficient because it is enough time for investors to adjust their portfolio and a longer 
period is likely to introduce unnecessary noise. Datastream also provides the percentage 
of total shares in issue available to ordinary investors29• This number is calculated by 
subtracting strategic holdings by one company in another, employee/family, a 
government or government institution, investment banks or institutions, and pension 
funds or endowment funds. The sample size reduced because the data for some is not 
complete. To get an overview of the pre-change and post-change levels, Table 20 
presents descriptive statistics for the percentages of institutional shareholdings and 
percentage of total shares in issue available to ordinary investors before and after the 
changes to FTSE Small Cap index for all six sub-groups of changes. 
As shown in Table 20, firms that are newly added to the index (pure additions) and 
firms that are completely deleted from the index (pure deletions) experience relative 
larger change in percentage institutional shareholdings than other sub-groups. The mean 
institutional shareholdings of pure additions rises from 12% to 16% and the mean 
percentage of total shares available to ordinary investors declines from 69% to 66%. Pure 
deletions experience a decline of 5% in the mean percentage institutional shareholdings 
and an increase of 5% in the mean percentage of total shares available to ordinary 
investors. For other sub-groups, the pre-event and post-event levels are almost the same. 
28 Datastream defines the variable NOSIllC as ''the percentage of institutional shareholding as the 
percentage of total shares in issue held as long term strategic holdings by investment banks or institutions 
seeking a long term return." 
29 Datastream defines the variable NOSHFF as ''the percentage oftotal shares in issue available to 
ordinary investors. The total number of shares less the strategic holdings. In general, only 
holdings of 5% or more are counted as strategic." 
Source: http://extranet.datastream.comlProducts _ DataiContentjactsheets/ documentsiFreefloat.pdf 
72 
Table 20: Descriptive Statistics for Percentages of Institutional Shareholdings and 
Percentage of Total Shares Available to Ordinary Investors before and after the 
Changes to FTSE SmaIICap Index from Jul2002 to Dec 2008. 
This table provides the descriptive statistics for pre-change and post-change levels of the 
percentages of institutional shareholdings and the percentage of total shares in issue available to 
ordinary investors for all addition and deletions that occur in or after July 2002. The month, 
denote as m, 0 represents the event month (the month in which the addition or deletion occurs). 
Percentages of institutional Percentage of total shares in issue 
shareholdings available to ordinary investors 
m Mean Median Max Min m Mean Median Max Min 
Pure -2 12 0 62 0 Pure -2 69 72 100 11 
additions -1 13 7 62 0 additions -1 68 69 100 23 
n=112 0 14 8 62 0 n=72 0 67 70 100 23 
1 16 12 93 0 1 65 70 100 7 
2 16 13 93 0 2 66 70 100 7 
Upward -2 20 17 62 0 Upward -2 63 65 100 17 
additions -1 21 17 62 0 additions -1 62 64 100 7 
n=107 0 20 19 61 0 n=103 0 63 65 100 7 
1 21 19 61 0 1 63 64 100 11 
2 21 19 61 0 2 63 63 100 11 
Downward -2 23 20 72 0 Downward -2 62 66 100 12 
additions -1 23 18 76 0 additions -1 62 67 100 12 
n=120 0 23 18 79 0 n=116 0 62 64 100 12 
1 23 19 72 0 1 63 66 100 10 
2 22 20 71 0 2 64 67 100 10 
Pure -2 31 26 66 3 Pure -2 61 59 96 33 
deletions -1 30 21 62 3 deletions -1 62 60 96 36 
n=9 0 26 21 62 3 n=9 0 66 68 96 36 
1 26 24 62 2 1 66 68 97 36 
2 26 19 62 2 2 66 71 97 36 
Upward -2 22 19 69 0 Upward -2 67 71 100 22 
deletions -1 22 19 69 0 deletions -1 67 71 100 23 
n=84 0 22 19 69 0 n=82 0 66 68 100 24 
1 22 19 70 0 1 67 70 100 22 
2 21 19 74 0 2 67 71 100 24 
Downward -2 27 26 67 0 Downward -2 60 62 100 13 
deletions -1 27 27 68 0 deletions -1 60 60 100 13 
n=138 0 26 26 65 0 n=137 0 61 61 100 13 
1 26 25 65 0 1 60 62 100 13 
2 25 25 65 0 2 60 61 100 13 
To examine the significance of the changes in Table 20, I compare the difference 
between the mean percentages of institutional shareholdings of two months before the 
event month (the month in which the addition or deletion occurs) and the mean 
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percentage of institutional shareholdings of two months after the event month for each 
firm in all sub-groups of changes, then average across all firms with each sub-group of 
changes. A parametric t-test and a non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank Sum test are 
used to evaluate the significance of the percentage changes. A non-parametric 
generalized sign test is used to evaluate the number of firms that experienced an increase 
in percentage institutional shareholdings. The number expected is based on a comparison 
of the difference between the mean percentage of institutional shareholdings of month+ 1 
and month+2 with the mean percentage of institutional shareholdings of month+3 and 
month+4. The results are reported in Panel A of Table 21. I also apply the same 
methodology to test the changes in percentage of total shares available to ordinary 
investors. The results are reported in Panel B of Table 21. 
For firms that are newly added to the index (pure additions), Panel A of Table 21 
reports that the average increase of 3.317% in the percentage institutional shareholdings 
is significant at 1 % level and significantly more firms that experienced increase in 
percentage institutional shareholdings than expected. For firms that are shifted from the 
FTSE SmallCap index to the FTSE Fledgling index (downward deletions), Panel A of 
Table 21 reports that the average decrease of 1.435% in the percentage institutional 
shareholdings is significant at 5% level, but the generalized sign test indicates that firms 
experienced increase in percentage institutional shareholdings are not significantly 
different from expected. For firms in the other four sub-groups of changes, both test 
statistics are insignificant. 
As shown in Panel B of Table 21, the only sub-group experiences significant change 
in percentage of total shares in issue available to ordinary investors is pure additions. 
There is a 3% decline for pure additions and significantly less stocks that experience 
increase in percentage of total shares in issue available to ordinary investors. 
4.5 Liquidity Tests 
Under the liquidilty hypothesis, index additions are valuable because of the 
improvement in the trading environment of stocks while index deletions are the opposite. 
To examine the trading environment, I construct four proxies for stock liquidity: the 
illiquidity ratio, dollar volume, relative spread, and zero returns ratio. 
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Table 21: Mean Difference of Percentages Institutional Shareholdings and 
Percentage of Total Shares Available to Ordinary Investors for Changes Following 
the FTSE SmallCap index additions and deletions from May 2002 to Dec 2008. 
In Panel A, the mean difference is defined as stock's average percentage investment 
company shareholdings in the two-month pre-event period subtracted from the average 
percentage investment company shareholdings in the two-month post-event period. In 
Panel B, the mean difference is defined as the stock's average percentage of total shares 
available to ordinary investors in the two-month pre-event period subtracted from the 
average percentage of total shares available to ordinary investors in the two-month post-
event period. N is the sample size, N(+) is the number of increases, and N(O) is the 
number of non-changes. Pr > Itl, Pr > lSI, and Pr > Izl are p-values for standard t-test, 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Sum test, and Sign test, respectively. 
Mean 
N N(+) N(O) Diff Pr> It I 
Panel A: Percentages of institutional shareholdings 
Pure 112 44 48 3.317 0.005 
additions 
Upward 107 44 19 0.565 0.376 
additions 
Downward 120 43 28 -0.938 0.301 
additions 
Pure 9 2 1 -4.556 0.303 deletions 
Upward 84 32 19 -0.625 0.509 deletions 
Downward 138 41 29 -1.435 0.044 deletions 
Pr>ISI 
0.001 
0.449 
0.152 
0.336 
0.674 
0.012 
%(+)/ 
%(+)est 
39%/27% 
41%/37% 
36%/35% 
22%/44% 
38%/35% 
30%127% 
Panel B: Percentage of...total shares in issue available to ordinarJ!.. investors 
Pure 72 21 14 -3.063 0.092 0.028 29%/43% 
additions 
Upward 103 48 14 0.340 0.726 0.441 47%/53% 
additions 
Downward 116 48 19 1.267 0.236 0.166 41%/42% 
additions 
Pure 9 6 1 4.889 0.383 0.336 67%/56% deletions 
Upward 82 35 16 -0.244 0.866 0.640 43%/35% deletions 
Downward 137 68 20 0.639 0.395 0.092 50%/47% deletions 
Pr>lzl 
0.001 
0.212 
0.424 
0.090 
0.246 
0.221 
0.017 
0.167 
0.829 
0.502 
0.166 
0.608 
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The illiquidity ratio, called ILLIQ, is the daily ratio of absolute stock return to its 
daily trading volume in dollars: 
T· 
1 ~ IRi,tl 
lLLIQi = T,. L VOLD. 
I t=l l,t 
(10) 
where Ri,t is the return of stock i on day t, VOLDi,t is the daily trading volume in dollars 
for stock i, and Ti is total number of days for stock i during the pre-event and post-event 
period. Amihud (2002) first suggests the illiquidity ratio as a rough measure of price 
impact, which can be interpreted as the daily price reaction associated with a dollar of 
daily trading volume. A more liquid stock should be the one with a smaller ILLIQ. 
Dollar volume is the natural logarithm of the average of product of daily trading 
volume in dollars. A higher dollar volume indicates improved liquidity. 
Relative spread is the average of the difference between the daily closing ask and bid 
prices divided by the mid-point of closing ask and bid prices. A decline in the relative 
spread is an indication of improved liquidity. 
Zero returns ratio is the ratio of the number of zero return days to the total number of 
trading days. Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999) first suggest this measurement as a 
proxy for transaction costs. They modeled the transaction costs through the incidence of 
zero returns. The major premise on which their model is based on is the following: "If the 
value of the information signal is insufficient to exceed the costs of trading, then the 
marginal investor will either reduce trading or not trade, causing a zero return." It is 
expected that a stock with low transaction costs will have less zero return days and is 
more liquid than a stock with high transaction costs. 
I eliminate all overlaps and infrequently traded stocks to prevent biased liquidity 
proxies. Therefore, I applied two screens discussed in trading volume analysis over 180-
day pre- and post-event windows at the same time for all stocks. 
Table 22 shows the mean (median) pre-event levels, changes, percent changes, and 
percent of stocks that experience positive reaction in stock's liquidity following addition 
to and deletion from the FTSE Small Cap Index. Pre-event levels are estimated over a 
l80-day period of [ED-2lO, ED-3l], and Post-event levels are estimated over a l80-day 
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period of [ED+61, ED+240]30. Since I compare the pre-event and post-event levels for 
the each of the six sub-groups of index changes, I use a parametric test, Paired t-Test, and 
a non-parametric test, Wilcoxon-Signed-Rank-Sum Test, to test whether the pre-event 
pre- and post- event levels are significantly different. For robustness checks, I use 
different lengths for the estimation windows. Table 23 and Table 24 show the results 
using 90-day and 45-day estimation window, respectively. As shown in those two tables, 
a shorter estimation window does not affect the major results. Since my goal is to capture 
permanent changes in stocks liquidity, the estimation window with a length of 180 days 
provides results that are more reasonable. 
As shown in table 22, the results for pure additions show art unexpected and 
significant increase in illiquidity ratio and relative spread while significantly more stocks 
experience positive reaction in dollar volume and negitive reaction in zero returns ratio at 
the same time. For upward additions, the mean percent changes of dollar valume, 
illiquidity ratio and relative spread experience a significant increase. But the mean and 
median percent changes are quite different. It is possible that the mean is driven by some 
extreme values, so that the t-Test, which requires normality assumption, is less powerfull 
than non-parametric tests. The sign test, which is insensitive to outliers, shows that there 
is an increase in liquidity, which is consistent among all four measurements. The results 
for downward additions are clear. All tests consistently show that stocks in this sub-group 
become less liquid after the shift from FTSE 250 index to the FTSE Small Cap index. 
For pure deletions, test statistics consistently show that there is a significant increase 
in dollar volume, which is opposite to expectation, and in illiquidity ratio. I do, however, 
caution that pure deletion is a noisy event to examine the impact of index changes on 
liquidity as stock can only be deleted completely from FTSE Small Cap index because of 
reasons based on liquidity. The results for the other two deletions sub-group is obvious. 
All tests consistently show that upward deletions experience a signficant increase in 
liqudity and downward deletions experience a significant decrease in liqudity. 
30 Chen, Noronha, and Slnga! (2004) and Becker-Blease and Paul (Forthcoming) measure post-addition 
liquidity begins 61 days after the effective date to ensure that any temporary upward bias induced by 
index fund and arbitrage trading does not influence the measurement oflong-term shifts in liquidity. 
Table 22: Changes in Stocks Liquidity (ISO-Day Window) 
This table shows mean (median) levels, changes, percent changes, and percent of stock experience positive reaction in stock liquidity following 
addition to and deletion from the FTSE SmallCap Index. Pre-event levels are the average over the 180-day period that ends at ED-31. Post-event 
levels are the average over the 180-day period that starts at ED+61. Dollar volume, $Vol, is the natural logarithm of the average of the product of 
daily trading volume and daily closing price. Illiquidity ratio, ILLIQ, is the average of the absolute value of the daily return divided by the daily 
trading volume in dollars. Relative spread, %Spd, is the average of the difference between the daily closing ask and bid prices divided by the mid-
point of closing ask and bid prices. Zero returns ratio, Zeros, is the ratio of the number of zero return days to the total number of trading days. I 
used Paired t-Test to test whether the mean of the post-event level is significant different from the mean of the pre-event level, Wilcoxon signed 
rank sum test to test whether the median of the post-event level is significant different from the median of the of the pre-event level, and Sign test 
luate the silmificance of percent of stock exoerience positive reaction. aUnits are 10-6 
Pre-event levels Changes 
$Vol ILLIQa %Spd Zeros $Vol ILLIQa %Spd Zeros 
Pure additions (N=86) 
2.3780 0.3943 0.0257 0.3534 0.0166 0.3105 0.0064 -0.0294 
(2.3865) (0.1734) (0.0232) (0.3833) (0.0188) (0.0192) (0.0032) (-0.0278) 
Paired t-Test Pr > Itl: 0.1870 0.1164 0.0035 0.2149 
Wilcoxon signed-rank-sum Test Pr> lSI: 0.0706 0.4276 0.0025 0.2781 
Upward additions (N= 167) 
2.3864 0.3155 0.0321 0.3362 0.0321 0.0217 -0.0014 -0.0321 
(2.4006) (0.1781) (0.0273) (0.3389) (0.0151) (-0.0315) (-0.0017) (-0.0167) 
Paired t-Test Pr > Itl: 0.0001 0.6282 0.4507 0.0136 
Wilcoxon signed-rank-sum Test Pr > lSI: 0.0004 0.2485 0.0698 0.0554 
Downward additions (N=151) 
2.6060 0.0556 0.0198 0.1155 -0.0916 0.2041 0.0145 0.0840 
(2.6125) (0.0305) (0.0174) (0.0722) (-0.0795) (0.0583) (0.0090) (0.0611) 
Paired t-Test Pr > Itl: <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Wilcoxon signed .. rank-sum Test Pr> lsi: <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Percent changes 
$Vol ILLIQ %Spd 
0.86 175.56 33.57 
(0.80) (35.59) (13.47) 
0.1287 0.0001 <.0001 
0.0653 0.0024 0.0002 
1.48 73.67 13.31 
(0.62) (-19.33) (-6.60) 
<.0001 0.0002 0.0308 
0.0003 0.7588 0.6342 
-3.40 1274.62 127.13 
(-3.03) (249.03) (66.20) 
<.0001 0.0002 <.0001 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Zeros $Vol 
11.30 66.28% 
(-8.60) 
0.2557 0.0025 
0.9331 
10.51 58.68% 
(-6.32) 
0.2026 0.0248 
0.3685 
157.33 8.61% 
(74.42) 
<.0001 <.0001 
<.0001 
Percent of increases 
ILLIQ %Spd 
55.81% 59.30% 
Sign Test Pr > Izl 
0.2809 0.0845 
39.52% 42.51% 
Sign Test Pr > Izl 
0.0068 0.0530 
86.09% 87.42% 
Sign Test Pr > Izl 
<.0001 <.0001 
Zeros 
39.53% 
0.0523 
42.51% 
0.0530 
80.97% 
<.0001 
"'-J 
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Table 22 (continued) 
Pre-event levels Changes 
$Vol ILLIQa %Spd Zeros $Vol ILLIQa %Spd Zeros 
Pure deletions (N=24) 
2.2109 1.3423 0.0368 0.4523 0.0679 0.0017 -0.0031 0.0069 
(2.2390) (0.3632) (0.0282) (0.4556) (0.0396) (0.0370) (-0.0018) (0.0028) 
Paired t-Test Pr > Itl: 0.0106 0.9972 0.5397 0.7643 
Wilcoxon signed-rank-sum Test Pr> lSI: 0.0003 0.5411 0.5597 0.7237 
Upward deletions (N= 1 06) 
2.5048 0.1528 0.0193 0.2142 0.0783 -0.0857 -0.0043 -0.0662 
(2.5234) (0.0592) (0.0158) (0.1694) (0.0653) (-0.0232) (-0.0021) (-0.0500) 
Paired t-Test Pr > Itl: <.0001 0.0020 0.0007 <.0001 
Wilcoxon signed-rank-sum Test Pr> lSI: <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Downward deletions (N=250) 
2.3386 3.1080 0.0549 0.3656 -0.0438 1.1341 0.0340 0.0267 
(2.3462) (0.6500) (0.0478) (0.3778) (-0.0415) (0.l881) (0.0078) (0.0389) 
Paired t-Test Pr > I~: <.0001 0.6018 0.0005 0.0069 
Wilcoxon signed-rank-sum Test Pr> lSI: <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0009 
Percent changes 
$Vol ILLIQ %Spd 
3.49 85.94 5.84 
(1.76) (6.03) (-6.77) 
0.0199 0.0352 0.5882 
0.0002 0.1661 0.8464 
3.36 -23.60 -8.18 
(2.58) (-54.00) (-15.46) 
<.0001 0.0645 0.1112 
<.0001 <.0001 0.0009 
-1.71 675.51 78.23 
(-1.77) (51.27) (24.30) 
<.0001 0.0006 <.0001 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Zeros $Vol 
10.29 75.00% 
(0.57) 
0.1746 0.0143 
0.3339 
-5.14 87.74% 
(-31.93) 
0.5690 <.0001 
0.0004 
34.07 34.80% 
(10.18) 
<.0001 <.0001 
<.0001 
Percent of increases 
ILLIQ %Spd 
58.33% 41.67% 
Sign Test Pr > Izl 
0.4142 0.4142 
16.04% 32.08% 
Sign Test Pr > Izl 
<.0001 0.0002 
60.40% 65.20% 
Sign Test Pr > Izl 
0.0010 <.0001 
Zeros 
50.00% 
1.0000 
28.30% 
<.0001 
61.60% 
0.0002 
.......:J 
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Table 23: Changes in Stocks Liquidity (90-Day Window) 
This table shows mean (median) levels, changes, percent changes, and percent of stock experience positive reaction in stock liquidity following 
addition to and deletion from the FTSE Small Cap Index. Pre-event levels are the average over the 90-day period that ends at ED-31. Post-event 
levels are the average over the 90-day period that starts at ED+61. Dollar volume, $Vol, is the natural logarithm of the average of the product of 
daily trading volume and daily closing price. Illiquidity ratio, ILLIQ, is the average of the absolute value of the daily return divided by the daily 
trading volume in dollars. Relative spread, %Spd, is the average of the difference between the daily closing ask and bid prices divided by the mid-
point of closing ask and bid prices. Zero returns ratio, Zeros, is the ratio of the number of zero return days to the total number of trading days. I 
used Paired t-Test to test whether the mean of the post-event level is significant different from the mean of the pre-event level, Wilcoxon signed 
rank sum test to test whether the median of the post-event level is significant different from the median of the of the pre-event level, and Sign test 
to evaluate the sifffiificance of oercent of stock exoerience oositive reaction. aUnits are 10.6 
Pre-event levels Changes 
$Vol ILLIQ3 %Spd Zeros $Vol ILLIQ3 %Spd Zeros 
Pure additions (N=86) 
2.3716 0.4687 0.0255 0.3820 0.0310 0.0784 0.0035 -0.0537 
(2.3816) (0.1963) (0.0216) (0.4278) (0.0258) (-0.0018) (0.0030) (-0.0333) 
Paired t-Test Pr > It!: 0.0377 0.6521 0.0129 0.0152 
Wilcoxon signed-rank-sUIn Test Pr> lSI: 0.0080 0.5483 0.0122 0.0588 
Upward additions (N= 167) 
2.3949 0.3223 0.0301 0.3308 0.0333 -0.0684 -0.0007 -0.0268 
(2.3996) (0.1854) (0.0259) (0.3333) (0.0260) (-0.0433) (-0.0020) (0) 
Paired t-Test Pr > 14: <.0001 0.0760 0.6816 0.0331 
Wilcoxon signed-rank-sUIn Test Pr> lSI: <.0001 0.0084 0.0744 -
Downward additions (N=151) 
2.5976 0.0630 0.0219 0.1212 -0.0738 0.1494 0.0116 0.0656 
(2.6083) (0.0336) (0.0186) (0.0889) (-0.0758) (0.0585) (0.0071) (0.0556) 
Paried t-Test Pr> Itl: <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
.. .Wilco"on signed-rank-sUIn Test Pr > lsi: <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Percent changes 
$Vol ILLIQ %Spd 
1.78 143.72 27.74 
(1.07) (-3.11) (13.94) 
0.0656 0.0114 <.0001 
0.0062 0.0524 0.0005 
1.48 37.30 13.96 
(1.10) (-30.22) (-7.80) 
<.0001 0.0155 0.0341 
<.0001 0.3987 0.6467 
-2.69 714.32 92.29 
(-2.92) (193.46) (46.86) 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Zeros 
-0.44 
(-9.80) 
0.9600 
0.1153 
13.64 
(0) 
0.0929 
-
106.97 
(66.67) 
<.0001 
<.0001 
Percent of increases 
$Vol ILLIQ %Spd 
61.63% 50.00% 56.98% 
Sign Test Pr > Izl 
0.0310 1.0000 0.1957 
64.67% 35.93% 41.92% 
Sign Test Pr > Izl 
0.0001 0.0003 0.0367 
15.23% 82.78% 81.46% 
Sign Test Pr > Izl 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Zeros 
38.37% 
0.0310 
47.31% 
0.4862 
77.48% 
<.0001 
-.....:J 
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Table 23 (continued) 
Pre-event levels Changes 
$Vol ILLIQa %Spd Zeros $Vol ILLIQa %Spd Zeros 
Pure deletions (N=24) 
2.l964 1.7128 0.0401 0.4847 0.0923 0.0889 -0.0031 -0.0199 
(2.2159) (0.3857) (0.0280) (0.5056) (0.0649) (-0.0539) (-0.0019) (-0.0222) 
Paired t-Test Pr > It I : 0.0005 0.9041 0.5291 0.5010 
Wilcoxon signed-rank-sum Test Pr> lSI: <.0001 0.4693 0.3277 0.3651 
Upward deletions (N= 1 06) 
2.5179 0.1427 0.0183 0.2091 0.0632 -0.0776 -0.0032 -0.0584 
(2.5261) (0.0440) (0.0156) (0.1556) (0.0526) (-0.0184) (-0.0012) (-0.0444) 
Paired t-Test Pr > Itl: <.0001 0.0041 0.0062 <.0001 
Wilcoxon signed-rank-sum Test Pr> lSI: <.0001 <.0001 0.0021 <.0001 
Downward deletions (N=250) 
2.3001 5.5303 0.0638 0.3873 0.0057 -1.6632 0.0182 0.0145 
(2.3116) (0.8077) (0.0527) (0.4389) (0.0015) (-0.0085) (0.0027) (0.0278) 
Paired t-Test Pr > Itl: 0.5655 0.6755 0.0168 0.1365 
Wilcoxon signed-Tank-sum Test Pr> lsi: 0.8090 0.6259 0.0757 0.0426 
Percent changes 
$Vol ILLIQ %Spd 
4.49 151.27 -1.24 
(2.89) (-12.50) (-7.44) 
0.0016 0.2527 0.8788 
<.0001 0.8681 0.5046 
2.73 -9.51 -4.68 
(2.03) (-49.l0) (-10.54) 
<.0001 0.5177 0.3180 
<.0001 <.0001 0.0114 
0.83 276.24 46.07 
(0.06) (-3.01) (8.28) 
0.2594 0.0014 <.0001 
0.9143 0.0060 0.0002 
------
Zeros 
10.27 
(-4.26) 
0.4130 
0.7911 
-4.86 
(-30.65) 
0.5370 
0.0514 
29.09 
(7.06) 
<.0001 
0.0001 
Percent of increases 
$Vol ILLIQ %Spd 
95.83% 45.83% 45.83% 
Sign Test Pr > Izl 
<.0001 0.6831 0.6831 
83.02% 17.92% 37.74% 
Sign Test Pr > Izl 
<.0001 <.0001 0.0116 
50.80% 49.60% 55.60% 
Sign Test Pr > Izl 
0.8003 0.8993 0.0766 
Zeros 
37.50% 
0.2207 
32.08% 
0.0002 
56.40% 
0.0430 
co 
o 
Table 24: Changes in Stocks Liquidity (45-Day Window) 
This table shows mean (median) levels, changes, percent changes, and percent of stock experience positive reaction in stock liquidity following 
addition to and deletion from the FTSE Small Cap Index. Pre-event levels are the average over the 45-day period that ends at ED-31. Post-event 
levels are the average over the 45-day period that starts at ED+61. Dollar volume, $Vol, is the natural logarithm of the average of the product of 
daily trading volume and daily closing price. Illiquidity ratio, ILLIQ, is the average of the absolute value of the daily return divided by the daily 
trading volume in dollars. Relative spread, %Spd, is the average of the difference between the daily closing ask and bid prices divided by the 
mid-point of closing ask and bid prices. Zero returns ratio, Zeros, is the ratio of the number of zero return days to the total number of trading 
days. I used Paired t-Test to test whether the mean of the post-event level is significant different from the mean of the pre-event level, Wilcoxon 
signed rank sum test to test whether the median of the post-event level is significant different from the median of the of the pre-event level, and 
Sil!l1 test to evaluate the sil!l1ificance of percent of stock experience positive reaction. aUnits are 10-6 
Pre-event levels Changes 
$Vol ILLIQ %Spd Zeros $Vol ILLIQ %Spd Zeros 
Pure additions (N=86) 
2.3917 0.0000 0.0260 0.3530 0.0187 -0.2735 0.0025 -0.0207 
(2.3904) (O.OOOO) (0.0205) (0.3556) (0.0162) (0.0066) (0.0024) (O) 
Paired t-Test Pr> Itl: 0.0617 0.2658 0.0609 0.3852 
Wilcoxon signed-rank-sum Test Pr > lSI: 0.0453 0.5270 0.0350 
-
Upward additions (N= 167) 
2.4099 0.0000 0.0294 0.3132 0.0303 -0.1386 -0.0001 -0.0350 
(2.4125) (O.OOOO) (0.0252) (0.3111) (0.0225) (-0.0183) (-0.0020) (-0.02) 
Paired t-Test Pr> It!: <.0001 0.0152 0.9410 0.0127 
Wilcoxon signed-rank-sum Test Pr> lSI: <.0001 0.0243 0.1258 0.0189 
Downward additions (N=151) 
2.5975 0.0000 0.0237 0.1158 -0.0648 0.1156 0.0086 0.0602 
(2.6014) (O.OOOO) (0.0191) (0.0667) (-0.0703) (O.0396) (O.0047) (O.0444) 
Paired t-Test Pr > I~: <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Wilcoxon signed-rank-sum Test Pr > lSI: <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Percent changes 
$Vol ILLIQ %Spd 
0.87 93.57 28.90 
(0.72) (15.81) (11.06) 
0.0408 0.0027 0.0001 
0.0360 0.0411 0.0014 
1.31 30.44 18.10 
(0.94) (-18.57) (-9.17) 
<.0001 0.0280 0.0196 
<.0001 0.5089 0.7636 
-2.43 480.37 74.49 
(-2.67) (143.09) (37.97) 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Zeros 
15.63 
(O) 
0.2003 
-
16.04 
(-1O.53) 
0.0830 
0.4852 
72.66 
(22.22) 
<.0001 
<.0001 
Percent of increases 
$Vol ILLIQ %Spd 
59.30% 52.33% 60.47% 
Sign Test Pr > Izl 
0.0845 0.6662 0.0523 
62.87% 41.32% 41.92% 
Sign Test Pr > Izl 
0.0009 0.0248 0.0367 
18.54% 76.82% 78.15% 
Sign Test Pr > Izl 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Zeros 
44.19% 
0.2809 
41.32% 
0.0248 
68.87% 
<.0001 
00 
.... 
Table 24 (continued) 
Pre-event levels Changes 
$Vol ILLIQ %Spd Zeros $Vol ILLIQ %Spd Zeros 
Pure deletions (N=24) 
2.1733 0.0000 0.0421 0.4639 0.1316 -1.3681 -0.0058 -0.0037 
(2.2051) (0.0000) (0.0287) (0.4778) (0.1168) (-0.1651) (-0.0032) (0) 
Paired t-Test Pr > Itl: <.0001 0.1407 0.3507 0.9145 
Wilcoxon signed-rank-sum Test Pr > lSI: <.0001 0.1111 0.1948 
-
Upward deletions (N= 106) 
2.5391 0.0000 0.0176 0.1966 0.0449 -0.0951 -0.0022 -0.0512 
(2.5384) (0.0000) (0.0143) (0.1556) (0.0388) (-0.0134) (-0.0008) (-0.0222) 
Paired t-Test Pr > I~: <.0001 0.0100 0.0208 0.0004 
Wilcoxon signed-rank-sum Test Pr > lSI: <.0001 <.0001 0.0274 0.0003 
Downward deletions (N=250) 
2.3092 0.0000 0.0702 0.3592 0.0081 1.3562 0.0047 0.0316 
(2.3201) (0.0000) (0.0563) (0.4000) (0.0126) (-0.1868) (-0.0000) (0.0222) 
Paired t-Test Pr> Itl: 0.3012 0.1893 0.3682 0.0064 
Wilcoxon signed-rank-sum Test Pr> lSI: 0.3016 <.0001 0.6011 0.0028 
Percent changes 
$Vol ILLIQ %Spd Zeros 
6.69 31.85 -7.05 18.41 
(5.13) (-50.50) (-12.02) (0) 
0.0007 0.3486 0.3715 0.1986 
<.0001 0.9338 0.2870 -
1.80 1.32 -0.74 -2.96 
(1.52) (-48.41) (-8.63) (-17.69) 
<.0001 0.9356 0.8765 0.7204 
<.0001 <.0001 0.1059 0.0609 
0.52 137.92 21.63 45.57 
(0.55) (-27.78) (-0.12) (9.23) 
0.1577 0.0004 0.0001 <.0001 
0.2473 0.4579 0.0760 <.0001 
Percent of increases 
$Vol ILLIQ %Spd 
100.00% 37.50% 41.67% 
Sign Test Pr > Izl 
<.0001 0.2207 0.4142 
79.25% 28.30% 41.51% 
Sign Test Pr > Izl 
<.0001 <.0001 0.0804 
54.40% 35.60% 49.60% 
Sign Test Pr > Izl 
0.1641 <.0001 0.8993 
Zeros 
41.67% 
0.4142 
26.42% 
<.0001 
54.40% 
0.1641 
co 
N 
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4.6 Regression Analysis of Stock Price Effects of Index Changes 
In this section, I investigate whether changes in liquidity explain permanent index 
price effects by estimating the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions of the 90-day 
cumulative abnormal return on raw changes in the liquidity proxies. The dependent 
variable is the abnormal stock return from 30 days before the effective day to 60 days 
after the effective day. Independent variables are raw changes in four liquidity measures. 
I also include stock's market value as a control variable. Panel A of Table 25 shows the 
results of the regression for each of the six sub-groups of index changes. In Panel B of 
Table 25, I introduce sub-group dummy variables and regress all data as a whole. 
Since four independent variables are changes in liquidity proxies, multicollinearity 
may become an issue. Typically, multicollinearity has the effect of increasing the 
standard errors of the independent variables. I examine multicollinearity by calculating 
the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for the regression coefficients. The VIF for variable 
Xi is given by: 
VIF(xa = ~ (11) l-R j 
where Rr is the square of the multiple correlation coefficient that results when Xi is 
regressed against all the other explanatory variables. Usually, a VIF greater than five or 
ten implies a potential multicollinearity problem. Given that all VIFs are less than 4.6, 
multicollinearity is not a problem in these regressions. 
Table 25, Panel A, reports estimates for each of the six sub-groups of index changes. 
The results indicate that increased dollar volume and declined relative spread are two 
important sources of value gains for index changes to the FTSE SmallCap index. 
Panel B in Table 25 contains coefficient estimates for the full sample that includes all 
six sub-groups. I find a significantly positive relation between change in dollar volume 
and cumulative abnormal returns and negative relation between changes in relative spread 
and zero returns ratio on one side and the cumulative abnormal returns on the other side. 
All dummy variables, except downward addition, are significant in the regression. These 
results suggest that sub-groups perform significantly different from the pure additions 
group. Overall, regression results provide support for the relationship between changes in 
stocks' liquidity and permanent price effects around index changes. 
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Table 25: OLS Analysis of Stock Price Effects of Index Changes 
The dependent variable is the market-adjusted CARs from 30 trading days before the ED to 60 trading days following the ED. In Panel A, 
regression are tested for each of the six sub-groups of index changes; independent variables including changes in each of the four liquidity proxies 
and market value on 30 trading days before the ED. In Panel B, regression is performed on the whole data set with sub-group dummy variables 
included. 
Panel A Regression 
Group c p 6$Vol p 6ILLIQ p 6%Spd p 6Zeros p MV P 
Stocks that shif!ed between the FTSE 250 and FTSE SmallCal!.. indices 
Downward 5.581 0.02% 0.806 1.92% 140286 6.56% -5.092 1.68% -0.339 24.28% -0.291 0.02% 
additions 
Upward 1.821 26.65% 0.860 4.74% -23135 84.74% 3.922 22.03% -0.222 44.13% -0.087 29.62% deletions 
Stocks that shifted between the FTSE SmallCal!.. and FTSE Fledgling indices 
Upward 4.450 0.02% 0.970 0.04% -1503 97.46% -3.809 0.05% -0.520 0.05% -0.238 0.02% 
additions 
Downward 2.712 0.06% 0.368 9.76% -143 84.99% -1.131 <0.01% -0.272 11.11% -0.158 0.05% deletions 
Stocks that are new to the FTSE SmallCaE!. index and deleted from the FTSE Em ill. o[indices 
Pure 1.642 17.91% 0.884 0.19% 26373 12.32% -4.675 0.46% -0.089 50.18% -0.090 16.89% 
additions 
Pure 
-0.212 91.96% -1.422 4.15% -30241 42.18% -3.095 33.95% -0.193 78.61% 0.009 94.03% deletions 
PanelB c p 6$Vol p 6ILLIQ p 6%Spd p 6 Zeros p MV p 
Regressors 3.039 <0.01% 0.582 <0.01% 44 94.70% -1.141 <0.01% -0.310 0.03% -0.166 <.0001 
Pure Downward Upward Upward Downward 
Dummy deletions additions deletions additions deletions 
variables dumm;y: E!. dumm;y: l!.. dumm;y: E. dumm;y: E!. dumm;y: P.. 
-0.187 1.68% 0.060 23.59% 0.326 <0.01% 0.112 1.43% -0.189 0.05% 
-------------~~-~-----~--~< -~~ ~~ --<~ ~ 
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4.7 Discussion 
In an effort to disentangle the competing hypotheses, I examine the changes in stock 
price, trading volume, institutional ownership, and liquidity following the changes to the 
FTSE SmallCap index. The six sub-groups of index changes can be grouped as the 
following pairs: 
1. Downward additions and upward deletions consist of all stocks that shifted 
between the FTSE 250 and FTSE Small Cap indices. 
2. Upward additions and downward deletions consist of all stocks that shifted 
between the FTSE Small Cap and FTSE Fledgling indices. 
3. Pure additions and deletions consist of all stocks that are new to the FTSE 
Small Cap index and deleted from the FTSE family of indices. 
Table 26 presents a summary of results for these three pairs of sub-groups. 
For downward additions and upward deletions, I find a permanent change in 
abnormal return and liquidity. Downward additions experience a downward trend and 
lose as much as 15.8% over the pre-event period of [ED-30, ED-I]. The positive 
abnormal return on the effective day is the sign of a small reversal. In contrast to 
downward additions, upward deletions experience an upward trend and gain as much as 
12.61% over the pre-event period of [ED-30, AD-I]. Limited price reversal for upward 
deletions happens starting on the announcement day, which is earlier than for downward 
additions. However, abnormal price reaction does not revert completely for this pair of 
sub-groups. Both sub-groups experience significant and positive abnormal trading 
volume on the effective day. None of these two sub-groups experience significant change 
in institutional shareholdings. One possible reason is that institutional investors tracking 
the FTSE SmallCap index buy (sell) shares while institutional investors tracking the 
FTSE 250 index sell (buy) shares when a stock shifts from one index to the other given 
that both FTSE 250 and FTSE SmallCap indices are real-time calculated indices and 
widely followed by institutional investors. Finally, I find that stocks that were promoted 
to the FTSE 250 index experience significant increase in liquidity while stocks that were 
demoted from the FTSE 250 index experience a significant decline in liquidity. Before 
further discussion on liquidity changes, I look at another pair of sub-groups that shows 
similar results. 
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Table 26: Summary of Results for UK sample 
This table presents a summary of results for my UK sample. Significant increase are denote as " i " 
while significant decrease are denote as " ~ ". Trading volume results on the announcement day (AD) 
and effective day (ED) are reported. 10 stands for Institutional Ownership. SO stands for Share 
available to ordinary investors. Four liquidity measures, dollar volume ($Vol), illiquidity ratio 
(ILLIQ), relative spread (%Spd), and zero returns ratio (Zeros) are reported. 
Group Abnormal Return 
Trading 101 
volume 
SO 
Liquidity 
AD ED $Vol ILLIQ %Spd 
Stocks that shifted between the FTSE 250 and FTSE SmallCap indices 
Downward permanent i -1- ~ i i additions price decrease 
Upward permanent i -I- i ~ ~ deletions price increase 
Stocks that shifted between the FTSE SmallCap and FTSE Fledgling indices 
Upward permanent i -I- i ~ ~ additions price increase 
Downward permanent i ~/- ~ i i deletions price decrease 
Zeros 
i 
i 
Support 
hypothesis 
Liquidity 
hypothesis 
Liquidity 
hypothesis 
Liquidity 
hypothesis 
Liquidity 
hypothesis 
Stocks that are new to the FTSE SmallCap index and deletedfram the FTSEfamily afindices 
Pure Complete Price 
additions reversal i i/~ i i i ~ pressure hypothesis 
Pure permanent i -I- i i deletions price decrease 
Results of upward additions and downward deletions also indicate that there is a 
permanent change in abnormal return and liquidity. Upward additions (downward 
deletions) experience an upward (downward) trend and gain as much as 21.55% (22.45%) 
over the pre-event period of [ED-30, ED]. Limited price reversal begins on the first 
trading day after the effective day but does not stay for long. Both sub-groups experience 
significant and positive abnormal trading volume on the effective day. There is no 
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significant change in institutional shareholdings for upward additions, but downward 
deletions experience significant decrease of 1.43% in institutional shareholdings. Again, a 
possible reason is buy and sell orders from institutional investors who take a long 
position and a short position offset each other when one stock shifts from one index to the 
other. Finally, I also find that stocks that were promoted from the FTSE Fledgling index 
experience a significant increase in liquidity while stocks that were demoted to the FTSE 
Fledgling index experience a significant decrease in liquidity. 
For the above two pairs of sub-groups, the permanent and significant change in stock 
liquidity explains the question: why abnormal price reaction does not revert completely? 
Investors anticipate the event and expect the stock liquidity to change. To be specific, 
investors expect that stock liquidity increases for stocks promoted to the FTSE 250 index 
(upward deletions) and to the FTSE SmallCap index (upward additions). Investors, 
therefore, start to trade prior to the event. This is consistent with the upward pre-event 
trend I find for upward deletions and upward additions. The same argument is also true 
for stocks demoted from the FTSE 250 index and the FTSE Small Cap index. In addition, 
significant abnormal trading volume over the period of [AD, ED] is followed by the 
short-lived price reversal. It is, therefore, not a surprise that the permanent increase 
( decrease) in stock price is actually the pricing of increases (decline) in liquidity. 
For pure additions and deletions, I find significant abnormal return and trading 
volume. Pure additions experience a complete price reversal. I seriously do, however, 
caution that pure deletion from the FTSE Small Cap index is a noisy and inappropriate 
event to examine the impact of index changes on stock liquidity as the only reason for 
pure deletion is based on stock liquidity. Therefore, I discuss only pure additions and the 
difference between pure additions and upward additions next. 
The first time a stock is added to an index is equivalent to a promotion. Consequently, 
price reactions associated with pure additions should behave similar to those of upward 
additions. Figure 8 plots the CARs for pure additions and upward additions from ED-30 
to ED+60. The Pure additions experience an upward pre-event trend similar to upward 
additions except the trend happens much closer to the effective day. The main difference 
between pure additions and upward additions appears during the post event period up to 
ED+60. As I discussed previously, a permanent increase in stock 
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Figure 8: Cumulative abnormal returns for pure additions and upward additions in 
the FTSE SmallCap Index over the period of [ED-30, ED+60]. The trading day 0 is 
the effective day and the trading day -6 is the announcement day. 
price for upward additions is the pricing of the increase in stock liquidity. Therefore, the 
complete price reversal for pure additions is because of the opposite changes in liquidity. 
Since I find that pure additions is the only sub-group that experience significant 
increase in percentage of institutional shareholdings and significant decrease in 
percentage of total shares in issue available to ordinary investors, one possible 
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explanation for this situation is related to strategic investors. When a stock is newly 
added to the FTSE SmallCap index, strategic investors buy the shares and hold them as a 
long-term investment. In addition, the four measurements of liquidity measure different 
aspects of liquidity. Therefore, when a stock is newly added to the index, more and more 
attention from the market results in higher dollar volume and lower zero returns ratio. 
However, at the same time, the holding of strategic investors result in a larger illiquidity 
ratio and bid-ask spread. 
The observed results for the four sub-groups of shifts between indices do not support 
the investor awareness hypothesis, because they exhibit symmetrical and permanent price 
reaction. In contrast, according to the investor awareness hypothesis, additions should 
experience a permanent increase in value, while deletions should show a temporary price 
decline. This is not surprising given the absence of significant changes in institutional 
ownership for two additions groups (upward and downward additions). 
The results for the pure additions and pure deletions sub-groups are not consistent 
with the investor awareness hypothesis as well. For example, despite the fact that pure 
additions experience significant increase in institutional shareholdings, they show a 
complete price reversal. This is not consistent with the investor awareness hypothesis, 
which predicts a permanent price effect for additions. 
For stocks shifted between the FTSE SmallCap and FTSE 250 indices (upward 
deletions and downward additions) and between the FTSE SmallCap and FTSE Fledgling 
indices (downward deletions and upward additions), there is a permanent and 
symmetrical price effect. According to the downward sloping demand curve hypothesis, a 
significant change in the number of shares available to ordinary investors causes the 
permanent price effect. However, none of these four sub-groups experience a significant 
change in the number of shares available to ordinary investors. Therefore, it is more 
reasonable to conclude that the permanent price effect is caused by changes in liquidity. 
Overall, results from my UK sample provide support for the liquidity hypothesis, 
indicating that the effect of index additions is permanent. The results also indicate that 
promotions to the FTSE 250 index and from the FTSE Fledgling index is a beneficial 
event for the promoted stock and that the added value is associated with a permanent 
increase of stock liquidity, and vice versa. 
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As a comparison, I examine the changes in stock price and trading volume following 
the changes to the S&P/TSX SmallCap index. The four sub-groups of index changes can 
be grouped as following pairs: 
1. Pure additions and deletions consist of all stocks that were new to the S&P/TSX 
SmallCap index and deleted from the S&P/TSX family indices. 
2. Downward additions and upward deletions consist of all stocks that shifted 
between the S&P/TSX MidCap index and S&P/TSX Small Cap index. 
For pure additions and deletions, significant abnormal returns are found on the 
announcement day and effective day. But, these abnormal returns fully reverted in 30 
days. In trading volume analysis, I found that two trading volume spikes occur on the 
announcement day and effective day. Similar to abnormal returns, these spikes returns to 
near normal after the event. Evidence, therefore, supports the price pressure hypothesis. 
In downward additions and upward deletions sub-groups, trading volume are much less 
affected when compared to pure additions and deletions. Upward deletions do not 
experience economically significant abnormal returns around the event. In contrast, I 
found that downward additions experience volatile and significant abnormal returns 
around the event. Similar to pure additions and deletions, the abnormal gain over the 
period of [AD, ED] is reverted completely within 10 days. Overall, results from my 
Canadian sample provide support for the price pressure hypothesis. 
The biggest difference between the FTSE Small Cap index and the S&P/TSX 
SmallCap index is the method to determine the constitution stocks. The FTSE SmallCap 
index uses a very transparent method, which means the dates and changes to the index are 
generally predictable. In contrast, the changes to the S&P/TSX SmallCap are generally 
considered an unexpected event. 
Since the changes to the FTSE SmallCap index are predictable, I examine cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) over the entire event window [ED-30, ED+60] to determine 
whether the price reactions are permanent when examining my UK sample. This is 
consistent with Biktimirov, Cowan, and Jordan (2004) who examine CAR of the period 
of [ED-40, ED+40] and Mase (2007) who examines CAR of the period of [ED-17, 
ED+30]. The price reactions observed before the announcement of the event may also 
reflect investors' expectation regarding the stocks that are added to (deleted from) the 
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index. In addition, in my further analysis about my UK sample, I found that there is a 
permanent change in stock liquidity. According to the liquidity hypothesis, the reduced 
(increased) future trading costs should translate into a permanent increase (decrease) in 
stock price. 
In contrast, since investors are unlikely to predict the changes to the S&P/TSX 
SmallCap index, I examine the CAR over the period of [AD, ED+60]. This is consistent 
with other studies that examine Standard and Poor's series of indices. For example, 
Shankar and Miller (2006) examine CAR over the period of [AD, ED+60] for firms 
added to (deleted from) the S&P 600 index. Therefore, only the price reactions observed 
over the period between the announcement day and effective day reflect investors' 
expectation regarding the stocks that are added to (deleted from) the index. In my 
examination about my Canadian sample, the evidence seems to support the price pressure 
hypothesis. 
Suggestions for future research are twofold. First, future research may include 
obtaining and analyzing additional data. For example, using intraday bid-ask spread data 
for liquidity test. In this study, one of the liquidity proxies, relative spread, is calculated 
from the closing bid-ask spread, which may not be able to reflect the real bid-ask spread. 
Furthermore examining the change in number of analysts following the stocks could 
provide additional evidence on the amount of information available about the stocks. 
In addition, the current institutional ownership analysis could be extended by using 
additional data. For example, if the number of investors data is available, changes in 
"shadow cost", which provides direct test for the investor awareness hypothesis, could be 
calculated. Information on trade size around the event could provide evidence on 
institutional and small investors' trades around the event. 
Second, additional cross-sectional regression analysis could be conducted. For 
example, regressions where the dependent variable is abnormal trading volume, 
institutional ownership variables or liquidity proxies and independent variables include 
control variables and dummy variables for various types of index changes would be 
helpful. 
Lastly, future research should conduct institutional ownership and liquidity analyses 
for changes to the S&P/TSX Small Cap index. In this study, I only compare the price and 
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volume effects between the FTSE SmallCap and S&P/TSX SmallCap indices. It is 
interesting to see the results of a more comprehensive comparison between these two 
indices. 
Chapter 5 Summary and Conclusions 
A significant body of research documents that there is a positive price reaction 
associated with the announcement of index additions and vice versa. Different hypotheses 
are developed to explain this reaction. But the evidence is primarily from examining US 
indices and large cap indices. 
In an effort to disentangle the competing hypothesis, I investigate price, trading 
volume, institutional ownership, and liquidity reactions for firms added to or deleted from 
the FTSE SmallCap index. In addition, I also investigate price and trading volume 
reactions for firms added to or deleted from the S&P/TSX SmallCap index as a 
comparison. These two indices differ in this context. First, additions and deletions in the 
S&P/TSX SmallCap index occur irregularly, but additions and deletions in the FTSE 
Small Cap index are reviewed on quarterly basis on fixed dates. Second, the FTSE 
SmallCap index is reviewed primarily according to a ranking based on market 
capitalization, but the S&P/TSX SmallCap index uses a method that is much more 
complicated. Furthermore the construction of the FTSE UK indices allows me to study 
three different types of additions and deletions: pure additions and deletions, shifts 
between the FTSE 250 index and FTSE SmallCap index, and shifts between the FTSE 
Small Cap index and the FTSE Fledgling index. 
The examination of my UK sample shows that firms promoted to the FTSE SmallCap 
index (upward additions) and the FTSE 250 index (upward deletions) have positive 
cumulative returns prior to the announcement day and permanent increase in stock 
liquidity. In contrast, I find that firms demoted from the FTSE 250 index (downward 
additions) and the FTSE SmallCap index (downward deletions) have negative cumulative 
return prior to the announcement day and permanent decrease in stock liquidity. Similar 
to firms promoted from the FTSE Fledgling index, firms newly added to the FTSE 
Small Cap index (pure additions) have a positive cumulative return prior to the 
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announcement day. But, in contrast to the permanent abnormal return and improved 
liquidity found for firms promoted from the FTSE Fledgling index, the excess cumulative 
return for pure additions reverted completely over the post-event period and there are 
opposite changes in stock liquidity. My findings discussed above support the liquidity 
hypothesis. This indicates that the effect of index inclusion or deletions is permanent 
because of the future changes in stocks liquidity. 
The examination of my Canadian sample shows that new additions have positive 
returns and firms shifted to the S&P/TSX SmallCap index from other S&P/TSX indices 
have negative returns on the announcement day and the effective day, but the cumulative 
return over the period from the announcement day to the effective day are fully reverted 
in both cases. Similarly, I find negative returns on the announcement day and the 
effective day for firms deleted from all S&P/TSX family indices and positive returns for 
firms promoted to the larger cap S&P/TSX indices, but these returns are also completely 
reverted. In addition, the daily trading volumes in all four sub-groups in my Canadian 
sample are significantly higher than normal on the announcement day and the effective 
day. These results are similar to those reported by Biktimirov, Cowan, and Jordan (2004) 
for changes in the Russell 2000 index and Shankar and Miller (2006) for changes in S&P 
600 index. Consistent with the price pressure hypothesis, I fmd that firms added to or 
deleted from the S&P/TSX Small Cap index experience temporary effects on the price 
and trading volume. 
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Appendix: Significance Testing 
I use t-test, rank test, and sign test to test the significance. As a parametric test, the 
standard t-test is given by: 
where x is the sample average, s is the sample standard deviation of the sample, and 
n is the sample size. In my thesis, most of the time /10 is equal to zero as the null 
hypothesis is to test whether the difference is significant differ from zero. 
Brown and Warner (1980) extend the standard t-test with the Crude Dependence 
Adjustment. When employed with testing abnormal returns31 , the test statistic using a 
150-day estimation period is given by: 
The rank test, described in Corrado (1989), is a non-parametric test of significance of 
abnormal returns and trading volumes. Use abnormal as an example, it transforms each 
stock's time series of abnormal returns, ARj,t, into corresponding ranks: 
~,t = rank(ARj,t), t = -119, ... ,+30, 
where ARj,Tl ;;::: ARj ,T2 implies ~,Tl ;;::: ~,T2 and 150 ;;::: Kj,t ;;::: 1. For any day t, the 
test statistic is give by: 
31 This test statistic is also used when testing abnormal trading volumes. 
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Zrank,t = ~ (sc~j:(I~" -75.5)), 
J=1 
where the sample standard deviation is given by: 
+30 ( N )2 
SCK) = 1~Of,:9 ! ~(Kj" -75.5) , 
where N is the sample size. 
Another non-parametric test employed to test significance is the sign test, as known 
as binomial proportionality test. The sign test examines whether the proportion of 
positive abnormal reactions is larger than one-half. Since the sign test is insensitive to the 
magnitude, it can eliminate the impact of outliers in the sample. If the observed number 
of stock with positive (abnormal) reactions, N/, on any day t, the test statistic is given by: 
An extension of sign test is the generalized sign test. The generalized sign test 
examine whether the number of positive changes exceeds the number expected in the 
absence of abnormal performance. The test statistic is given by: 
N+-N A Z . = t P 
G-s!gn,t .J Npel - p) 
where N/ is the observed number of stock with positive (abnormal) reactions on any 
day t and p is the expected proportion of stock with positive (abnormal) reactions in the 
absence of abnormal performance. 
